

# RAN EX POST PAPER

## Developing, implementing and using risk assessment for violent extremist and terrorist offenders

### Introduction

Across the EU, there is a call for more specialised risk assessment tools to assess the risk of radicalisation, extremism and/or terrorism in the offender population. Several such tools have been developed and are in use at the time of writing, for example, the Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG 22+) and the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment 2 Revised (VERA-2R). More specialised tools are being developed across the EU, either in national contexts or in EU project contexts.

The RAN Prison and Probation (P&P) working group meeting on 9 and 10 July in Brussels focused on the organisational aspect of specialised risk assessment tools: decision-making to ascertain whether a specialised tool is necessary and determine the purpose of the tool; shaping the implementation process; the importance of selecting and training suitable assessors (i.e. professionals using the risk assessment tool); and considerations particular to the prison and probation context and the offender population.

This ex post paper contains guidelines for prison and probation professionals involved in the development, use and/or implementation of specialised risk assessment tools.

This ex post paper is based on contributions made by participants at the RAN P&P meeting on risk assessment implementation in Brussels on 9 and 10 July. The paper is authored by **Simon Cornwall**, Counter-Terrorism Consultant, and **Merel Molenkamp** of the RAN Centre of Excellence. Views expressed in this paper do not reflect the official views of the European Commission or Member States.

## What is risk assessment?

'The purpose of risk assessment is to point to future crime and manage offender risk throughout the course of the criminal justice process. Risk assessment is the process whereby offenders are assessed on several key variables empirically known to increase the likelihood of committing an offense' <sup>(1)</sup>.

Penology employs two main risk models. The first model is used to detect, prevent and punish crime, and to minimise risk through rehabilitation. The second, updated risk model, based on actuarial justice, predicts outcomes by using risk profiles (rather than the concept of individual risk). Actuarial justice 'is primarily interested in estimating and preventing the occurrence of forthcoming behaviours rather than with sanctioning them or understanding and addressing their past causes' <sup>(2)</sup>.

This move towards more scientific assessments calls for qualified individuals to carry them out. Although an assessment may be used for several purposes, it must be designed with specific outcomes in mind, e.g. prisoner categorisation, support of pretrial work or sentencing, rehabilitation or determining risk. Target groups might include specific cohorts of offenders such as convicted terrorists, or those with particular issues such as mental health disorders.

---

<sup>(1)</sup> See online (<https://www.insideprison.com/risk-assessment.asp>).

## Risk assessment and risk screening

Risk assessment in this paper refers to specialised, individualised, comprehensive assessment of the risk of radicalisation, extremism and/or terrorism.

By contrast, risk screening, often performed through a less comprehensive tool, focuses mainly on behaviour that might indicate radicalisation/involvement with extremist or terrorist ideology — but without necessarily analysing its extent, driving factors or likelihood to result in criminal behaviour. Screening is focused on collecting information on a more basic level to determine individuals' suitability for specific assessment. In addition, it can help ascertain whether increased monitoring is necessary.

The use of screening tools can help save time and resources. Those working with specific screening tools for radicalisation, extremism and/or terrorism must be trained to use these tools and record their observations.

## Objectives of specialised risk assessment for radicalised offenders

When selecting and designing a specialist risk assessment tool for (violent) extremism and/or radicalisation, the first step is to determine the objective and purpose of such a tool within your prison or probation system. What is it you want to learn from and/or achieve with such a tool?

<sup>(2)</sup> Robert, D. (2004). Actuarial Justice. In M. Bosworth (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Prisons and Correctional Facilities* (pp. 12). Thousand Oaks, California, USA: Sage Publications, Inc.

Risk assessment tools can be designed for use with different and multiple objectives, as explained below.

**As an organisational tool.** Used to arrange and organise the different sources of information, so as to gain a quicker and clearer understanding of offender-related issues and risks. Case files can sometimes run into thousands of pages, and the risk assessment document will highlight the key points of the case in terms of extremism/radicalisation.

**As a decision-making tool.** Here, it forms part of the decision-making process, for instance about placement of prisoners in a particular prison or regime. It may be used to assess the risk of further criminal activity from individuals or the security risk they pose physically, mentally or otherwise. This will help match prisoners to different correction systems within each prison, directing resources to those most in need. It also helps to ensure prisons are safe environments, able to address the needs of their populations.

