EX POST PAPER
RAN H&SC – Grooming for terror – Manipulation and control
25 APRIL 2019
Bucharest, Romania

Grooming for terror – Manipulation and control

Following the RAN Issue Paper on 'Root causes of violent extremism', written by Magnus Ranstorp ([1]), violent extremism can be best conceptualised as a kaleidoscope of factors, creating infinite individual combinations. There are some basic primary colours that create complex interlocking combinations. One of these factors is the role that groomers play in putting people on the path of violent extremism. Groomers (also known as recruiters) involve hate preachers and those who prey on vulnerabilities and grievances to channel recruits into violent extremism through persuasion, pressure and manipulation. So far, the focus has mostly been on the victims of these groomers. However, the focus of this paper will be on the psychology of the groomer. Who are they, what drives them and which tactics do they use? This information can be invaluable in prevention efforts to recognise potential groomers prior to them starting the grooming process. Therefore, the primary goal is to further examine whether grooming behaviours can be recognised by health and social care workers, community leaders and educators, and, if so, which stages of the grooming process are most recognised as being indicative of future grooming actions. Based on the RAN Health & Social Care Working Group meeting on 24–25 April in Bucharest where this topic was discussed, this ex post paper will use these findings and describe what implications they has for health and social care workers in prevention and countering of violent extremism.

[1] Ranstorp, M., The root causes of violent extremism, RAN Issue Paper. Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016.

Product of the RAN Centre of Excellence and the RAN POL working group.
Authored by **Jordy Krasenberg** and **Lieke Wouterse**,
RAN Centre of Excellence.

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE GROOMERS?

Groomers are often labelled as persons with narcissistic tendencies or even psychopathic tendencies. Nonetheless, a mental health label will only help us to a certain extent. For most, it is easier to accept such behaviours from this label, but for extremist groups, we have found this to be more complicated. More likely, the majority of the groomers do not have any mental health disorder. It was argued that very **empathic people** are likewise capable of recruiting people for their cause, which in their eyes signifies the "greater good" or fulfils some personal need. The meeting found that no dominant groomer profile could be distinguished and therefore there is not one single reason for grooming, either. Nonetheless, at least two profiles have been distinguished, with different drives to do what they do, which provides some useful insights into the groomers.

1. Pathological profiles

By looking at grooming in an enclosed prison environment, it was observed that a significant proportion of "prison groomers" was diagnosed with a mental health disorder. What drives many of them may not be ideologically based, but serves as a way of channelling their mental health disorder. For example, a **perverted narcissist** finds pleasure in annoying others. Many **psychopathic and narcissistic individuals** have a need to create chaos and enjoy confrontation. It satisfies their infinite hunger for stimulation. Thus, grooming is a behaviour that is natural for some personality-disordered individuals. Therefore, even a psychopathic individual with limited intellect (e.g. low average/borderline IQ) can easily demonstrate this behavioural pattern and pull a victim into their **grooming cycle**. People with certain pathological profiles might be of use to an extremist organisation, although most would consider this a risk factor for the organisation. Noteworthy in this regard is that groomers with this profile are predominantly **driven by self-serving motives** that fulfil their own needs, which is what separates them from groomers with the utopian profile. They don't have a bigger purpose in their mind than their own needs for chaos, control over the other and power. They most likely are **ambiguous towards the cause**.