**As a rehabilitation tool.** It can inform plans to help rehabilitate individuals and explore resources. These include specific assessment tools such as violence predictors, sexual offence protocols and extremism assessment tools. The tool can help to identify offending-related needs and explore interventions, treatment and programmes to minimise these, in the form of either general offending programmes or specific treatments or interventions.

**As a reviewing tool.** It can be used to evaluate and assess individuals during their detention, and to update their profile accordingly. This ensures interventions are on track and individuals are progressing through their sentences as expected.

**As a multi-agency cooperation tool.** To the extent that the risk profile can be shared with other agencies, it serves to inform them about the case and the actions taken for security and rehabilitation. For example, if information-sharing with colleagues in the criminal justice system is possible during a trial, the tool can help provide sentencing options and build dialogue at an early stage. It supports the creation of a common language around offenders.

## Developing specialised risk assessment tools

Clearly identifying the type of risk under assessment is critical when developing a risk assessment tool. In the case of the extremist target group, it should be clear whether the risk assessment tool is focused on vulnerabilities, or intent or capability to undertake a criminal act.

In addition, the purpose of the tool (i.e. having different objectives, as mentioned above) should be clear from the outset, before it is created. When developing a specialised risk assessment, the following two options exist.

1. Design a new specialised risk assessment tool based on the specific context it is to be used in, drawing from available knowledge and research (this is being undertaken in Spain, for instance, and is also how the ERG 22+ was designed in the United Kingdom).
2. Use an existing tool (examples of such tools are provided below) by modifying it to suit the specific context (VERA-2R, for instance, has been adopted by several EU countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland).

## What can existing tools teach us?

Three tools were analysed in depth: the Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP) tool set, VERA-2R and ERG 22+ <sup>(3)</sup>.

### **Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP)**

The first of the three, the **R2PRIS RRAP tool set**, was developed under the European Commission project 'Radicalisation prevention in prisons' (R2PRIS) and built as the result of concerted transnational cooperation between academia, private sector research, correctional sector representatives and practitioners. Following a multi-level radicalisation prevention approach comprising three risk assessment tools, it targets all types of extremism. The tools apply the Structured Professional Judgement approach, i.e.:

- the professional is systematically guided;
- the professional must decide on the presence or absence of risk factors;
- the risk level is judged by a decision-maker, using different categories of risk/needs for intervention.

Readers should bear in mind that this assessment focuses on signalling risk and vulnerability in the general population rather than in charged or convicted terrorist offenders.

The first RRAP tool is a '**HV Helicopter View (Prison/Prison Administration level)**', an organisational risk assessment tool that aims to raise awareness and support prison governors/prison system administrators to reflect and assess situational dimensions in preventing radicalisation - factors related to prison/prison

service and those present among inmates – and to identify the strategies and action plans that need to be implemented. This tool is to be used in a facilitated session by prison system administrators, prison governors and their management teams to assess radicalisation situational risk factors.

The second tool, the **FBOG Frontline Behavioural Observation Guidelines (Frontline level)** is an instrument developed to raise awareness about radicalisation in prisons and to support frontline staff (i.e.: prison officers, educators, teachers, social workers, etc.) in signalling behaviours/changes in behaviours that can represent the externalisation of cognitive radicalisation in inmates (focusing on inmates' physical appearance; decoration of cells and the objects in their possession; daily routines; ways of relating to other inmates, prison staff, relatives and others; and speech). This tool was developed to be used by trainers and prison service facilitators in workshops or training sessions with frontline staff in which participants – using a predefined model - are asked to develop "their own" behavioural observation guidelines.

The third RRAP tool, **Individual Radicalisation Screening**, is for technical staff, mainly psychologists or staff undergoing training to use psychological assessments and aims to assess inmates risk of radicalisation, from individual vulnerabilities that can be present at the pre-radicalisation stage to the more extreme involvement (militancy) with radical groups.

---

<sup>(3)</sup> Information on the tools is based on presentations made during the meeting.

The **IRS Individual Radicalisation Screening** follows a structured professional judgement (SPJ) approach. Therefore, it is key to understand that it represents a structured way to assess individual, inter-individual/group and organisational factors that may contribute to the radicalisation of inmates. Moreover, this instrument needs to be considered in confluence with other existing data on dimensions (e.g., personal factors related to the inmate's history, behaviours and vulnerabilities) that can be relevant to radicalisation. Filling the instrument and answering to its items is an iterative process that may require interviewing the inmate, collecting and analysing observation reports, interaction with other professionals (e.g., frontline staff), and the check of available information (from other assessment tools from the psychiatric and psychological domains, to the prison records available that provide behavioural information about the inmate being assessed). Questions focus on 39 items in 9 dimensions (emotional uncertainty, self-esteem, radicalism, distance and societal disconnection, need to belong, legitimisation of terrorism, perceived in-group superiority, identity fusion and identification, and activism). All answers must be supported by evidence. Each dimension is scored on a scale (from one to five) which is divided into three risk categories: low, moderate and high vulnerability. Analysis of the different dimensions gives indication whether inmates are likely to be experiencing certain stages of the radicalisation process<sup>(4)</sup>.

The use of the R2PRIS RRAP tools requires a training and certification process. The certification

process consists of an **online and classroom training** and follow-up coaching sessions after implementing the tools.

#### ***Violent Extremist Risk Assessment 2 Revised (VERA-2R)***

The development of this assessment tool was co-funded by the European Commission. The tool supports the professional judgement of assessors within the risk management process. Drawing from the current research and evidence base, it has been developed and reviewed to ensure it is abreast of ongoing research and trends. At the time of writing, VERA-2R appears to be the most widely used assessment tool in Europe; nearly half the workshop participants had used it.

VERA-2R focuses on all forms of (violent) extremism and operates across five domains: beliefs, attitudes and ideology; social context and intent; history, actions and capability; commitments and motivations; and protective indicators. Within these domains, 36 questions are posed. There is also an additional domain exploring 11 factors related to criminal history, personal history and mental disorders. The assessment is carried out by trained individuals who interview offenders. They aim to engage offenders in the process, while gathering information about how individuals ended up committing offences, and gauging their capacity for violence, physically or psychologically, to society or individuals.

The tool is only used to assess terrorist and violent extremist prisoners. In some circumstances, it is

---

<sup>(4)</sup> For additional information, see online (<http://www.r2pris.org>).

used to screen vulnerable prisoners, but the tool does not have a screening portion, nor is it designed specifically for screening .

Information gleaned under the assessment is used in interventions and programmes supporting rehabilitation of individuals. The tool is used to support the pre-trial process within the criminal justice system, and can be drawn on to support sentencing decisions <sup>(5)</sup>.

### ***Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG 22+)***

The increasing numbers of terrorists being convicted in England and Wales led the National Offender Management Service to develop the ERG 22+. It was used to inform risk management of individuals within the prison and probation system. Based on the limited literature available at the time, it was piloted and reviewed before being disseminated nationally. It is a structured process supporting professional judgement, and at the time of writing, is used only in England and Wales.

The ERG 22+ has three domains: engagement, capacity and capability. Within these 3 domains, 22 questions measure the dimensions of engagement within an extremist cause, consider how the individual will offend within that cause and assess their capability to cause psychological or physical harm. The tool examines the push and pull factors behind the offence and produces a full picture of why the individual committed the offence and how they were drawn into the ideology.

All individuals convicted of a terrorist offence will undergo assessment by ERG 22+, carried out by

trained professionals (psychologists, probation officers or prison officers), who engage offenders in the process through interviews and report writing. The assessment is still produced even if the individual does not engage in the process.

The ERG 22+ contains a screening tool, which allows for its use with vulnerable offenders not convicted of terrorist offences but considered to be at threat of being radicalised or drawn to extremist ideology. Through the screening tool, a shorter version of the ERG 22+ is provided, which determines whether a full assessment is required, thereby saving time and resources and targeting those most in need of assessment.

The tool also is used to obtain evidence of the need for intervention in aspects of individuals' lives and behaviour. It is not intended for court use and does not support sentencing or pre-trial action.

### **Risk assessment tools compared**

Three tools were presented during the meeting. They shared similar dimensions and factors, albeit with some nuanced differences.

The tools can be applied at various levels: management level, first-line professionals or specialised staff. In terms of population, the target group includes those vulnerable to radicalisation (but not charged with or convicted of terrorist-(related) crime), as well as those charged with or convicted of terrorist-(related) crime — or sometimes, both. Another difference lies in where/when the tools can be used: pre-

---

<sup>(5)</sup> For additional information, see online (<https://www.vera-2r.nl/>).

trial/during trial, or only after sentencing. A final distinction is whether tools contain a screening version.