2. The utopian

Most would agree that the groomers they've witnessed are **ordinary persons with unusual beliefs**. Their main motivation is driven by an idea of paradise, or a utopian world. This idea gives them **purpose in life** and is quite often driven by a **sense of heroism** or an opportunity for adventure. In multiple case studies, we've witnessed how this helps them find a meaning in life and a purpose to work towards and provides them with status in a group. At the core, many of the rewards internally are self-serving. Every person groomed provides the groomer with a sense of achievement and pride, helping to bring the cause one step closer to its goal and making them a key figure in achieving this goal. There is considerable pleasure to be found in being a role-model for others, while there might also be fear of loved ones being hurt by the group. Other motives are about belonging, so it can be about bonding, creating friendships, having more sexual appeal to the opposite gender and providing mutual support. Noteworthy here is that the process of grooming is more of an unconscious act than intentional manipulation. Victims of groomers have in most cases themselves become groomers, **repeating a cycle of grooming**. Lastly, some traits of a pathological direction might found be here with the utopian group, but this is less clear. Also, for most groomers, **recruiting and grooming are considered a (ideological) duty** to expand their beliefs and to achieve the ultimate goal. The necessity is considered so strong, that they need to grow or to die as an organisation. Often, they act as part of a small group as a brotherhood/sisterhood. For bigger and more professional organisations, we can witness more purposeful actions.

Age and gender of the groomers

From the cases presented, male groomers were on average 36 years old in the prison environment, compared to most jihadists who were 26 years of age on average. Overall, both inside and outside of prison, young groomers are probably less successful as they lack authority and the life experience to have appeal to vulnerable young men in search for meaning. It was notable that many of the young men who had lost their fathers were looking for a substitute father figure or an older brother and were more easily manipulated by the older groomers to do their bidding. This contributes to their grooming success, because **a successful groomer has a life story with grievances and solutions to build on**, besides the talent for manipulation. When it comes to gender, it should be noted that there are some similarities and differences. For example, marriage and (sexual) attraction are used by both men and women to achieve their purpose. However, as women tend to be perceived as being more empathetical, successful female groomers can use that to their advantage. To truly grasp the **role of gender in grooming,** more research needs to be done.

Differences between recruiting and grooming

The term grooming is commonly used for (online) child sexual abuse or gangs, but the term has not been used that much when it comes to radicalisation and grooming someone for terror. When it comes to radicalisation, the term recruitment is most often used. Recruitment refers to the operational, structural and rational process of convincing someone to become a part of one's organisation, to enrol them in the organisation and make use of them for the benefit of the organisation. Recruiting is a process that not only takes place for extremist causes but is very common for businesses too. A recruiting strategy is a formal plan of action involving an organisation's attempts to successfully identify and recruit high-quality candidates for the purpose of filling a particular position within the organisation. **Extremist organisations usually have strategies in place to recruit new targets**. When it comes to violent extremism and terrorism, recruitment refers to an active process of mobilising supporters to become involved in terrorist activities. It is this phase that moves beyond passive support, such as providing information; to creating a wellspring of shared identification; to active grooming ([2]). For instance, manuals can be downloaded online on how to make bombs, poison food, avoid surveillance, develop clandestine terror cells and institute terror attacks. Extremist groups have been working in their strategic communications to attract the attention of people who may be willing to support their ideology. Approaches to recruitment play a vital role in sustaining the numbers of recruits for combat (foreign terrorist fighters, lone-actor terrorism, etc.) and many other kinds of supporters who are an essential part of the overall strategy.

It is important to keep in mind that the recruitment campaign is not reserved only for those who choose to fight (e.g. jihadi's going to Syria). The campaign targets many other audiences, including those who stay in their own countries and support the extremist organisation by executing a great many tasks necessary for the operation of the organisation. Therefore, to understand the communication strategy of the terrorists, we must first understand the different strategies for recruiting people with particular skill sets, how they want to be supported and what motivates possible recruits. In any case, we can distinguish between two possible targets for recruitment:

1. People with **combat attitude**. Often those with a criminal past or other traits who might serve the purpose of committing violence.

2. People with **command attitude**. This is considered the most precious attitude in recruiting militants or finding other potential groomers. It is characteristic of natural leaders in gangs, cults and terrorist groups. This subject will be granted a special status, and will climb the organisational ladder much quicker.

Terrorist organisations like Daesh have been known to be reaching out much more broadly for potential recruits. Their recruitment strategies online have been specifically aimed at people with specific mental health disorders (like autism spectrum disorder ([3]) with the aim of stimulating them to commit lone terrorist attacks. On a more personal level, so the groomer level, this would be less likely. **A person's mental health disorder would be considered too much of a liability and thus a risk**.

Like recruiting, grooming is a process in which someone is convinced (often through manipulation) to join an organisation. In contrast to recruiting, **grooming involves a strong emotional aspect as well**. Former groomers highlighted the characteristics of leadership skills as highly valuable, possibly the most valuable. **Charismatic leadership is more important** than the most commonly reported sociological factors associated with grooming. When the organisation has a network of groomers, it can happen that a certain groomer is not best placed to recruit a certain target. In that case, a different groomer might approach the target to increase their chances of successfully grooming them.

Groomers create a strong emotional bond with their victim, making them dependent on the groomer. Hence, they are quite often described as your friendly neighbour. They **abuse the control or power** they have over their victim for their own benefits, for a self-serving interest. Even though the term grooming has not been used often in combination with radicalisation, the process of grooming for terror has many similarities when it comes to the strategies and tactics used in grooming for gangs, cults, human trafficking and (child) sexual abuse.

The recognisable steps of a grooming strategy for terror

At an organisational level, there is a recruitment strategy. On a personal grooming level, it may be near impossible to precisely pinpoint where the grooming process begins and ends or the fluidity of the behaviours throughout the process. However, one can distinguish some universal grooming strategies. These tactics or

[2] Lennings, C. J., Amon, K. L., Brummert, H., & Lennings, N. J. (2010). Grooming for terror: The internet and young people. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 17(3), 424–437. doi:10.1080/13218710903566979
[3] e.g. A high-functioning autistic person can prove to be useful due to their particular behavioural traits (fixation, systematic, linear, etc.).

modus operandi are not so different from adjacent fields such as child sexual abuse or human trafficking ([4]). Indeed, the process of grooming appears to be quite universal. Without taking into account the online dimension (as this would require another paper), the process can be described in recognisable steps.

Scanning the external environment

- Quick scan of situation;
- Be aware of persons in a leadership position; they might cause trouble for the groomer;
- Get invited, get introduced;
- Find a common base with the target group (youth club or mosque visitors).



	Focus on	Leave
Search for potential victims *Victim selection is an incredibly strategic, well-planned process that marks the first step in the grooming process.*	• Person at a breaking point in life or with perceived psychological vulnerabilities (such as low self-esteem, low confidence, social naivety or isolated); • Person looking for deepening knowledge of ideology; • Person with leadership skills or fighting skills depending on purpose of grooming.	• Person with mental health problems or clear disorders; • Person who is too critical or showing strong resilience; • Person with solid knowledge of ideology.

Approaching potential victims

A recruiter's objective is to approach the candidate through **daily routines** such as happening to be at the same place, pretending to have the same hobbies or going to the same mosque to pray. They try to get introduced via someone he/she trusts or someone from the community.

The recruiter is advised to engage in conversation, **find common points of interest** (religion, personal issues, politics) and find out about the personality of the candidate. The overall aim is to get his or her **trust** before initiating the next step in the grooming process.

Pitching ideology

Since religion and/or ideology play a tremendous role during this stage, recruiters are recommended to:

- not point out the differences in basic ideology;
- point out dangers of other groups;
- create doubts about other branches of ideology or in general other belief systems;
- point out the "scholars or influencers" as the only reliable source;
- give out material (leaflets, books).

The length of this phase depends on the personality of the victim, the manipulative skills of the groomer and external factors, and concludes by sharing contact details.