## Implementation process

Effective implementation of risk assessment tools hinges on the degree of understanding, cooperation and coordination across the various stakeholders working with the tools. This includes those providing input (information) for the tool (intelligence services, police, prosecution, prison staff, etc.), those working with the tool (probation officers, psychologists, social workers, etc.) and those using the outcomes of the tool (probation officers, psychologists, social workers, prosecution, judges, lawyers, local authorities, etc.).

Therefore, ideally, decision-making on the use of a specialised risk assessment tool and its related processes should be discussed with all relevant stakeholders, before actually considering which particular tool to use. Decisions around use of the tool, and who 'owns' and which agency completes the assessment, as the individual passes through the criminal justice system, are key to helping all agencies understand the process and the need for information-sharing.

In the following step-by-step analysis, the prison initiates the implementation process — similar steps would be followed if initiated from a probation perspective.

**Step 1.** Consult with relevant stakeholders on the need and necessity of a specialised risk assessment tool for violent extremist offenders. The following considerations should be taken into account.

- The target population of the assessment, and the size of that population.
- The costs of developing, implementing and using the tool in the prison system — considering what is currently available and how to utilise this in support of the tool, rather than reinventing resources.
- Insight into which gaps/needs the specialised tool would address (e.g. being able to better address radicalisation in the rehabilitation process, or being able to better manage violent extremist offenders in terms of security).
- Clearly specifying the use of the tool: pretrial, in sentencing, for screening, for categorisation of prisoners, for interventions or programmes, etc.
- Use an evidence-based structured approach process, supported by current professional decision-making tools and evidence-based risk management.

The decision is taken by the designated prison authority to invest in a specialised risk assessment tool.

**Step 2.** Map current risk assessment tools in prison and from relevant stakeholders (e.g. police). The aim is to understand what they focus on, what kind of information they provide and how they are used during the criminal justice process.

**Step 3.** Research existing specialised risk assessment tools for extremism and radicalisation. Consider which tool best meets the needs set out in Step 1, or whether a new tool should be developed. Consider the mapped tools in Step 2 to ascertain which tool works best in conjunction with existing processes. Existing tools may differ in terms of target audiences and use (e.g. those for screening vs those for court processes). It may be

possible to use components from different tools, but you must ensure they are fully compatible once integrated and that they can be used across domains, for an outcome that harmonises with the assessment process as a whole.

**Step 4.** Share conclusions with relevant stakeholders (prioritising those due to work directly with the tool). Sharing outcomes and facilitating discussion on how the tool works in individual cases is critical. This builds confidence in users and broadens their understanding of the tool's use. Different assessors bring diverse skills to the table, and sharing these builds a more comprehensive knowledge base.

The decision is taken to use tool X as a specialised tool for extremism and radicalisation.

**Step 5.** The tool must be adapted to the national/local context (in terms of legislation, language, jargon, specific circumstances, etc.). All parties involved should understand what the tool is used for and also, importantly, what it is not used for. If the aim is to use it to signpost interventions and programmes, ensure they are available and the staff involved are aware of the assessment tool.

**Step 6.** Assign a pilot location for working with the specialised risk assessment tool. The pilot phase serves to support development of the working processes around the tool (since these processes are determined by the local/national legislation and criminal justice framework, questions posed below are of a general nature).

- When should it be used? (During pre-trial? After sentencing?)
- Who are the assessors? Ensure they remain in contact, as feedback for the pilot is crucial from them.

- What is the target group? (Sentenced terrorists, vulnerable offenders in the regular population?) Ensure the group is varied and diverse.
- How often should it be repeated? Annually? Following a change in the individuals' circumstances?
- How will it be documented? How will this information be used to inform the pilot as well as the tool and training materials?
- Who will have full/partial access to the risk assessment tool outcomes? Will certain sections of the assessment need to remain confidential? How will this confidentiality be ensured?
- How will offenders themselves be involved? How can you best involve them? What if they do not wish to be involved?
- Who needs to know about the tool? (Additional training may be required for prison management, local authorities, etc.). Some groups may need awareness-training, which may be delivered through emails, team meetings, visits, etc. as alternatives to formal training.