[4] Winters, G. M., & Jeglic, E. L. (2017). Stages of sexual grooming: Recognizing potentially predatory behaviors of child molesters. Deviant Behavior, 38(6), 724–733. doi:10.1080/01639625.2016.1197656

Seducing for first participation	• The indoctrination process gets more serious and personal. The groomer tries to build a communication strategy by finding **easy ways to keep in touch** (Facebook, WhatsApp, etc.). • The groomer uses **manipulation tactics** to convince the victim (e.g. love-bombing). For example, they get invited to lectures, conferences (e.g. dawrah), dinners, etc. The aim is to create an **emotional bond (friendship)**, which will in turn make it easier for the victim to be manipulated by the groomer. The groomer will aim to make the victim feel on top of the world, important, unmissable. • The groomer aims to **isolate the victim** from their former life, to cut all connections that may disturb the process (friends and family members who may negatively influence the recruitment process). This stage marks a dramatic change in the life of the victim, creating a vacuum where the opinions of friends and advisors become unpleasant or contradictory to newly held beliefs, leading the recruit to seek more guidance from their new-found terrorist friends (confirmation bias). These micro-communities of like-minded people deepen devotion to the ideology and group and reinforce convictions. • The groomer constantly pays attention to **the intrinsic motivation of the victim**. What is the main reason (psychological, emotional) for him/her to join the group (meaning-making)?
Encourage permanent participation	• **Indoctrination activities** involve individual participation in small groups that encourages candidates to recognise their own potential for upcoming engagements (e.g. participation in propaganda activities, study with radical figure and self-proclaimed expert on ideology). This is also a form of **testing** commitment to the group. • Indoctrination is complete when a candidate has accepted the radical ideology, **understands their place in the strategy** and is ready for active engagement. • At this stage **candidates are evaluated** to decide if they are ready for the specific role the group requires of them. This might include themselves becoming groomers. • The **final stage is taking action**, either violent or non-violent. The deep personal commitment of a candidate also drives them to be consistent with their promises and their actions (e.g. Lucifer Effect); such commitment makes their decision easier by reducing the amount of things they have to think about ([5]).

Grooming tactics

Recruiting often requires a relationship approach that we here call grooming. Although **enticed by the message, potential recruits are controlled by a method**. This often requires an investment of time, sometimes building a relationship with potential victims over the course of years.

(a) **Love-bombing.** The first step of the love-bombing technique involves the groomer showering the prospective recruit with a sense of affection, respect and total approval for them to have the belief that society's laws and structures have disappointed and caused them to feel alienated. This sense of approval and respect for self-integrity causes the prospective members to have a desire to be a part of the recruiter's group. Some examples include providing transport to the venue or paying for meals and drinks or sending sweet messages all the time. Building trust is what they aim for.

(b) **Information isolation**. Trying to restrict access to media and discounting "outside" information (fake news, conspiracy). Furthermore, the groomer will provide the potential recruit with their own media channels, magazines and books.

(c) **Social isolation.** The recruiter wants to eliminate all other people who could have a potential influence on the potential recruit (e.g. primary caregivers, family and friends). This is done by either winning them over or demonising them (e.g. calling families'/friends' behaviour haram or a sin or by more sophisticated "innocent" questions about the relative that are really critique). Relatives and friends are themselves often not very helpful in this process by acting very aggressively.

(d) **Initiate control.** Fairly early in the process the recruiter also starts controlling the subject by making them do simple tasks and also begins controlling their physical world (e.g. diet control). This is like the foot-in-the-door-technique. The actual tasks are also usually part of the process because they serve the purposes of the

([5]) See the following document by NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (2016) for more information on Daesh recruitment strategies: 'Daesh recruitment: How the group attracts supporters'.

group and gradually groom the person in the way of thinking in the group. The need for acceptance grows to the extent that the recruit can slowly agree to bigger tasks.

One important thing to understand here is what is called the **Lucifer Effect**. The transformation of human character is what psychologist Philip Zimbardo calls 'the Lucifer Effect' ([6]). His experiments show that people adjust to the situations they face and can be encouraged to do more, step by step. Extremist organisations make use of this "commitment and consistency" technique, consciously manipulating the unwritten psychological rule that people generally do not like to back out of deals they have made.

They know that their supporters are more likely to act as the organisation wants them to after they have agreed to do something for the cause. It is in our nature to strive for consistency in our commitments, and to behave in line with pre-existing attitudes, values and previous actions. Even a recruit who is not ready to behave as the organisation or person requires will, most likely, over time, change their perception and become engaged in terrorist activities. Extremist organisations encourage those who are not ready to participate directly in a suicide mission or a terrorism campaign to support the organisation in a way suited to their current capabilities. However, it is only a matter of time before greater commitment will be required ([7]).

The **positive attention and praise gradually disappear and are replaced increasingly by punishment**, often randomly distributed in order to create insecurity. What happens when the recruiter suddenly takes away the positive attention and reinforcement from something that earlier gave that reward is that the other person will be occupied with trying to figure out what they did wrong and they will frantically try to get the positive things back. The **punishment doesn't necessarily have to be physical**; it could be the threat of losing contact with the group or other social mechanisms. One common tactic used here is **gaslighting**, in which an individual seeks to sow seeds of doubt in a targeted individual or in members of a targeted group, making them question their own memory, perception and sanity.

(e) **Deindividuation tactics** aim to encourage loss of individuality, loosening of restraints against unusual behaviour, and lowered self- and increased group consciousness. Tactics include member **"rebirth" (revert)**, with the current self-considered flawed and worthy of abandonment, stimulating insecurities. Examples of this include changing members' names, wearing common clothing or uniforms, and ritualised group activities promoting group consciousness. Daily life is group-focused and individual autonomy is further subsumed.

We now have a person isolated from the world and deeply invested in the organisation. Leaving at this stage has a very high price. The person at this stage usually has committed themself by taking part in different activities that are frowned upon by the society outside the group, which also makes it much harder to leave. The more violent and criminal acts someone has committed, the more invested they are, which is also part of the whole setup.

Implications for social work

One of the first things to do is **recognise grooming as abuse**. From a previous RAN YF&C–H&SC joint meeting ([8]), we learned about the challenges involved.

• The **difficulty of detecting** those who are at risk of radicalisation; especially in the early stages of radicalisation because indications (isolating behaviour, frustrations) are similar to those associated with other problems, such as addiction.

• Being able to **come into contact** with them and support them and their families in a change of direction: families and social surroundings play a key role in this process.

• **Supporting both the individual and their family during the disengagement process**. Cooperation is key to be effective, but not always easy to obtain. Also, the relationship between the individual and their social environment is not always positive, which might have driven them into the hands of groomers in the first place.

Sometimes it's good to intervene when somebody is grooming instead of waiting for the groomer to commit an identifiable crime. Much of this can be learned from adjacent fields, like (child) sexual grooming ([9]). In a

---

[6] Zimbardo, P. (2007). The Lucifer effect: Understanding how good people turn evil. New York, NY: Random House.
[7] NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. (2016). *Daesh recruitment: How the group attracts supporters*. Riga, Latvia: NATO StratCom CoE.
[8] Molenkamp, M., Kroft, F., & Verdegaal, M., Working with families and safeguarding children from radicalisation. Step-by-step guidance paper for practitioners and policy-makers, Ex Post Paper. Nice, France: RAN Centre of Excellence, 2–3 February 2017.
[9] Winters, G. M., & Jeglic, E. L. (2017). Stages of sexual grooming: Recognizing potentially predatory behaviors of child molesters. *Deviant Behavior, 38*(6), 724–733. doi:10.1080/01639625.2016.1197656

grooming process, there is always a point where changing behaviour could alert health and social care workers, or community leaders and teachers.

Building resilience in the community

The development of an emotional bond between the groomer and the victim plays a key role in the dynamics of grooming and should be a priority in the interventions. For this reason, preventive interventions should educate adolescents by warning about these strategies and their potential influence on the victims. **Nobody likes to be manipulated!** Through awareness, communities could neutralise the impact of grooming tactics and avoid developing an emotional bond with the groomer. Moreover, warnings about the use of grooming tactics and manipulative techniques could in turn reduce their effectiveness and consequently enhance the probability of the potential victims interpreting such behaviours as manipulative. Thus, better educating children, parents and community members about possible grooming behaviours could be greatly beneficial. See example to the right of an informative pamphlet ([10]).