**Step 7.** Those involved in the pilot (i.e. carrying out or directly affected by the risk assessment) must be trained to use the tool. The training should instil confidence in the tool and the process. Assessors need to feel supported and secure in the knowledge that the tool is based on solid research, able to withstand challenges to its legality and authenticity.

**Step 8.** The risk assessment pilot begins and continues for a specified time period.

**Step 9.** Review of the pilot

- What benefits did the tool offer? Is it really needed? Did it have a positive impact? Do



users believe it has value and want to use it again?

- How can the working processes be improved? Can time be saved by cutting out unnecessarily repetitive processes?
- Have all relevant stakeholders been involved?
- Most crucially, written and verbal feedback should be provided from all involved. Small groups of users should openly and honestly critique the tool, offering their perspectives, both positive and negative.
- Produce a report and propose actions/make recommendations, consider how to implement changes to the tool, the training and the practice.

**Step 10.** Modify the tool and working processes, drawing from the experiences of the pilot phase. Prepare roll-out to other parts of the country/criminal justice system. For follow-up, there should be a plan for review and feedback, with quality assurance of assessments and a dedicated individual/team to support assessors and decision-makers.

## Qualified assessors

A key point to bear in mind is that it is the professionals making the final decision, not the risk assessment tool. The professionals using the risk assessment tool who build the risk profile are crucial to the effectiveness of the risk assessment.

Currently, a mix of practitioners, mainly probation officers and psychologists, are trained to carry out and develop assessments in prison and probation in the EU.

The following qualifications and experience should be considered when determining who can assess risk of extremism and radicalisation in offenders:

- experience of carrying out risk assessments;
- expertise on the topic of radicalisation;
- experience/familiarity with the target population;
- experience/familiarity with the prison context (if applied in prison);
- a psychological or mental health background, if the tool's elements/indicators call for such experience;
- having undergone training in use of the specific risk assessment tool.

To ensure the quality of risk assessment tools and their assessors, extra checks can be incorporated into the system. For instance, finalised risk assessments can be reviewed by other assessors (the outcomes should be similar). Also, experienced assessors may be assigned a role of continuously checking assessments of other professionals, to ensure the tools are being used correctly.

Research exploring the link between mental health and extremism/radicalisation has sparked debate as to whether assessors for specialised risk assessment tools should hold qualifications in psychology/psychiatry. In practice, many probation officers and social workers may be assessors. They often have much more contact with offenders, and therefore, more information to contribute to the risk assessment.

Since the outcomes of pretrial risk assessments are often used in court by defence lawyers, assessors also need to be trained to defend their decisions in court appearances.

## Biases and stereotyping

Assessments should be free of bias and stereotyping, and writers must avoid these throughout the process. Otherwise, their assessments will not be robust and able to withstand challenges, and they will appear unfair and unreliable.

Throughout the process of carrying out an assessment, writers must bear in mind the following points.

- Be balanced and impartial: ensure a fair picture is presented, with information sourced from both positive and negative locations.
- Use plain, easily understood language (avoid unexplained acronyms or jargon); understanding the language is very important for individuals being assessed.
- Use neutral terms.
- Take into account disability and difference, without making assumptions.
- Avoid characterisations of race, ethnicity, gender, age, etc., where possible, and do not stereotype.
- Be aware of the impact of the assessment/screening on individuals, their peers and others involved in their detention. Carrying out an 'extremist' assessment may result in individuals being labelled, regardless of the outcome, as might moving prisoners to particular units or wings to carry out specific assessments.

### Assessing risk in extremists with complex needs: autism spectrum disorder

Whilst there is no empirical evidence to indicate that people with autism are at increased risk of

committing terrorist acts, we must explore how autism can be assessed, and consider whether current assessments might not be picking up on risk and linking factors. Autism is a spectrum and we need to be very aware of prejudice and labelling within this context.

Autistic traits such as circumscribed interests, vivid fantasy, obsession and compulsion, and difficulty with social communication may significantly impact interviews, how individuals fit into assessment frameworks, and how individuals can engage in processes, programmes and interventions.

Many case studies highlight the need for a specific assessment that reflects a better understanding of drivers and supports positive outcomes for offenders. Current assessment tools may not recognise autistic traits, and diagnoses may easily be overlooked in interviews with certain types of autistic individuals.