Awareness amongst professionals

Professionals are not always able to identify potential grooming behaviours that someone from an extremist group may employ. It may be that people are not able to identify the groomer because they are not aware of what grooming is or what classifies as a grooming behaviour. Education could be provided to adults in the community through a variety of domains, such as **pamphlets** at locations frequented by caregivers, providing information to teachers and school staff, public service announcements, or websites geared towards families, social workers, healthcare services or education providers.

Prevent the burning of bridges

As mentioned above, one crucial aspect of grooming includes the isolation of the potential victim and consequently creating a sense of belonging with the new group and no place to go back to. It was determined that **one of the most crucial aspects of preventing people from being groomed is for the potential victim or recruit to maintain previous social networks**. The **social worker is a bridge** to the non-extremist world. If social workers can reach families or friends at the attempted isolation stage, they could actually counteract the influence from the extremist movement. As a social worker, you need to empower and encourage family and friends to keep talking to the potential victim of grooming, or to start doing so. If that is not possible, social workers need to step in. In particular, those in frequent contact with young adults and children (e.g. school officials, social care workers, guidance counsellors) should remain cognisant that potential groomers may be targeting young individuals and pay particular attention to the more vulnerable individuals. Providing people with a better understanding of the grooming process and who the offenders are could aid in identifying these types of perpetrators prior to the act.

Redirect the life path — be a lifeboat

For people in prevention, it is important to make clear to vulnerable individuals the discrepancies between **what's being sold (way of life and ideology) and what is behind it**. It is important to give hope and perspective and give them another path in life by using the local networks in place and redirecting them there.

Two useful methods of redirecting someone's life path are:

1. **Motivational interviewing.** A quick and effective client-centred technique that allows clients to set their own goals and make their own choices by helping them identify what is personally meaningful in their own lives ([11]).

[10] See: *The Grooming Process and Warning Signs*.
[11] See: *Motivational Interviewing in therapy*.

2. **Empowerment conversation**. Used by the police in Norway, this technique is vital to create an arena for frank expression of all parties involved; gaining an overview of the situation can help parties arrive at a common understanding of the problem. Only then can we start working towards positive change. This method is available in the RAN Collection ([12]).

Business as usual?

Despite chances for intervention, social and healthcare providers can easily fail to identify victimised people. With increased knowledge from adjacent fields like cults, gangs, sexual grooming, human trafficking, and new screening tools and intervention strategies, professionals can begin to ask the right questions and help their clients avoid further exploitation and abuse. Working on the prevention of violent extremism is similar to regular and more common issues that health and social care workers have to deal with. The groomers' modus operandi, which has been described throughout the document, would generally speaking be nothing new to most social workers. That is, if we assume the social worker has been educated in, for example, the prevention of (child) sexual grooming. If this is not the case, **social workers need to be educated on how the grooming process works** and which phase the victim is in. Depending on what grooming phase the person is in, the social worker will have to take a different approach.

Disengagement of the groomer

Although not the main focus of the meeting, we will focus shortly in this section on the disengagement of successful groomers as compared to the more inept groomers with possibly another position in an organisation. This difference matters, as the successful groomer is the face and, in some cases, the "guru" of the organisation and the main driving force behind success in grooming activities. Taking this person out of the group would mean a crucial blow to the organisation as a whole; even more so if the person decides to leave on their own accord or by self-defeating actions. These leaders are fallible, as was demonstrated in the demise of many cults and several neo-Nazi groups. By **sowing a seed of doubt amongst their followers**, the organisation could be disbanded and disengagement work or deradicalisation was made possible. Nonetheless, organising disengagement of the successful groomer is possibly more complicated. It means taking someone out of a group in which that person has developed an influential position. As mentioned in the recent RAN EXIT paper on 'Setting up an exit intervention' ([13]), disengagement work is not an isolated activity. Social services, the police, media, local authorities, the secret service and family members are only some of the actors who play a role during an intervention. Sharing information and collaborating with these actors is an important part and is key in achieving this. Finding out who is best equipped to take out the groomer is dependent on their profile, position, and whether or not this attempt might be very dangerous.