Therefore, we need more training, a different assessment tool and a better understanding of the fact that assessments currently in use will not always afford good, safe outcomes for individuals and for society in general.

### Concluding recommendations

- In cases where extremist offenders have a diagnosis of autism, links between the two need to be considered by risk assessment, formulation and reduction approaches.
- In autistic terrorist offenders, different facets of autism can shape various risk factors and parts of the 'pathway' — each individual differs and formulation needs to be dynamic.
- Protective factors can be contextualised by autism.
- Formulations of risk and protective factors, as well as interviewing styles, need to be

informed by an understanding of the contextual role of autism <sup>(6)</sup>.

### Prison context vs community context

Compared to risk in the community, risk within prison can present a very different dynamic. Remaining keenly aware of each type of risk and its high and low points is critically important for a more constructive and less restrictive risk management plan. In prison, individuals may be vulnerable to other inmates and may find themselves at risk of radicalisation or grooming into a network. Once released, however, this risk may be mitigated by family members and the home environment; the assessment may consequently heighten differing risk factors. In the community, individuals may have access to propaganda not available in prison, so the risk will be different. Observing the variable nature of risk and how agency and environment impact on it are key for a robust risk management plan.

### Involving offenders in risk assessment

A major part of any assessment is carrying out an effective interview with offenders; you must extract as much from this interaction as possible. An assessment is only as good as the information it is based on and how well it is structured and written. It is important to engage prisoners in the process and have their voices heard. The interview is a good space in which to explore discrepancies when prisoners' versions conflict with information you have obtained elsewhere. Assessors must draw conclusions using all sources of information

provided. All decisions made during the assessment must be justifiable, defensible and based on current verified sources. Empathy, transparency and a non-judgmental stance from assessors may help prisoners build trust, gain confidence in the assessment process through incarceration, and encourage disclosure.

Disengaged prisoners will not provide accurate and current information. The assessment will lack depth and important aspects of the case may be omitted, leaving the assessment open to challenges from different sources. Moreover, if the assessment is then relied on for further work, interventions, programmes, etc., its recommendations for intervention may be wrong or ineffective, while crucial points may be overlooked.

In certain instances, it may not be appropriate or possible to share information with offenders (e.g. when this information must remain confidential as a matter of national security). It is vital that the assessment provide some means of including such information without sharing it as open source. Certain assessments, for instance, contain sections which cannot be disclosed without the author's permission. This prevents information that may adversely affect individuals or agencies from becoming public knowledge.

Offenders may not be truthful about their thoughts and actions. At the RAN P&P meeting, participants mentioned examples of groups of offenders synchronising their stories or mimicking 'commendable' prison behaviour. Such instances

---

<sup>(6)</sup> Information based on research carried out by Dr Zainab Al-Attar of the University of Central Lancashire.

may present difficulties for assessors. However, as multiple sources of information are used, and risk assessments should be repeated over time, offenders will find it hard to consistently uphold a fabricated version.

## Conclusions

Risk assessment has become a buzzword when dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context. This interest and attention is warranted, as these assessments are (or at least, should be) at the heart of decision-making processes around (violent) extremist and terrorist offenders. Apart from the legal process in which these offenders are involved, risk assessments can have an enormous impact upon daily life in prisons or in communities. They are also crucial for organising proper security and rehabilitative measures.

Specialised risk assessment tools for extremism are valuable, as they address elements that other risk assessments do not. The existing evidence base is not (yet) broad enough to scientifically validate these tools. Their use in a relatively small population, in some countries only and for a short time period limit research options.

The current trend of using more specialised tools and the unfortunate growing number of extremist and terrorist offenders are opening the path for investment in more research.

Implementing specialised risk assessment tools requires careful consideration. Using already developed tools as a starting point is cost-effective and ensures a higher level of quality at the start.

As is the case with interventions focused on preventing or dealing with radicalisation, the

effectiveness of risk assessment ultimately depends on the calibre of the professionals applying the tools. Therefore, appointing and training qualified assessors is equally as important as developing a good risk assessment tool.

RAN P&P should address the topic of risk assessment in related meetings in the future. Staying abreast of new trends and insights, learning from other tools being developed and sharing lessons learnt will move EU P&P professionals forward in risk assessment for radicalisation and extremism.