To get them out, different professionals need to find out the best way to "**groom the groomer**", by using some of the grooming techniques described in this paper yourself. This means a person-orientated approach is needed. In some cases, this might involve **redirecting the self-serving motivations (status, power, control)** by giving them a similar position and sense of importance somewhere else. Finding out the function behind the behaviour is crucial in finding a new direction and therefore offering them a way out. For others, it means **taking away the fuel** by addressing the fact that they themselves have been manipulated by the group or a groomer to do their bidding. Knowing that you're being groomed is the best resilience. Again, nobody likes to be manipulated.

Lastly, another approach should consider **discrediting the leaders** of these groups. By targeting the successful groomers, professionals might be able to wipe out the group as the disillusioned members of the group will be more open to finding a way out. Police and intelligence could play a crucial role in this and tactics that have been

[12] See: A guide to police empowerment conversations (in Norwegian: Bekymringssamtale).
[13] RAN EXIT, Setting up an exit intervention, Ex Post Paper. Berlin, Germany: Radicalisation Awareness Network, 13–14 February 2017.

used against criminal gangs to discredit their leaders have the potential to work here. For example, a police officer having regular conversations with a groomer will do damage to their credit. In some cases, dark secrets of abuse by a groomer or leader were brought to the attention of the group, which effectively discredited them and resulted in them being ousted and much of the organisation being disbanded. In the end, **it's about taking away the magic** around the person or the group that opens up a door to a different path.

Suggested further reading

Almendros, C., Gámez-Guadix, M., Carrobles, J. A., & Rodríguez-Carballeira, A. (2011). Abuso psicológico en grupos manipuladores [Psychological abuse in manipulative groups]. Behavioral Psychology / Psicología Conductual: Revista Internacional Clínica y de la Salud, 19(1), 157–182.

Dubrow-Marshall, R., van de Donk, M., & Haanstra, W., Lessons from adjacent fields: Cults, Ex Post Paper. Bordeaux, France: RAN EXIT, 27–28 June 2017.

Gámez-Guadix, M., Almendros, C., Calvete, E., & de Santisteban, P. (2017). Persuasion strategies and sexual solicitations and interactions in online sexual grooming of adolescents: Modeling direct and indirect pathways. Journal of Adolescence, 63, 11–18. doi:10.1016/j.adolescence.2017

Järvå, H., Adjacent fields: Gangs, Ex Post Paper. Prague, Czech Republic: RAN Centre of Excellence, 11–12 September 2018.

Molenkamp, M., Kroft, F., & Verdegaal, M., Working with families and safeguarding children from radicalisation. Step-by-step guidance paper for practitioners and policy-makers, Ex Post Paper. Nice, France: RAN Centre of Excellence, 2–3 February 2017.

RAN CoE, RAN C&N Workshop on jihadist propaganda and how to respond, Ex Post Paper. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: RAN Centre of Excellence, 3–4 October 2016.

Ranstorp, M., The root causes of violent extremism, RAN Issue Paper. Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016.

Rodríguez-Carballeira, A., Porrúa-García, C., Escartín, J., Martín-Peña, J., & Almendros, C. (2014). Taxonomy and hierarchy of psychological abuse strategies in intimate partner relationships. Anales de Psicología / Annals of Psychology, 30(3), 916–926.

Verdegaal, M., The role of gender in extremism and P/CVE, Ex Post Paper. Manchester, United Kingdom: Radicalisation Awareness Network, 29–30 November 2018.

Winters, G. M., & Jeglic, E. L. (2017). Stages of sexual grooming: Recognizing potentially predatory behaviors of child molesters. Deviant Behavior, 38(6), 724–733. doi:10.1080/01639625.2016.1197656

Zeuthen, M., & Sahgal, G., Gender and violent extremism. RUSI conference paper. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies.