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Impact of Visa Liberalisation on Countries of Destination

– National Report of Finland



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Summary

The study reviews the impact that the visa liberalisations of the Western Balkan and the EU's Eastern Partnership countries have on Finland. The review employs a number of different indicators, such as the border crossings, residence permit applications and asylum applications made by citizens of the countries in question, as well as the tourism and crime attributable to them. It should be noted that **the impact of the visa liberalisations is very difficult to assess with any certainty** within the framework of this study. All of the trends studied can be explained by a number of factors. Visa liberalisation is merely one possible factor among the others, and it is impossible to distinguish its impact from that of the others. Even so, in light of the indicators reviewed, **some trends can be seen and connected to visa liberalisation, at least in terms of their timing.**

Regarding the countries of the Western Balkans, the visa liberalisations have been in force for a longer period of time¹ and the assessment of their impact is easier. However, with respect to many indicators reviewed in the study, a connection to the visa liberalisation agreements is not visible. For example, the number of border crossings at Finland's external border or the number of asylum applications made by the citizens of the countries in question do not display a clear correlation to the visa liberalisation's entry into force. On the other hand, **some developments after the visa liberalisations seem surprising.** The development of tourism, for instance, has been measured by examining the annual number of persons who have booked overnight stays at Finnish tourist accommodation establishments. A review of this indicator reveals that **the number of tourists from the Western Balkans has declined** from

the beginning of the review period (2007) towards its end (2017). **Decline is also visible in the number of employment-based residence permit applications** made by citizens of the Western Balkan countries.

The visa liberalisations of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries are still fairly recent,² due to which it is difficult to draw any conclusions based on them. Moldova was the first of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries whose visa requirements were lifted. This cannot be considered particularly significant with regard to Finland: While the number of border crossings at Finland's external border made by Moldovan nationals has increased markedly since the visa liberalisation, there are no other material changes. Of the countries covered by the study, Ukraine has the strongest ties to Finland. **Tourism and employment-based migration from Ukraine to Finland have been on the increase for quite some time now and continued to grow during the first year of visa liberalisation, 2017.** Positive development was also visible during the first year of Georgia's visa liberalisation, particularly as tourism to Finland grew, as did the number of residence permits issued to Georgians. On the other hand, a negative phenomenon also made an appearance as **itinerant Georgian criminal groups reached Finland's shores in late 2017.** As stated above, the review period with regard to Ukraine and Georgia is nevertheless very short, due to which it is very hard to draw any conclusions as to the impact of the visa liberalisations – it is not yet known how the situation will develop in the long-term and even the aforementioned trends cannot be linked to the visa liberalisations with any certainty.

¹ Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia since 19/12/2009, and Serbia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina since 15/12/2010.

² Moldova since 28/4/2014, Georgia since 28/3/2017 and Ukraine since 11/6/2017.

1. The National Framework

Q1. Short term (within two years) and long-term (beyond two years) trends after the commencement of visa-free regimes disaggregated by region and third countries of interest.³

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Tables 1. External border-crossings; 2. Detections of irregular border crossings; 3. Visa applications; 4. Visa application refusals; 5. Asylum applications and 17. Return decisions.

Western Balkans - FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina:

In terms of the Western Balkans, there are no clear trends that could be connected to visa liberalisation. Border crossings at Finland's external border declined with regard to several Western Balkan nationalities at the time the visa liberalisation agreements were made. When comparing the number of border crossings in the year of visa liberalisation (2009 or 2010) to their number a few years earlier (in 2007), the decline in respect of Albanian, Macedonian and Bosnian citizens was 77 per cent, 65 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively. On the other hand, no similar drop is found in respect of Montenegro and Serbia. However, even for the countries whose figures initially declined border crossings have begun to increase again since then, and a clear increase in border crossings can be detected with regard to all countries of the Western Balkans when comparing the time before visa liberalisation (2007) to the time after the visa liberalisation (2017). **No clear link between visa liberalisation and the trend in the number of border crossings** can be established in light of these statistics.

Table 2 requests a review of observed illegal border crossings. In Finland, illegal border crossings between border crossing points by Western Balkan nationalities have not been detected. Instead, **the number of refusals of entry at border crossing points has increased slightly in respect of Western Balkan nationals, as expected:** when visa requirements are lifted, the importance of border checks and entry interviews increases and any possible misuse is detected only as the person arrives at the external border of Finland, rather than during the visa process.⁴

Data on the number of visa applications is not available for the period preceding the visa liberalisation of the Western Balkans.

Some variation, which may be connected to the visa liberalisation, is visible in the numbers of asylum applications. **Asylum applications made by Albanians, in particular, increased strongly in 2015.** The surprising growth in the number of asylum seekers nevertheless occurred five years after the visa liberalisation agreement was made, and would therefore not seem to be a direct result of the visa liberalisation. Even so, it is unlikely that the record number of Albanian asylum seekers would have been possible without the visa liberalisation, due to which there is an indirect connection between the matters. When looking at the overall picture one notices that, from a long-term perspective, asylum applications made by Albanians increased from some ten applications (in 2007) to around a hundred (in 2017) a year. (Asylum applications made by Albanians are discussed in more detail below, in section 3, particularly in Q21.) On the other hand, for some other Western Balkan countries we can detect an initial increase in the number of asylum seekers immediately after the visa liberalisation, but then a subsequent decline to the previous, or an even lower, level. On the basis of this information, **it is difficult to see any clear trends in the development of asylum applications** made by citizens of the Western Balkans following the visa liberalisation agreement. The number of positive asylum decisions has been very low with regard to all the citizens of the Western Balkans both before and after the visa liberalisation.

The variations in the number of return decisions do not seem to be linked to the visa liberalisation agreements. Instead, for the nationals of Western Balkans, there seems to be a linkage to the number of asylum applications, as positive asylum decisions are rare and negative asylum decisions include a return decision.

³ Please use information such as: increase of entries, number of asylum applications, refusals of entry, return and removal decisions in your answers.

⁴ Source: Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard, interview, 14 June 2018.

Eastern Partnership - Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine:

Movement to Finland from the EU's Eastern Partnership countries has been on the increase for quite a long time already. In contrast to the countries of the Western Balkans, where the development has been uneven, no significant decreases can be detected in the trend regarding the EU's Eastern Partnership countries. On the other hand, the visa liberalisation agreements made with the Eastern Partnership countries are so recent that **this trend cannot, for the most part, be connected to the visa liberalisation**, instead of which we are dealing with a more long-term trend.

The strong **growth in the number of border crossings by Moldovan citizens** would nevertheless seem to be connected to the visa liberalisation agreement in 2014. The number of Moldovan nationals who crossed Finland's external border has increased by more than a tenfold since the year preceding the visa liberalisation (from 2,405 in 2013 to 28,759 in 2017). The number of border crossings made by Moldovans is surprisingly high considering that Moldovans do not otherwise stand out in the statistics reviewed in the study, such as hotel accommodation statistics. According to the Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard, Moldovans living in the Russian Federation are likely to explain part of the high number of border crossings.⁵ In other words, **Moldovans living in Russia seem to travel to the EU region via Finland more often** than they used to. The number of border crossings also grew in terms of Georgia and Ukraine in the visa liberalisation year 2017, but this trend started even before the visa liberalisation. Therefore, the growth cannot be connected to the visa liberalisation, particularly since the review period following the visa liberalisation is very short.

In terms of the illegal border crossings, the same applies as stated above with regard to the Western Balkan nationals: no illegal border crossings between border crossing points have been detected by nationals of Eastern Partnership countries either. As expected, **refusals of entry have increased to some degree** after the visa liberalisation agreement was made.

The available figures on visa applications do not lend themselves to any significant conclusions: the number of visa applications has increased gradually over time since before the visa liberalisation, and in the year of the visa liberalisation, there is a natural decline in the figures.

In terms of Georgians, one can see a point of contact between the development in the number of asylum applications and the visa liberalisation. The number of **asylum applications made by Georgians increased clearly** in 2017 in comparison to the previous year (the visa requirements for Georgia were lifted as of March 2017): there was a sixfold increase in the number of Georgian asylum seekers between 2016 and 2017, from twenty to a hundred and twenty. (Asylum applications made by Georgians, including side effects, are discussed in more detail below, in section 3, particularly in Q21.) Regarding Ukraine, the trend is declining rather than on the rise: in 2014, the number of asylum applications increased strongly due to the war in Ukraine; since then, the numbers have declined. Therefore, the trend does not seem to be connected to the visa liberalisation. Asylum applications made by Moldovans are rare – although their number increased from zero to fifteen in the year immediately following the visa liberalisation (2015), it dropped back to zero the very next year.

Return decisions issued to citizens of Moldova increased significantly in the first year of visa liberalisation, 2014, but have since then dropped back to their previous level. Similarly, the number of return decisions issued to Georgians increased in the first year of Georgia's visa liberalisation, 2017. This increase follows the increase in the number of asylum applications made by Georgians. In the case of Ukraine, the development of the number of return decisions has been more varied and there does not seem to be a temporal connection to the visa liberalisation.

⁵ Source: Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard, interview, 14 June 2018.

Q2. What are the main links between the countries of origin and Finland or the applicable 'pull factors'⁶ disaggregated by region and third countries of interest?

Western Balkans - FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina:

A diaspora of Western Balkan nationals began to form in Finland as of the 1990s. Before this, migration to Finland from this area was insignificant in scale. As far as we know, the first Albanian citizen who moved to Finland did so in 1991, for instance.⁷ The situation is similar also for other Western Balkan nationals: in 1990, the number of Western Balkan citizens or people of Western Balkan origin⁸ living in Finland was small. Since then, their number has grown.⁹

At the beginning of the 1990s, refugees from the area of the former Yugoslavia arrived in Finland as a result of the Yugoslav Wars. In 1991, the first asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia - about 260 of them - arrived in Finland. The number was at its peak in 1992, when some 1,900 asylum seekers from the area of former Yugoslav arrived in Finland, most of them Kosovo Albanians. The visa requirement set for former Yugoslav citizens that entered into force in July 1992 complicated arrival in Finland. In the following years Finland still received asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia, but to a lesser extent.¹⁰ In the autumn

of 1992, Finland decided to receive approximately 200 Bosnian concentration camp prisoners and their family members as quota refugees.¹¹ Quota refugees from the former Yugoslavia were received also in the preceding years of the 1990s.

According to the population statistics of Statistics Finland, the number of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina living in Finland in 1992 was less than two hundred, while in 2010, when the visa liberalisation agreement was made, their number in Finland was nearly 1,800 and, in 2017, they numbered around 1,500. **In 2017, people registered as citizens of former Serbia and Montenegro, who numbered 3,812, had the greatest representation among Western Balkan citizens in Finland's population statistics.**¹² The registers included 661 Serbian, 469 Albanian, 224 Macedonian and 28 Montenegrin nationals.¹³

In terms of their origin, people from the Western Balkans are most often defined as **former Yugoslavs, of whom there were over 12,000 in Finland in 2017.**¹⁴

Eastern Partnership - Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine:

Moldova declared independence in 1991 and the first Moldovan citizens were registered as residing in Finland in 1992, when there were nine of them in total. Since then, development has been even, and in 2017, 159 Moldovans lived in Finland. The number of those who registered as being of Moldovan origin was slightly higher: 289 in 2017.

The same applies, to a large extent, to Georgia: the first Georgians make an appearance in Finland's population statistics in 1992 (25 people), and in

2017, 131 Georgian nationals lived in Finland. The number of those who registered as being of Georgian origin, however, was slightly lower: 108 in 2017.

The first Ukrainian citizens likewise make an appearance in Finland's population statistics in 1992, but even then their number was higher than that of citizens of the rest of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries (82), and growth since then has been even more pronounced. In 2017, 4,033 Ukrainian citizens lived in Finland, while those who registered

⁶ These may include: presence of diaspora, historical links between countries, social assistance received by asylum seekers, probability of receiving a residence permit/long-term visa, schemes (tourism, family ties, business) for attracting certain categories of migrants using visa-free regime.

⁷ Leitzinger, Antero (ed.) (2010), *Mansikkamaan vartijat - Muistelmia ulkomaalaishallinnosta eri vuosikymmeniltä*. Helsinki. Finnish Immigration Service. p. 193.

⁸ The origin classification used by Statistics Finland is based on a person's parents' country of birth. The origin classification allows for differentiating between people born abroad and people of a foreign background, but born in Finland.

⁹ Statistics Finland, Population according to nationality, age and gender 1990–2017; Statistics Finland, Population according to origin and background country, age and gender 1990–2016. The data was retrieved from the PXWeb database of Statistics Finland on 17 August 2018.

¹⁰ Salminen, Outi (1997), *Entisestä Jugoslaviasta tulleiden pakolaisten kotoutuminen "Täällä on kaikki hyvin, mutta..."*. Helsinki: Reports of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 1997:9.

¹¹ Stefanovic, Vedran and Tarja Summa (1994), *Jugoslaviasta Suomeen - Entisen Jugoslavian alueen pakolaiset Suomessa*. The Finnish Association for Mental Health, p. 21

¹² Those registered as former Yugoslavs in terms of their nationality still numbered slightly more than a hundred in 2017, even though their number has grown continuously smaller since 1997, when they numbered 2,521.

¹³ Statistics Finland, Population according to nationality, age and gender 1990–2017. The data was retrieved from the PXWeb database of Statistics Finland on 17 August 2018.

¹⁴ Statistics Finland, Population according to origin and background country, age and gender 1990–2016. The data was retrieved from the PXWeb database of Statistics Finland on 17 August 2018.

as being of Ukrainian origin numbered approximately only half of this (2,221 persons).¹⁵ It therefore seems that, **of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries, Ukraine's ties to Finland are closest.** Ukrainians arrive in Finland particularly on grounds of employment. Ukrainians were issued 1,313 residence

permits of an employed person in 2017. In addition, thousands of Ukrainians arrive in Finland every year for more short-term seasonal work. Employment-based migration from Ukraine to Finland is discussed below, in Q11.

Q3. Which national institutions and/or authorities are involved in implementing the visa liberalisation process and what is their respective role in this process?²⁶

Visa liberalisation agreements are negotiated by the European Commission. The Commission receives its political guidance from the Visa Working Party, in which Member States participate. The responsible party in Finland is **the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.** A civil servant of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs actively participates in the discussion in the Visa Working Party, reviewing the matter from the perspective of a general political framework of Europe and the country under discussion. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs considers Finland's national interests at all stages of the visa liberalisation negotiations.¹⁷

In addition to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a civil servant of the **Finnish Border Guard** also usually participates in the Visa Working Party.¹⁸ The Finnish

Border Guard made assessment trips to the planned visa liberalisation countries as part of the EU's joint, multinational teams. The purpose of the assessment trips was, among other things, to investigate the effectiveness of border checks in the countries in question.¹⁹

On the national level, the **Ministry of the Interior** discusses particularly perspectives of internal security, considering the risks that may result from visa liberalisations. The negotiation phases include reviews of the countries' situations with regard to organised crime, for example, as well as drug-related crime and other possible negative phenomena which may spread due to visa liberalisation.²⁰

Q4. Were there changes in your national legislation in connection with the introduction of the visa-free regimes? If yes, please explain their scope and impact on nationals coming from the third countries analysed in this study?

No changes have been made to Finland's national legislation.

Q5. Were there any public/policy debates related to the visa liberalisation process in Finland? If yes, what were the main issues discussed and how did this impact national policy?

The visa liberalisation negotiations in question **did not give rise to any notable political debate** in Finland. This is partly due to the fact that visa liberalisations are negotiated by the EU and that Finland participates in the visa liberalisation process only as one Member State of the EU.

Nor did Finland's media follow the visa liberalisation process particularly actively, although some news on the subject matter can be found.²¹ The reporting was factual and declaratory in style and the articles did not engage in any speculation of the impact that the visa liberalisations might have.

¹⁵ Statistics Finland, Population according to nationality, age and gender 1990–2017; Statistics Finland, Population according to origin and background country, age and gender 1990–2016. The data was retrieved from the PXWeb database of Statistics Finland on 17 August 2018.

¹⁶ For example: changes in instructions for border patrol agents and in equipment.

¹⁷ Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, email, 6 August 2018.

¹⁸ Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, email, 6 August 2018.

¹⁹ Source: Ministry of the Interior, interview, 29 June 2018.

²⁰ Source: Ministry of the Interior, interview, 29 June 2018.

²¹ For example Helsingin Sanomat, 8 December 2016: Ukrainalaisille ja georgialaisille viisumivapaus EU:hun. <https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-200004998389.html>; Keski-suomalainen 2 March 2017: Ukrainan EU-viisumivapaus etenee. <https://www.ksml.fi/ulkomaat/Ukrainan-EU-viisumivapaus-etenee/940885>; Yle uutiset 15 December 2010: Albanian ja Bosnian viisumivapaus voimaan. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-5687140>.

2. Positive impact of visa liberalisation

Q6. *What positive impact did the visa liberalisation have on Finland?*

The positive impacts of the visa liberalisation on Finland seem minor in light of the indicators studied. The visa liberalisations of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries have only been in effect for a short period of time and the impact is difficult to assess at this point. However, when studied from a short-term perspective, the impact seems to be

positive rather than negative. The visa liberalisation of the Western Balkans has been in effect for a longer time. When taking the long-term perspective (2007–2017), however, no positive changes emerged that could be linked to the visa liberalisation. The topic is discussed in more detail below, and further in Q7–Q14.

Western Balkans - FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina:

The visa liberalisations of the Western Balkan countries do not appear to have had a positive impact on tourism to Finland. The accommodation statistics indicate that tourism to Finland from the countries in question has, if anything, decreased since the visa liberalisation agreements (the matter is discussed in more detail in Q10). Nor would the visa liberalisations seem to have had a positive impact on those arriving to Finland on employment-based grounds (the matter is discussed in more detail in Q11). The number of students and entrepreneurs arriving to Finland from the Western

Balkans is low and does not display any particular trends. To summarise, it can be said that, at least in light of the indicators studied here, **no particular positive impact on Finland can be seen in the visa liberalisation of Western Balkan countries;** instead, the impact may possibly have even been negative. It is nonetheless difficult to say what specific role the visa liberalisations have played in the development of the indicators in question. In any case, Finland does not seem to be a typical destination country for Western Balkan nationals in terms of tourism, longer stays, or business activities.

Eastern Partnership - Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine:

The impact of the visa liberalisations of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries is difficult to assess at this stage, given that the visa liberalisation has been in effect for such a short period of time. As a short-term observation, it can be noted that tourism to Finland from the countries in question and particularly residence permits issued on the grounds of employment have increased since the visa liberalisation agreements were made (these topics are discussed in more detail in Q10 and Q11).

That said, these figures have been on the increase for quite some time already, even if the increase was greater in the first year of the visa liberalisation. It is therefore difficult to assess the connection between the visa liberalisation and the matters studied. To summarise, although the impact is difficult to assess at this early stage, **the impact seems to be positive, when studied from a short-term perspective.**

Q7. *Did Finland assess the impact of visa liberalisation as positive?*

No impact assessment has been conducted in Finland since the visa requirements were lifted.

Q8. *Did your collaboration with relevant third countries improve within the field of migration since the introduction of visa liberalisation?²²*

No improvements in cooperation have been detected so far.

²² For example: in cases of return and readmission.

Q9. Did Finland identify specific economic benefits?²³

No special economic benefits for Finland have been observed as having resulted from the visa liberalisations of the Western Balkan or the EU's Eastern Partnership countries. The footnote to the question requests, for example, a review of the trend in the direct investments from the respective third countries to Finland. An examination of the number of foreign investments is unlikely to be a useful indicator when assessing the impact of visa liberalisations. Business Finland²⁴ estimates the visa

liberalisation as not having a material impact on the number of foreign investments. If a company is seriously interested in investing in Finland, the company's representatives are usually granted a visa to make a business trip to Finland. In addition, the investments made in Finland from the visa liberalisation countries falling under the scope of the study have been so small during the review period that they do not lend themselves to an analysis of the cause and effect relations.²⁵

Q10. Did Finland experience a growth in tourism²⁶ *from third-country nationals under the visa liberalisation regime?*

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 11. Total number of visitors staying in hotels and other accommodation establishments from the visa-free countries.

Tourism develops varyingly: while overnight stays in Finland have increased in terms of some nationalities, the number of tourists from other countries has declined since the visa liberalisation. In general, it can be said that **tourism from the Western Balkans to Finland has been declining, whereas the number of tourists arriving from the EU's Eastern Partnership countries has increased.**

The visa liberalisations of the Western Balkan countries do not appear to have had a positive impact on tourism to Finland from the countries in question. Accommodation statistics show that the number of Macedonian and Serbian tourists arriving in Finland declined clearly during the first year of visa liberalisation; the number of Serbian tourists dropped to a fourth of what it was prior to the visa liberalisation (from slightly more than 1,800 to less than 400) and the number of Macedonian tourists halved (from 900 to 400). Regarding Serbia, the decline took place in the first year of visa liberalisation, 2009, whereas, in terms of Macedonia, the decline began in the year preceding the visa liberalisation, 2008. Since then, the number of tourists has begun to increase again, but it is nevertheless noteworthy that the number of tourists from either country in 2017 had not achieved the level of 2007. Likewise, the number of Albanian tourists who arrived in Finland in 2017 was smaller than ten years before. Therefore, **the visa liberalisations of Macedonia, Serbia and Albania do not appear to have had a positive impact on tourism to Finland from the countries in question – on the**

contrary. Regarding the Balkan countries, increase is visible only in the number of tourists arriving from Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The number of Montenegrin tourists has multiplied tenfold, but given the low starting level (3 tourists in 2007), the number of tourists in 2017 remained below two hundred, despite the significant increase. Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, the increase has been more modest – the number of tourists more or less doubled over a period of ten years from around 150 to approximately 300. **Tourism to Finland from Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina has increased during the validity of the visa liberalisation.** Still, it is impossible to say whether the visa liberalisations had an impact on the aforementioned changes in the travel of Western Balkan nationals to Finland. Several factors can explain an increase or decrease in the overnight hotel stays of a particular country's citizens. Visa liberalisation is merely one possible factor among others, the impact of which cannot be distinguished from the impact of other factors. Other likely reasons for increased tourism include economic growth and a more affluent population in the country of origin, which has an impact on the population's possibility to travel abroad.

Based on accommodation statistics, **tourism to Finland from the EU's Eastern Partnership countries seems to have increased during the period studied.** Of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries, Finland receives the highest number of tourists from Ukraine (some 9,400 hotel guests

²³ For example: an increase in direct investments from the respective third countries to your (Member) State.

²⁴ Business Finland is an agency working under the direction of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, gathering innovation funding, internationalisation and export promotion as well as foreign investments directed at Finland and services related to tourism under the same roof.

²⁵ Source: Business Finland, email, 22 August 2018.

²⁶ For example: third-country national visitors staying in hotels and other accommodation establishments increased.

in 2017), the next highest number from Georgia (around 1,800 hotel guests) and the lowest number of tourists from Moldova (approximately 400 hotel guests). The increase in tourism does not, in any particular way, coincide with the visa liberalisations' entry into force; rather, the numbers have been on the increase for a longer period of time. However, especially for Georgia and Ukraine the increase has

been greater in the first year of visa liberalisation, 2017. In light of this information, it is **difficult to say how big an impact the visa liberalisation agreements, in particular, have had on the growth of tourism**. As stated above with regard to the Western Balkans, the increase in tourism can also be explained by other possible factors.

Q11. Did Finland experience an impact on its labour market since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 13. Total number of first residence permits issued for remunerated activities reasons to visa-free country nationals.

The visa liberalisations of the Western Balkan countries do not seem to have had a positive impact on the number of people who have moved to Finland on employment-based grounds. The number of people arriving to Finland on employment-based grounds has decreased since the visa liberalisation. The annual number of Macedonian, Serbian, Albanian and Bosnian citizens who have been issued an employment-based residence permit was markedly lower at the end of the review period in 2017 than before the visa liberalisation. Thus the visa liberalisations would seem to have, if anything, a negative impact on the number of people moving to Finland on the basis of employment; that is if the matters are connected in the first place.

The number of residence permits issued to citizens of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries on employment-based grounds is increasing. For Georgia and Ukraine the figures increased also in the first year of visa liberalisation, 2017, and the increase was larger than in the previous years. The development has nevertheless been similar for a longer period of time already, and its connection to the visa liberalisation seems in no way clear. Moldovans and Georgians still arrive to Finland on

employment-based grounds relatively rarely (less than 20 residence permits issued in 2017), but the number of employment-based residence permits issued to Ukrainians is high: the number of residence permits of an employed person issued to Ukrainians totalled 1,313 in 2017. Finland employs local labour market tests: the condition for residence permits issued to workers arriving from outside the EU or the EEA is a job for which a Finnish employee is not available. Therefore, Ukrainians are arriving for jobs in industries which have trouble finding workforce in Finland, such as constructions sites, farms and berry-picking. In terms of Ukraine, it is necessary to study seasonal work in addition to employment-based residence permits. Especially for those arriving for seasonal work lasting less than 6 months, acquiring a permit for seasonal works is more simple and economical than the regular residence permit of an employed person, and therefore it is also the most popular option for short-term employment.²⁷ Finland receives thousands of seasonal workers from Ukraine every year, attracted to Finland by the good level of wages. The amount of wages a Ukrainian can earn in Finland over a few days is equal to what they can earn in a month at home.²⁸

Q12. Did Finland experience a growth in the number of students arriving from third countries since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 14. Total number of first residence permits issued for education reasons to visa-free country nationals.

The number of students arriving to Finland from the Western Balkans is low and does not show any visible trends. The number of Albanian and Bosnian students in Finland is showing signs of growth, but at the end of the review period in 2017,

it still stood at less than 20 students every year, due to which we cannot talk about a significant change.

There are **no particular trends visible in the**

²⁷ The new Seasonal Work Act entered into force on 1 January 2018. According to the new legislation, citizens of visa exempt countries who come to Finland for seasonal work for a maximum of three months have to apply for a seasonal work certificate from the Finnish Immigration Service. If they come to Finland for more than three months, they have to apply for a seasonal work permit. Previously citizens of visa exempt countries were not required any certificate or permit for seasonal work lasting less than three months. For seasonal work for the duration of three months or more one was required a residence permit of an employed person.

²⁸ Helsingin Sanomat 18 July 2018: Tuhannet ukrainalaiset tulevat tänne tekemään työt, jotka eivät suomalaisille kelpaa - lisätienestintäkiä ollaan valmiita ikävöimään perhettä kuukausia. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10303168>. Referred to on 3 August 2018.

number of students arriving to Finland from the EU's Eastern Partnership countries. The numbers are relatively low, with the most common

country of origin being Ukraine, whose citizens were issued less than 60 residence permits on the basis of studies in 2017.

Q13. *Did Finland experience a growth of entrepreneurship, including of self-employed persons from third countries since the introduction of visa liberalisation?*

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 15. Total number of first residence permits issued to entrepreneurs (including self-employed persons) from visa-free countries.

The **number of entrepreneurs arriving from the Western Balkans is very low** (less than 5 residence permits a year issued on these grounds), and do not show any visible trends.

The **number of entrepreneurs arriving from the EU's Eastern Partnership countries is likewise very low** (less than 5 residence permits a year) and they do not show any trends either.

Q14. *Did Finland experience a growth in trade with third countries since the introduction of visa liberalisation?*

No, **visa liberalisations are unlikely to have much of a connection to these countries' increase in trade with EU countries.** What does have a significant impact, on the other hand, is the fact that the EU has entered into Association Agreements with the countries in question, and that these agreements include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA). The DCFTAs guarantee duty free entry to EU markets and other benefits to the products of the countries in question. Other factors influencing an increase or decrease in trade include crop year droughts or rains, which may have an impact on the volume of foodstuffs that can be exported. The EU also has strong support programmes for the productions sectors of the countries in question in the form of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and other subsidies. Over the years, the ENI funding will probably become visible in local companies being able to increase their production to meet the requirements of EU countries and to sell more of their products to the EU area. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs expects ENI to have more of an impact than the visa liberalisation. Nor is it uncommon for a

single large-scale trade with a country to change the trade statistics of an entire year.²⁹

There are no trends visible in the development of Finland's foreign trade with the countries in question which could be linked to the visa liberalisations. Finland's trade with Western Balkan countries was acknowledged as being of a minor scale at this point. Closer trade relations were attributed more to the countries' degree of success, past and future, in socio-economic reformations, the development of the rule of law and economic transformations, the improvement of the business environment and the development of competitiveness. Factors mentioned as having an impact on the increase or decrease of trade with the EU's Eastern Partnership countries included the exchange rate of the Russian rouble and the kinds of import restrictions Russia sets at any given time on foodstuffs from former Soviet Union countries. To summarise, it can be concluded that the development of trade is influenced by a whole multitude of factors and that the visa liberalisation's impact on foreign trade can be questioned.³⁰

²⁹ Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, emails 29 June, 3 July and 27 July 2018.

³⁰ Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, emails 29 June, 3 July and 27 July 2018.

3. Challenges of visa liberalisation

Q15. Did Finland face certain challenges since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Finland has confronted two challenges related to the visa liberalisations: the **unfounded asylum applications made by Albanians**, particularly in 2015, and the **property offences committed by**

itinerant Georgian criminals as of 2017, who also exploit the asylum procedure. For more details, see Q21.

Western Balkans - FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina:

The number of asylum applications made by Albanians grew strongly in 2015. The subject matter is discussed in more detail in Q21. No special

challenges resulting from visa liberalisations have been observed in terms of other Balkan countries.

Eastern Partnership - Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine:

Itinerant Georgian criminals arrived in Finland in late 2017 exploiting the asylum procedure. The subject matter is discussed in more detail in Q21. No

special challenges resulting from visa liberalisations have been observed in terms of other EU Eastern Partnership countries.

Q16. Did Finland encounter a rise in illegal employment since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 20. Total number of nationals from the visa-free countries found in illegal employment.

Statistics on the topic are available only as of 2015, due to which a comparison between the period of time preceding the visa liberalisation and following it cannot be carried out in light of statistics with regard to the Western Balkans. Even so, the sources interviewed for the study did not mention illegal employment as something that would have been particularly pronounced in the case of Western Balkan nationals. Therefore, **the visa liberalisation has not, presumably, caused at least any strong increase in illegal employment with regard to the Western Balkan countries.**

Although some illegal employment occurs in the case of the citizens of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries, the phenomenon cannot be connected to the visa liberalisation. Ukrainians stand out in the statistics concerning

illegal employment. The figures are fairly low (13 cases in 2017), but not all cases come to the attention of authorities. The Regional State Administrative Agency noted that, at the moment, it is precisely the illegal employment of Ukrainians that has proved challenging. However, illegally employed Ukrainians were mentioned as arriving to Finland with a visa or some other permit issued by another EU Member State, or else using forged documents, due to which the phenomenon is not related to the visa liberalisation. There are also some cases in which Ukrainians have attempted to enter the country as tourists, relying on the visa liberalisation, after which the true purpose of the journey has been discovered as involving employment. Even so, the phenomenon is not significant to the extent that visa liberalisation could be said to have resulted in an increase in illegal employment.³¹

³¹ Source: Regional State Administrative Agency, emails 13 June and 14 June 2018.

Q17. Did Finland encounter a rise in smuggled and/or trafficked persons from the visa-free countries since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Tables 21. Total number of smuggled persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings) and 22. Total number of trafficked persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings).

Statistics are not available, since statistics on the nationality of victims of smuggling or human trafficking are not compiled.

Regarding smuggling, the Finnish Border Guard noted that **smuggling of the citizens of the countries in question has not been detected**. On a general level, it can be noted that visa liberalisation does not usually increase the need for smuggling, but to the contrary: the risk of human smuggling is likely to reduce as a result of visa liberalisation as legal border crossings become easier.³²

The National Assistance System for Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings noted that individual

citizens of the countries in question have been directed to the assistance system over the past ten years. The figures show only normal annual fluctuation, and there is no discernible link to visa liberalisation. It was also noted, on a general level, that persons falling under the scope of visa liberalisation move so rapidly from one country to the next that victims of sexual exploitation, for example, are not easy to reach. Border crossings are difficult to intervene in when the case concerns a person who is crossing the border legally.³³ In this sense, too, the framing of the question can be questioned and thoughts turned to whether the supposed impact of visa liberalisation on human trafficking has been of an increasing or decreasing nature.

Q18. Did Finland encounter a rise in the number of identified facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 23. Total number of identified facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence from the visa-free countries (final court rulings).

No, the arrangement of illegal immigration did not become more common as a result of the visa liberalisation. Citizens of the countries in question have been convicted of the arrangement of illegal immigration only twice during the past ten years:

one Ukrainian in 2014 and one Serbian in 2016. On a general level, the need to arrange illegal immigration is likely to reduce due to visa liberalisation as border crossings become easier.

Q19. Did Finland encounter a rise in the number of nationals found to be illegally present from the visa-free countries since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 24. Total number of nationals found to be illegally present from the visa-free countries.

No clear increase in the number of persons found to reside in the country illegally can be detected. The exception to this is Serbia – there was a significant increase in Serbian citizens found to be illegally present in Finland in the year following the visa liberalisation: from 2009 to 2010 their number increased sixfold, from 35 to 230. The increase was nevertheless short-lived and the number of

Serbians found to reside in the country illegally has since returned to a lower level than before the visa liberalisation. In terms of the other countries studied, the numbers of citizens found to reside in Finland illegally contain normal year-to-year fluctuation which does not seem to have a clear connection to the visa liberalisation agreements.

³² Source: Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard, interview, 14 June 2018.

³³ Source: National Assistance System for Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings, email 9 August 2018.

Q20. Did Finland encounter a rise in the number of overstayers since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 25. Total number of overstayers from the visa-free countries.

No, **normal year-to-year fluctuation**, which does not seem to be connected to the visa liberalisation agreements, can be seen in the number of persons

remaining in the country after their right of residence has expired.

Q21. Did Finland encounter any signs of possible misuse of the visa liberalisation?³⁴

Finland has experienced **two phenomena** which would seem to involve an abuse of visa liberalisations: the unfounded asylum applications made by Albanians, particularly in 2015, and the property offences committed by itinerant Georgian criminals as of 2017.

The number of asylum applications made by Albanian citizens began to grow gradually after the visa liberalisation took effect. In the first years of the visa liberalisation, 2010 and 2011, Finland received approximately 10 Albanian asylum seekers. From this point forward, the figures rose gradually so that, in 2014, 110 Albanians applied for asylum in Finland. **The record-breaking year was 2015, when 760 Albanians applied for asylum in Finland.** The asylum applications made by the Albanians can be considered an abuse of the asylum system, given that not one Albanian was granted international protection in 2014 or 2015.³⁵ In addition, the majority of substantively investigated applications were found to be manifestly unfounded.³⁶ Finland carried out certain measures in 2015 (see Q45), after which the number of asylum applications made by Albanians has decreased to about a hundred a year. The increase in the number of asylum applications **cannot be linked directly to the visa liberalisation agreement** made with Albania, and it is probable that other factors had an impact on the phenomenon. In August 2015, for example, the Finnish Immigration Service became aware of a rumour circulating in Albania, according to which it was advisable to seek asylum in Finland. According to the rumour, finding employment would be easy in Finland and, should the search for a job turn out to be unsuccessful, the applicant would at least get plenty of money in the form of reintegration assistance if they returned to Albania voluntarily. **However, the increase in the number of asylum seekers would**

probably not have been possible without the visa liberalisation agreement made some years earlier, due to which a link between the matters can be seen.

The number of asylum seekers arriving to Finland from the EU's Eastern Partnership countries has increased with regard to Georgia: **the number of Georgian asylum seekers increased sixfold**, from about 20 applicants per year to 120 in 2017. The phenomenon has not achieved the same proportions as the arrival of Albanian asylum seekers two years earlier. In terms of Georgia, the asylum seeker situation nevertheless **involves an extremely negative side effect, as itinerant Georgian criminal groups systematically exploit the asylum process to commit property offences.** Georgian criminals have been operating in the EU area for a long time now, but their operations have seldom reached Finland before. As a result of the visa liberalisation, itinerant Georgian criminals have begun to arrive in the EU area legally, taking advantage of the visa liberalisation of biometric passports. In late 2017, a few groups of Georgians arrived to Finland by sea and registered as asylum seekers, using false identities and hiding their documents. Many of them ended up in police custody after being apprehended for shoplifting soon after they had applied for asylum.³⁷ On the other hand, some have registered as asylum seekers only after they were apprehended for property offences.³⁸ For many Georgian criminals, register reviews have revealed that the criminals have been moving about in different EU countries for quite some time and, thanks to the international exchange of information, some of them have been identified as itinerant criminals.³⁹ Regarding Georgian itinerant criminality, it must be noted that it is the **doing of a few criminal organisations.**

³⁴ For example, dealing with cases when persons enter the country legally but later become illegally employed, are staying in the country legally, but are working without a work permit or apply for asylum without reasonable grounds.

³⁵ In Finland, the asylum process also includes the investigation of other grounds for a residence permit in certain situations. Two Albanians were issued a residence permit in the asylum process on the basis of other grounds in 2014; in 2015, residence permits were not issued at all.

³⁶ In addition to substantively resolved applications, some applications lapsed when the applicant withdrew their application or disappeared from the reception centre and did not return there.

³⁷ Source: The National Bureau of Investigation, Laittomasti maassa oleskelleina tavatut: viranomaisten havaitsemat tapaukset vuonna 2017. Dated on 22 January 2018.

³⁸ Source: The National Bureau of Investigation, Laittomasti maassa olleina tavatut: viranomaisten sisämaassa havaitsemat tapaukset tammi-huhtikuussa 2018. Dated on 14 May 2018.

³⁹ Source: The National Bureau of Investigation, Laittomasti maassa oleskelleina tavatut: viranomaisten havaitsemat tapaukset vuonna 2017. Dated on 22 January 2018.

Q22. *Did Finland as a country of destination face any administrative burden⁴⁰ since the introduction of the visa-free regime?*

The visa liberalisations **have not resulted in a significant administrative burden in Finland.** The phenomena mentioned hereinabove in Q21 have nevertheless also increased the workload of authorities. Initially, the numerous asylum applications filed by Albanians, particularly in 2015, resulted in work at the Finnish Immigration

Service, which is responsible for resolving asylum applications. Subsequently they resulted in work for the Police, which is responsible for removals. The operations of itinerant Georgian criminals in Finland as of late 2017 have also increased the workload of the Police to some extent.

Q23. *List the institutions that faced administrative burdens.*

The Finnish Immigration Service and the Police.

Q24. *Did Finland as a country of destination face any security risks since the introduction of the visa-free regime?*

No other threats besides the itinerant Georgian criminality described in Q21 above have been observed.

Q25. *What types of offences⁴¹ were committed by third-country nationals in Finland after the commencement of the visa-free regime?⁴² Were there any significant differences compared to the time before the visa-free regime started?*

Property offences committed by Georgians have become more common since the visa liberalisation (see Q21). No increase in criminality has been visible in terms of other nationalities.

Q26. *What was the rate of offences (final court rulings) committed by third-country nationals⁴³ in Finland after the commencement of the visa-free regime? Were there any significant differences compared to the time before the visa-free regime started?*

The statistics on final convictions 2007–2016⁴⁴ do not contain any peaks in the offence statistics of the citizens of the visa liberalisation countries nor any other trends which could be linked to the visa liberalisations. Above in Q21 and Q24 it was noted that itinerant Georgian criminality increased in late 2017. This increase cannot, however, be seen in the statistics concerning final decisions, the data of which reaches only as far as 2016. Instead,

the phenomenon is described in the statistics on suspected offences, according to which suspected offences by Georgians in 2017 increased fivefold compared to the previous year – Georgian nationals were held as suspects for nearly three hundred offences pursuant to the Criminal Code, whereas the number in previous years has been around sixty a year.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ For example: significant increase of residence permit applications, increased demand for work permits, more time-consuming border control procedure due to the lack of visas. etc.

⁴¹ Please use this pre-defined list of categories: cybercrime; drugs offences; economic and financial offences; illicit immigration; illicit trafficking (not drug related); offences against property; offences against public order and safety; offences against public trust (e.g. fraud, forgery, counterfeiting); offences against the person; sexual exploitation of children (including child pornography); sexual offences against adults; terrorism-related activity; trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants.

⁴² This applies to third-country nationals who do not live your country, but visited (short stay of up to 90 days).

⁴³ See above.

⁴⁴ Source: Statistics Finland, Tuomitut kansalaisuuksittain 2007–2016. Delivered upon request via email, 13 August 2018.

⁴⁵ Source: The National Bureau of Investigation, Laittomasti maassa olleina tavatut: viranomaisten sisämaassa havaitsemat tapaukset tammi-huhtikuussa 2018. Dated on 14 May 2018.

Q27. *What is the role and impact of irregular migration facilitators that provide their services to third-country nationals with an entry ban? Please provide a short description with specific examples about your (Member) State situation and make a clear distinction between people who assist migrants and people who are profiting from facilitation.*

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 21. Total number of smuggled persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings), 22. Total number of trafficked persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings) and 23. Total number of identified facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence from the visa-free countries (final court rulings).

The phenomenon is not visible in any particular way with regard to the visa liberalisation countries in Finland.⁴⁶

Q28. *How did the activities of irregular migration facilitators impact Finland?⁴⁷*

No facilitation of illegal border crossings has been observed in Finland with regard to citizens of the visa liberalisation countries.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Source: Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard, interview, 14 June 2018.

⁴⁷ Did their activities lead to increases in irregular border-crossings, enhanced border controls or document fraud?

⁴⁸ Source: Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard, interview, 14 June 2018.

4. Measures put in place to deal with possible misuse of visa-free regimes

Q29. Did Finland implement certain measures to deal with the challenges that appeared after the commencement of the visa-free regime?

In general, it can be noted that the **visa liberalisations have not resulted in challenges to Finland due to which exceptional measures would have been called for.** The study states the great number of Albanian asylum seekers in 2015 and itinerant Georgian criminals in 2017 as

challenges that Finland has faced due to the visa liberalisation. The measures carried out due to the Albanian asylum seekers are discussed below, in Q30 and Q45. The measures executed due to the itinerant Georgian criminals, on the other hand, are discussed in Q38.

Western Balkans - FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina:

The measures carried out due to the increase in the number of Albanian asylum seekers are discussed below, in Q30 and Q45. No further measures to mention.

Eastern Partnership - Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine:

The measures executed due to the itinerant Georgian criminals are discussed in Q38. No further measures to mention.

Q30. Did Finland implement measures to increase the efforts to promote voluntary return? If yes, for which nationalities and explain their impact?

The Albanian asylum seekers were encouraged to return voluntarily. In September 2015, the Finnish Immigration Service organised **an information session** at a reception centre housing Albanian asylum seekers, in which the applicants were told that Albanians are very seldom granted international protection and that, should they withdraw their application and return home voluntarily, they would be able to travel with a plane ticket arranged by the IOM with a police escort and avoid an entry

ban. Approximately 30 Albanian asylum seekers participated in the session, 10 of who withdrew their applications and returned home through voluntary repatriation.⁴⁹ The information session can therefore be considered a fairly effective measure, even though it has not been subject to an official impact assessment.

Other measures executed due to the asylum seeker situation are discussed in Q45.

Q31. Did Finland implement measures to expand the legal possibilities of stay? If yes, for which nationalities and explain their impact.

No measures of this kind; the legal residing of citizens from the visa liberalisation countries has not been facilitated any further since the visa requirements were lifted.

Q32. Did Finland implement measures to fight illegal employment? If yes, please explain their impact and add specific examples.

No measures to report. See Q16: no increase in illegal employment has been detected.

⁴⁹ Source: Reception Unit of the Finnish Immigration Service, email, 25 June 2018.

Q33. Did Finland implement measures to fight the smuggling and/or trafficking of persons from the visa-free countries? If yes, please explain their impact and add specific examples.

No measures to report. See Q17: no increase in human smuggling or trafficking has been detected.

Q34. Did Finland implement measures to fight the activities of facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence? If yes, please explain their impact and add specific examples

No measures to report. See Q18: no increase has been observed in the arrangement of illegal entry.

Q35. Did Finland implement measures to reduce the incidence of nationals found to be illegally present in your country? If yes, please explain their impact and add specific examples.

No measures to report. See Q19: no increase has been detected in the number of persons residing in the country illegally.

Q36. What was the effectiveness of the measures listed above and which of them were most successful in reaching their intended goals? Please provide any good practices / lessons learned you have identified.

Informing Albanian asylum seekers about voluntary return is assessed in the section which discussed the matter (Q30), which called for an explanation of the impact. Other measures arising from the increase in	the number of Albanian asylum seekers are assessed in the space reserved for it under Q46. No further measures or good practices.
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Q37. Did Finland implement measures to deal with administrative burdens since the introduction of the visa-free regime?⁵⁰ If yes, please list and explain these measures, their impact / effectiveness and add any good practices / lessons learned you have identified.

The strong increase in the number of Albanian asylum seekers particularly in 2015 resulted in administrative work as well. The measures carried out due to the phenomenon are discussed in Q45.

Q38. Did Finland implement measures to deal with the possible misuse of visa liberalisation?⁵¹ If yes, list and explain these measures, their impact / effectiveness and add any good practices / lessons learned you have identified.

The study notes that Finland has experienced two phenomena which would seem to involve an abuse of visa liberalisations: the unfounded asylum applications made by Albanians, particularly in 2015, and the property offences committed by itinerant Georgian criminals as of 2017. The measures carried out due to the asylum situation are discussed separately in the section reserved for them, Q45.	The itinerant criminality of the Georgians has not resulted in any exceptional measures as the Police have been able to handle it within the course of their normal duties. Itinerant criminals are identified with the help of the internal exchange of information and their activities are prevented by means of detention. ⁵² The matter has also been brought up in political discussions with Georgia. ⁵³
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Q39. How did Finland deal with cases when third-country nationals entered the country legally, but did not legalize their stay after 90 days (overstayers)?

Overstayers are not visible on the level of phenomena with regard to the citizens the study is concerned with.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ For example: significant increase of residence permit applications, increased demand for work permits, more time-consuming border control procedure due to the lack of visas. etc.

⁵¹ For example, dealing with cases when persons enter the country legally but later become illegally employed, are staying in the country legally, but are working without a work permit or apply for asylum without reasonable grounds.

⁵² Source: The National Bureau of Investigation, Laittomasti maassa oleskelleina tavatut: viranomaisien havaitsemat tapaukset vuonna 2017. Dated on 22 January 2018.

⁵³ Ministry of the Interior, interview, 29 June 2018.

⁵⁴ Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard, interview, 14 June 2018.

When encountered, an overstayer is usually fined and removal measures are initiated. The Police noted that usually in such a situation the person is put in detention while the flights and other return arrangements are organised.⁵⁵ The Finnish Border

Guard noted that, in the event that the visa period is exceeded in a significant manner, a removal proposal is made to the Finnish Immigration Service, which can order a readmission ban for a period longer than two years.⁵⁶

Q40. In the case of overstayers from the visa-free countries, does Finland apply a different return procedure compared to the usual procedure?

No, see Q39 above.

Q41. Does Finland apply any special procedures in cases where overstayers have lost their identification documents or in instances where there are problems with their identification?

No special national practices. In terms of visa liberalisation countries, readmission is provided for in EU-level documents.⁵⁷

Q42. *How did Finland's cooperation with the visa-free countries evolve over time in terms of assistance and information exchange, before and after the visa-free regime commencement?*⁵⁸

No changes in cooperation have been detected.

Q43. *How effective was the cooperation with third countries to reach your desired goals? Were there any particular differences in your interactions with different third countries and did you identify any good practices / lessons learned?*

Not applicable. Finland does not have any special objectives with regard to the countries in question; the EU has a bigger interest in the visa liberalisation negotiations.

Q44. *How did Finland respond to the influx of asylum seekers from the visa-free countries?*⁵⁹

As stated in Q21, **the number of Albanian asylum seekers increased after the visa liberalisation.** A particularly high number of asylum applications made by Albanians were received in July (281 applications) and August (161 applications) 2015.⁶⁰ The applications were primarily clearly unfounded. At the same time, the Finnish Immigration Service became aware of a rumour circulating in Albania, according to which applying for an asylum in Finland would be worth the while. According to the rumour, employment would be easy to find in Finland and, should the search for a job turn out to be unsuccessful, the applicant would at least get plenty of money in the form of reintegration assistance if they returned to Albania voluntarily. In August 2015, the **support for voluntary repatriation to be granted to Albanians was lowered** in such a way that cash support and commodity support were

abandoned and the support for voluntary repatriation typically consisted of the travel alone.⁶¹ In addition, the Finnish Immigration Service organised an **information session** in a reception centre housing Albanian asylum seekers, in which the asylum seekers were encouraged to return voluntarily (see Q16 for further details). The asylum applications of citizens from visa liberalisation countries were also directed to a **Fast Track process** in which asylum applications are processed particularly rapidly. Furthermore, in the autumn of 2015 several Balkan countries, Albania included, were determined **safe countries of origin**, due to which an asylum application made by a citizen of one of the countries in question can be considered clearly unfounded and the application can be resolved in an accelerated procedure. In such cases, a refusal-of-entry decision is enforceable as early as on the eighth day following the decision's service.⁶²

⁵⁵ National Police Board, interview, 15 June 2018.

⁵⁶ Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard, interview, 14 June 2018.

⁵⁷ Source: The Police.

⁵⁸ For example, in terms of information campaigns in the third countries working on the elimination of 'push factors' – unemployment, poverty, poor conditions in the national health system, assistance to visa-free countries from Member States and reintegration assistance to returnees.

⁵⁹ For example, using the concept of safe country of origin.

⁶⁰ Source: Statistical services of the Finnish Immigration Service, <http://tilastot.migri.fi/#decisions?l=en>.

⁶¹ Source: Finnish Immigration Service, Reception Unit, email, 25 June 2018.

⁶² Source: Finnish Immigration Service, Asylum Unit, email, 28 June 2018.

The number of asylum seekers arriving to Finland from the EU's Eastern Partnership countries has increased with regard to Georgia: the number of Georgian asylum seekers increased sixfold, from about 20 applicants per year to 120 in 2017. The number of Ukrainian and Moldovan asylum seekers has remained unchanged or decreased.

An investigation on whether Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova can be considered safe countries of origin was launched in 2017. At the time the study was written (August 2018) **Georgia was determined as a safe country of origin**. Regarding Ukraine and Moldova no actual policy had been made yet.

Q45. *Were the measures of Finland effective to manage the influx of asylum seekers from the visa-free countries? Please provide a short description of your national situation highlighting any good practices / lessons learned you have identified.*

The measures carried out due to the situation concerning Albanian asylum seekers in August–September 2015 **can be considered effective, given that the number of asylum seekers arriving from Albania began to decline**

immediately towards the end of 2015. Although the measures were not subject to an official impact assessment, presumably at least the reduction of the repatriation support and the decline in the number of asylum seekers are connected.

Q46. *How did Finland cooperate with other (Member) States found in a similar situation (i.e. influx of asylum seekers from the visa-free countries)?*

Not applicable.

Q47. *Did Finland receive assistance from the EU to deal with the influx of asylum seekers from the visa-free countries?*

No.

5. Conclusions

Q48. *With regard to the aims of this Study, what conclusions would you draw from the findings reached in elaborating your National Contribution?*

The impact that the visa liberalisations of the Western Balkan countries have on Finland seems to be fairly minor. As far as any impact can be discerned, it seems to be rather negative from Finland's point of view. Contrary to what one might assume, tourism and employment-based migration to Finland from the countries in question have declined during the review period. Nevertheless, no strongly negative impact is detectable.

The visa liberalisations of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries have been in effect for such a short period of time that drawing any conclusions on their impact would be difficult at this point. The visa liberalisation agreement with Moldova was made in 2014, meaning that the review period is slightly longer than it is in respect of Ukraine and Georgia (visa liberalisation in 2017). The **border crossings of Moldovan citizens** have increased significantly since the visa liberalisation, but no corresponding growth is visible in the number of overnight hotel stays, for example, or in

employment-based migration, the volumes of which are still low. Therefore, Moldova's visa liberalisation cannot be considered particularly significant with regard to Finland. Of the countries covered by the study, Ukraine has the strongest ties to Finland. **Tourism and employment-based migration from Ukraine to Finland have been on the increase for quite some time now and continued to grow during the first year of visa liberalisation.** Positive development was also visible with regard to Georgia, particularly in relation to tourism to Finland. On the other hand, a negative phenomenon also made an appearance as **itinerant Georgian criminality** reached Finland's shores in late 2017. As stated above, the review period with regard to Ukraine and Georgia is nevertheless very short, due to which it is very hard to draw any conclusions as to the impact of the visa liberalisations – it is not yet known how the situation will develop in the long-term and even the aforementioned trends cannot be linked to the visa liberalisations with any certainty.

Q49. *What do you consider to be the relevance of your findings to (national and/or EU level) policymakers?*

The fact that the **consequences of the visa liberalisations seem surprising to some extent** can be considered the most significant conclusion to be drawn from the study.

Regarding the Western Balkans, what is surprising is firstly **the minor visibility of the visa liberalisation in various statistics**: a clear trend that could be linked to the visa liberalisations is largely absent from nearly all of the indicators. On the other hand, what has been surprising with regard to some indicators **is the direction of the development**: regarding Albania and Serbia, for example, the number of border crossings has increased during the review period, but the amount of tourism⁶³ seems to have declined. In terms of the Western Balkan countries, there is no growth in the number of residence permit applications either, contrary to what one could expect. On the other hand, nor does international crime seem to have increased.

Drawing any conclusions with regard to the EU's Eastern Partnership countries is difficult at this stage, since the visa liberalisations are such a recent development. The markedly increased number of border crossings made by Moldovans is a phenomenon which seems to be directly linked to the visa liberalisation, but it is not of particular importance, especially since the increase is not visible in hotel accommodation statistics. Regarding Ukraine, the positive trends have continued after the visa liberalisation in that both tourism and the number of employment-based residence permit applications have continued to grow. However, these trends cannot be attributed to visa liberalisation as they were pre-existent even before it. Regarding Georgia, there has been a slight increase in tourism as well, but on the other hand also a negative phenomenon: the itinerant Georgian criminality. In general, it is too early to assess the long term impacts of visa liberalisation regarding Ukraine and Georgia, which seem to be the most interesting countries to look at from Finland's point of view.

⁶³ Tourism to Finland was measured by examining the annual number of citizens from the country in question arriving to Finnish hotels and other tourist accommodation establishments.

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2 | 2018

Viisumivapauksien vaikutukset kohtemaihin

– Suomen kansallinen raportti



Euroopan unionin
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Viisumivapauksien vaikutukset kohdemaihin

- Suomen kansallinen raportti

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Tiivistelmä

Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Länsi-Balkanin maiden sekä EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden viisumivapauksien vaikutuksia Suomelle. Tarkastelussa on useita eri indikaattoreita, kuten kyseisten maiden kansalaisten tekemät rajanylitykset, oleskelulupahakemukset, turvapaikkahakemukset sekä turismi ja rikollisuus. On todettava, että tämän tutkimuksen puitteissa on **hyvin vaikea päätellä varmuudella viisumivapauksien vaikutuksia**. Kaikkiin tutkittaviin kehityskulkuihin on useita selittäviä tekijöitä. Viisumivapaus on vain yksi mahdollinen tekijä muiden joukossa ja sen nimenomaista vaikuttavuutta on mahdotonta erotella muista tekijöistä. Tarkasteltujen indikaattorien valossa voi kuitenkin nähdä **tiettyjä kehityskulkuja, jotka voidaan yhdistää viisumivapautteen ainakin ajallisesti**.

Länsi-Balkanin maiden kohdalla viisumivapaudet ovat olleet voimassa pidemmän aikaa¹, ja vaikutusten analysointi on helpompaa. Monen tutkimuksessa tarkastellun indikaattorin kohdalla yhteyttä viisumivapauden solmimiseen ei kuitenkaan ole nähtävillä. Esimerkiksi kyseisten maiden kansalaisten Suomen ulkorajan ylitysten määrässä tai turvapaikkahakemusten määrässä ei ole näkyvissä selvää korrelaatiota viisumivapauden solmimiseen. Toisaalta **jotkut viisumivapausajan kehityskulut vaikuttavat yllättäviltä**. Esimerkiksi turismin kehitystä on mitattu tarkastelemalla suomalaisissa majoitusliikkeissä yöpyneiden henkilöiden vuosittaista määrää. Tätä mittaria tarkasteltaessa havaitaan **länsibalkanilaisten turistien määrän laskeneen** tarkastelujakson alusta (2007) loppuun tultaessa (2017). Myös **työperusteisen oleskelulupahakemusten määrässä on nähtävillä laskua** kyseisellä ajanjaksolla.

EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden viisumivapaudet ovat vielä verrattain tuoreita² ja johtopäätösten tekeminen on sen vuoksi hankalaa. EU:n itäisistä kumppanuusmaista viisumivapauden sai ensimmäisenä Moldova. Tätä viisumivapautta ei voida pitää Suomen kannalta erityisen merkittävänä: Moldovan kansalaisten tekemät Suomen ulkorajan ylitykset ovat kyllä kasvaneet huomattavasti viisumivapaus-sopimuksen jälkeen, mutta muita olennaisia muutoksia ei ole havaittavissa. Tutkimuksen kohdemaita vahvimmat yhteydet Suomeen ovat Ukrainalla. **Ukrainasta Suomeen suuntautuva turismi ja työperäinen maahanmuutto ovat olleet kasvusuunnassa jo pidemmän aikaa ja jatkoivat kasvuaan myös ensimmäisenä viisumivapausvuonna 2017**. Myös Georgian kohdalla ensimmäisenä viisumivapausvuonna oli nähtävissä myönteistä kehitystä erityisesti Suomeen suuntautuvan turismin kasvaessa, mutta myös myönnettyjen oleskelulupien suhteen. Toisaalta eräs negatiivinen ilmiökin oli havaittavissa **georgialaisen liikkuvan rikollisuuden rantauduttua Suomeen loppuvuonna 2017**. Kuten edellä on todettu, tarkasteluajanjakso Ukrainan ja Georgian kohdalla on kuitenkin hyvin lyhyt ja sen takia on vielä erittäin vaikea tehdä johtopäätöksiä viisumivapauksien vaikutuksista: ei ole vielä tietoa, kuinka tilanne tulee kehittymään pidemmällä aikavälillä, eikä edellä mainittuja kehityskulkuja voida varmasti yhdistää viisumivapauksiin.

¹ Makedonian, Montenegron ja Serbian kohdalla 19.12.2009 lähtien ja Serbian sekä Bosnia ja Hertsegovinan kohdalla 15.12.2010 lähtien.

² Moldovan viisumivapaus tuli voimaan 28.4.2014, Georgian 28.3.2017 ja Ukrainan 11.6.2017.

1. Kansallinen tilannekatsaus

Q1. Short term (within two years) and long-term (beyond two years) trends after the commencement of visa-free regimes disaggregated by region and third countries of interest.³

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Tables 1. External border-crossings; 2. Detections of irregular border crossings; 3. Visa applications; 4. Visa application refusals; 5. Asylum applications and 17. Return decisions.

Western Balkans - FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Länsi-Balkanin maiden kohdalla ei ole nähtävissä selkeitä trendejä, jotka voitaisiin yhdistää viisumivapauteen.

Suomen ulkorajan ylitykset laskivat useiden Länsi-Balkanin maiden kansalaisuuksien kohdalla viisumivapaussopimusten solmimisen aikoihin. Verrattaessa rajanylitysten määrää viisumivapausvuonna (2009 tai 2010) muutaman vuoden takaiseen (2007) esimerkiksi Albanian kansalaisten kohdalla laskua oli 77 prosenttia, Makedonian kohdalla 65 prosenttia ja Bosnia ja Hertsegovinan kohdalla 60 prosenttia. Toisaalta Montenegron ja Serbian kohdalla vastaavaa notkahdusta ei ole havaittavissa. Myös niiden maiden kohdalla, joilla määrät ensiksi laskivat, rajan ylitykset ovat sittemmin kääntyneet uudelleen nousuun, ja kaikkien Länsi-Balkanin maiden kohdalla ulkorajan ylityksissä havaitaan selkeää nousua verrattaessa aikaa ennen viisumivapautta (2007) aikaan viisumivapauden jälkeen (2017). Näiden tilastojen valossa **ei ole mahdollista nähdä selvää yhteyttä viisumivapauden ja ulkorajan ylitysten määrän kehityksen välillä.**

Taulukossa 2 pyydetään tarkastelemaan havaittuja laittomia rajanylityksiä. Suomessa ei ole havaittu Länsi-Balkanin maiden kansalaisten laittomia rajanylityksiä rajanylityspaikkojen välillä. Sen sijaan **pääsyn epäämiset rajanylityspaikoilla ovat odotetusti nousseet hieman kaikkien Länsi-Balkanin maiden kansalaisten kohdalla:** kun viisumeista luovutaan, rajatarkastusten ja maahantulopuhuttelejien merkitys korostuu ja mahdolliset väärinkäytökset havaitaan viisumiprosessin sijasta vasta henkilön saavuttua Suomen ulkorajalle.⁴

Viisumihakemusten lukumäärätietoa ei ole saatavilla ajalta ennen Länsi-Balkanin maiden viisumivapautta.

Turvapaikkahakemusten määrissä voidaan nähdä tiettyä vaihtelua, jolla saattaa olla yhteys viisumivapauteen. Erityisesti **albanialaisten tekemät turvapaikkahakemukset lisääntyivät voimakkaasti vuonna 2015.** Yllättävä kasvu turvapaikanhakijamäärissä tapahtui kuitenkin viisi vuotta viisumivapaussopimuksen solmimisen jälkeen eikä siten näyttäisi olevan viisumivapauden suora seuraus. Albanialaisten turvapaikanhakijoiden ennätysellinen määrä olisi tuskin kuitenkaan ollut mahdollinen ilman viisumivapautta, joten siten asiolla on välillinen yhteys. Kokonaisuutta tarkasteltaessa havaitaan, että albanialaisten tekemät turvapaikkahakemukset nousivat pitkällä aikavälillä noin kymmenestä hakemuksesta (2007) noin sataan (2017) vuosittain. (Albanialaisten tekemiä turvapaikkahakemuksia käsitellään tarkemmin jäljempänä osiossa 3, erityisesti kohdassa Q21.) Joidenkin Länsi-Balkanin maiden kohdalla puolestaan on havaittavissa, että viisumivapaussopimuksen solmimisen jälkeen turvapaikanhakijoiden määrä on noussut, mutta sen jälkeen painunut taas entiselle tai jopa entistä alhaisemmalle tasolle. Näiden tietojen perusteella on **vaikea nähdä selkeitä trendejä Länsi-Balkanin maiden kansalaisten tekemien turvapaikkahakemusten määrän kehityksessä viisumivapaussopimuksen solmimisen jälkeen.** Myönteisten turvapaikkapäätösten määrät ovat olleet hyvin pieniä kaikkien Länsi-Balkanin maiden kansalaisten kohdalla ennen viisumivapautta ja sen jälkeen.

Palauttamispäätösten määrrien vaihtelulla ei näytä olevan yhteyttä viisumivapauksien solmimiseen. Sen sijaan Länsi-Balkanin maiden kansalaisten kohdalla palauttamispäätösten määrä seurailee jonkin verran turvapaikkahakemusten määrää, sillä heille tehtävät myönteiset turvapaikkapäätökset ovat harvinaisia ja kielteisen turvapaikkapäätöksen yhteydessä tehdään maastapoistamispäätös.

³ Please use information such as: increase of entries, number of asylum applications, refusals of entry, return and removal decisions in your answers.

⁴ Lähde: Rajavartiolaitoksen esikunta, haastattelu 14.6.2018.

Eastern Partnership - Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine:

EU:n itäisistä kumppanuusmaista Suomeen suuntautuva liikkuminen on ollut kasvusuunnassa jo pidemmän aikaa. EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden kohdalla trendissä ei ole nähtävissä erityisiä notkahduksia kuten Länsi-Balkanin mailla, joilla kehitys on ollut epätasaisempaa. Toisaalta EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden viisumivapaussopimukset on solmittu niin äskettäin, että valtaosaltaan tätä **kehityskulkua ei voida yhdistää viisumivapauteen**, vaan kyseessä on pidempiaikainen kehitys.

Moldovan kansalaisten rajan ylitysten määrän voimakkaalla kasvulla näyttäisi kuitenkin olevan yhteys viisumivapaussopimuksen solmimiseen vuonna 2014. Suomen ulkorajan ylittäneiden Moldovan kansalaisten määrä yli kymmenkertaistui viisumivapautta edeltävästä vuodesta vuoteen 2017 tultaessa (2 405:stä 28 759:ään). Moldovalaisten rajan ylitysten määrä on yllättävän korkea ottaen huomioon, etteivät moldovalaiset muuten nouse esille tutkimuksessa tarkastelluissa tilastoissa, esimerkiksi hotellimajoitustilastoissa. Rajavartiolaitoksen esikunnan mukaan **Venäjän federaatiossa asuvat moldovalaiset selittävästi luultavasti osan suurista rajanylitysmääristä.**⁵ Toisin sanottuna Venäjällä asuvat moldovalaiset matkustanevat EU-alueelle aiempaa enemmän Suomen kautta. Myös Georgian ja Ukrainan kohdalla rajan ylitysten määrä kasvoi viisumivapausvuonna 2017, mutta trendi on ollut sama jo ennen viisumivapautta eikä kasvua siten voida yhdistää viisumivapauteen, etenkin kun tarkasteluaika viisumivapauden jälkeen on hyvin lyhyt.

Laittomien rajanylitysten osalta pätee sama kuin yllä on todettu Länsi-Balkanin maiden osalta: Suomessa ei ole havaittu Georgian tai Ukrainan kansalaisten laittomia rajanylityksiä rajanylityspaikkojen välillä. **Pääsyn epäämiset ovat kasvaneet jonkin verran** viisumivapaussopimusten solmimisen jälkeen, kuten odotettua.

Viisumihakemuksista saatavilla olevan lukumäärätiedon perusteella ei voida tehdä merkittäviä johtopäätöksiä: viisumihakemusten määrä on kasvanut vähitellen aikana ennen viisumivapautta ja viisumivapausvuonna määrissä on luonnollinen lasku.

Turvapaikkahakemusten määrän kehityksessä voidaan nähdä yhtymäkohta viisumivapauteen georgialaisten kohdalla. **Georgialaisten tekemien turvapaikkahakemusten määrä nousi vuonna 2017 selvästi edellisvuoteen verrattuna** Georgian saatua viisumivapauden maaliskuussa 2017: määrä kuusinkertaistui kahdestakymmenestä sataankahteenkymmeneen. (Georgialaisten tekemiä turvapaikkahakemuksia muine lieveilmiöineen käsitellään tarkemmin jäljempänä luvussa 3, erityisesti kohdassa Q21.) Ukrainan kohdalla ei ole nähtävissä nousua, vaan pikemminkin laskeva trendi: vuonna 2014 turvapaikkahakemusten määrä nousi voimakkaasti Ukrainan sodan johdosta, tämän jälkeen määrät ovat laskeneet. Kehityksellä ei siten vaikuta olevan yhteyttä viisumivapauteen. Moldovalaisten tekemät turvapaikkahakemukset ovat harvinaisia, tosin heti viisumivapautta seuraavana vuonna (2015) hakemusten määrä nousi nolasta viiteentoista, mutta laski heti seuraavana vuonna takaisin noltaan.

Moldovan kansalaisille tehtyjen palauttamispäätösten määrä nousi voimakkaasti ensimmäisenä viisumivapausvuonna 2014, mutta on sen jälkeen palannut entiselle tasolle. Myös georgialaisille tehtyjen palauttamispäätösten määrä kasvoi voimakkaasti Georgian ensimmäisenä viisumivapausvuotena 2017. Tämä kasvu seurailee georgialaisten tekemien turvapaikkahakemusten määrän kasvua. Ukrainan kohdalla palauttamispäätösten kehitys on ollut vaihtelevampaa eikä siinä voida nähdä ajallista yhteyttä viisumivapauden solmimiseen.

⁵ Lähde: Rajavartiolaitoksen esikunta, haastattelu 14.6.2018.

Q2. What are the main links between the countries of origin and Finland or the applicable 'pull factors'⁶ disaggregated by region and third countries of interest?

Western Balkans - FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Suomeen alkoi muodostua **länsibalkanilaisten diaspora 1990-luvulta lähtien**. Tätä aiemmin Suomeen suuntautunut maahanmuutto Länsi-Balkanin alueelta oli vähäistä. Esimerkiksi ensimmäinen Albanian kansalainen on tiettävästi muuttanut Suomeen vuonna 1991.⁷ Tilanne on samansuuntainen myös muiden länsibalkanilaisten kohdalla: vuonna 1990 Suomessa asui ainoastaan harvoja kansalaisuudeltaan tai syntyperältään⁸ länsibalkanilaisia. Sittemmin heidän lukumääränsä on kasvanut.⁹

1990-luvun alussa Suomeen tuli pakolaisia entisen Jugoslavian alueelta Jugoslavian hajomissotien seurauksena. Ensimmäiset noin 260 turvapaikanhakijaa entisestä Jugoslaviasta tulivat Suomeen vuonna 1991. Suurimmillaan turvapaikanhakijoiden määrä oli vuonna 1992, jolloin Suomeen saapui noin 1 900 turvapaikanhakijaa entisen Jugoslavian alueelta, suurin osa Kosovon albaaneja. Heinäkuussa 1992 voimaan tullut entisen Jugoslavian kansalaisille asetettu viisumipakko vaikeutti maahan pääsyä. Seuraavina vuosina Suomeen saapui edelleen turvapaikanhakijoita entisestä Jugos-

laviasta, mutta vähäisemmässä määrin.¹⁰ Vuoden 1992 syksyllä Suomi päätti vastaanottaa kiintiöpakolaisina noin 200 bosnialaista keskitysleirivankia ja heidän omaistaan. Kiintiöpakolaisia vastaanotettiin myös 1990-luvun myöhempinä vuosina.

Tilastokeskuksen väestötilastoissa Suomessa asuvin Bosnia ja Hertsegovinan kansalaisten määrä oli vuonna 1992 hieman alle kaksisataa, viisumivapaus sopimuksen solmimisvuonna 2010 heitä asui Suomessa lähes tuhatkahdeksansataa ja vuonna 2017 heitä oli noin tuhatviisisataa. **Vuonna 2017 länsibalkanilaisista eniten Suomen väestötilastoissa esiintyi entisen Serbia ja Montenegron kansalaisiksi merkittävät, joita oli 3 812.**¹² Serbian kansalaisia oli kirjoilla 661, Albanian kansalaisia 469, Makedonian kansalaisia 224 ja Montenegron kansalaisia 28.¹³

Syntyperän perusteella länsibalkanilaistaustaiset määrittyvät edelleen yleisimmin **entiseksi jugoslavalaisiksi: heitä oli Suomessa vuonna 2017 yli 12 000.**¹⁴

Eastern Partnership - Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine:

Moldova julistautui itsenäiseksi vuonna 1991 ja ensimmäiset Moldovan kansalaiset on kirjattu Suomessa asuviksi vuonna 1992, jolloin heitä oli yhdeksän kappaletta. Kehitys on sittemmin ollut tasaista ja vuonna 2017 Suomessa asui 159 moldovalaista. Syntyperältään moldovalaisiksi ilmoittautuneita oli hieman enemmän: 289 vuonna 2017.

Georgian kohdalla pätee pitkälti sama: ensimmäiset georgialaiset näkyvät Suomen väestötilastoissa vuonna 1992 (25 kappaletta) ja vuonna 2017 Suo-

messassa asui 131 Georgian kansalaista. Syntyperäseen Georgian ilmoittaneita puolestaan oli hieman vähemmän: 108 vuonna 2017.

Myös ensimmäiset Ukrainan kansalaiset näkyvät Suomen väestötilastoissa vuonna 1992, mutta heidän määränsä on jo tuolloin ollut muita EU:n itäisiä kumppanuuksia korkeampi ja sittemmin kasvu on ollut sitäkin voimakkaampaa. Vuonna 2017 Suomessa asui 4 033 Ukrainan kansalaista ja syntyperäseen Ukrainan ilmoittaneita puolestaan oli tästä noin

⁶ These may include: presence of diaspora, historical links between countries, social assistance received by asylum seekers, probability of receiving a residence permit/long-term visa, schemes (tourism, family ties, business) for attracting certain categories of migrants using visa-free regime.

⁷ Leitzinger, Antero (toim.) (2010), Mansikkamaan vartijat - Muistelmia ulkomaalaishallinnosta eri vuosikymmeniltä. Helsinki: Maahanmuuttovirasto. s. 193.

⁸ Syntyperä-luokitus, jota Tilastokeskus käyttää, määräytyy henkilön vanhempien syntymävaltiotiedon perusteella. Syntyperä-luokituksen avulla on helposti eriteltävissä ulkomailla ja Suomessa syntyneet ulkomaalaistaustaiset henkilöt.

⁹ Tilastokeskus, Väestö kansalaisuuden, iän ja sukupuolen mukaan 1990–2017; Tilastokeskus, Väestö syntyperän ja taustamaan, iän ja sukupuolen mukaan 1990–2016. Tiedot haettu Tilastokeskuksen PX-Web-tietokannasta 17.8.2018.

¹⁰ Salminen, Outi (1997), Entisestä Jugoslaviasta tulleiden pakolaisten kotoutuminen "Täällä on kaikki hyvin, mutta...". Helsinki: Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön selvityksiä 1997:9.

¹¹ Stefanovic, Vedran ja Summa, Tarja (1994), Jugoslaviasta Suomeen - Entisen Jugoslavian alueen pakolaiset Suomessa. Suomen mielenterveysseura. s. 21

¹² Kansalaisuudeltaan entiseksi jugoslavalaisiksi merkittävät oli vuonna 2017 edelleen hieman yli sata, vaikka heidän määränsä on vähentynyt jatkuvasti vuodesta 1997 lähtien: vuonna 1997 heidän lukumäärä oli 2521.

¹³ Tilastokeskus, Väestö kansalaisuuden, iän ja sukupuolen mukaan 1990–2017; Tiedot haettu Tilastokeskuksen PX-Web-tietokannasta 17.8.2018.

¹⁴ Tilastokeskus, Väestö syntyperän ja taustamaan, iän ja sukupuolen mukaan 1990–2017. Tiedot haettu Tilastokeskuksen PX-Web-tietokannasta 17.8.2018.

puolet (2 221 henkilöä).¹⁵ **EU:n itäisistä kumpu-panuusmaista tiiveimmät yhteydet Suomeen tuntuvat siten olevan Ukrainalla.** Ukrainalaisia saapuu Suomeen erityisesti työnteon perusteella. Ukrainalaisille myönnettiin 1 313 työntekijän oles-

kelulupaa vuonna 2017. Lisäksi Suomeen saapuu vuosittain tuhansia ukrainalaisia lyhyempiaikaisiin kausitöihin. Ukrainasta Suomeen suuntautuvaa työperusteista maahanmuuttoa on käsitelty jäljempänä kohdassa Q11.

Q3. Which national institutions and/or authorities are involved in implementing the visa liberalisation process and what is their respective role in this process?¹⁶

Viisumivapausneuvottelut käydään Euroopan komission johdolla. Komissio saa poliittisen ohjauksen viisumityöryhmältä, johon jäsenvaltiot osallistuvat. Suomessa vastaava taho on **ulkoministeriö**. Ulkoministeriön virkamies osallistuu viisumityöryhmässä aktiivisesti keskusteluun tarkastellen asiaa yleispoliittiselta, Euroopan ja käsitellyssä olevan maan laajemman suhdekehikon kannalta. Ulkoministeriö huomioi Suomen kansalliset intressit viisumivapausneuvottelujen kaikissa vaiheissa.¹⁷

Viisumityöryhmään osallistuu ulkoministeriön lisäksi yleensä myös **Rajavartiolaitoksen** virkamies.¹⁸

Rajavartiolaitos toteutti suunniteltuihin viisumivapausmaihin arviointimatkoja EU:n yhteisissä monikansallisissa ryhmissä. Arviointimatkoilla selvitettiin muun muassa, toimivatko rajatarkastukset kyseisissä maissa.¹⁹

Kansallisella tasolla **sisäministeriö** pitää esillä erityisesti sisäisen turvallisuuden näkökohtia harkiten, mitä riskejä viisumivapauksista voi seurata. Neuvotteluvaiheessa tarkastellaan maiden tilannetta, esimerkiksi järjestäytyntä rikollisuutta, huumerikollisuutta sekä muita mahdollisia negatiivisia ilmiöitä, jotka saattavat levitä viisumivapauden myötä.²⁰

Q4. Were there changes in your national legislation in connection with the introduction of the visa-free regimes? If yes, please explain their scope and impact on nationals coming from the third countries analysed in this study?

Suomen kansalliseen lainsäädäntöön ei tehty muutoksia.

Q5. Were there any public/policy debates related to the visa liberalisation process in Finland? If yes, what were the main issues discussed and how did this impact national policy?

Kyseiset **viisumivapausneuvottelut eivät aiheuttaneet erityistä poliittista keskustelua Suomessa.** Tämä johtuu osittain siitä, että viisumivapaudet neuvotellaan EU:n johdolla ja Suomi osallistuu viisumivapausprosessiin vain yhtenä EU:n jäsenmaana.

Myöskään Suomen lehdistö ei seurannut viisumivapausprosessia erityisen aktiivisesti, mutta jotain uutisointia aiheesta löytyy.²¹ Uutisointi oli asiapitoista ja toteavaa eikä artikkeleissa spekuloitu viisumivapauksien vaikutuksilla.

¹⁵ Tilastokeskus, Väestö kansalaisuuden, iän ja sukupuolen mukaan 1990–2017; Tilastokeskus, Väestö syntyperän ja taustamaan, iän ja sukupuolen mukaan 1990–2016. Tiedot haettu Tilastokeskuksen PX-Web-tietokannasta 17.8.2018.

¹⁶ For example: changes in instructions for border patrol agents and in equipment.

¹⁷ Lähde: Ulkoministeriö, sähköposti 6.8.2018.

¹⁸ Lähde: Ulkoministeriö, sähköposti 6.8.2018.

¹⁹ Lähde: Sisäministeriö, haastattelu 29.6.2018.

²⁰ Lähde: Sisäministeriö, haastattelu 29.6.2018.

²¹ Esimerkiksi Helsingin Sanomat 8.12.2016: Ukrainalaisille ja georgialaisille viisumivapaus EU:hun. <https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-200004998389.html>; Keski-suomalainen 2.3.2017: Ukrainan EU-viisumivapaus etenee. <https://www.ksml.fi/ulkomaat/Ukrainan-EU-viisumivapaus-etenee/940885>; Yle uutiset 15.12.2010: Albanian ja Bosnian viisumivapaus voimaan. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-5687140>.

2. Viisumivapauksien positiiviset vaikutukset

Q6. What positive impact did the visa liberalisation have on Finland?

Viisumivapauksien positiiviset vaikutukset Suomelle näyttävät tarkasteltujen indikaattorien valossa vähäisiltä. EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden viisumivapaudet ovat olleet voimassa vasta vähän aikaa ja vaikutuksia on vielä vaikea arvioida. Lyhyen aikavälin vaikutukset näyttävät kuitenkin positiivisina pikemminkin kuin negatiivisina. Länsi-

Balkanin maiden kohdalla viisumivapaus on ollut voimassa jo pidemmän aikaa. Pitkällä aikavälillä tarkasteltaessa (2007–2017) esiin ei kuitenkaan noussut merkittäviä positiivisia muutoksia, jotka olisivat yhdistettävissä viisumivapauteen. Aihetta on käsitelty tarkemmin alla ja edelleen kohdissa Q7–Q14.

Western Balkans - FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Länsi-Balkanin maiden viisumivapauksilla ei näyttäisi olleen positiivista vaikutusta Suomeen suuntautuvalla turismille. Majoitustilastot osoittavat, että viisumivapauksien solmimisen jälkeen kyseisistä maista Suomeen suuntautuva turismi on pikemminkin vähentynyt (asiaa käsitelty tarkemmin kohdassa Q10). Viisumivapauksilla ei näyttäisi olevan positiivista vaikutusta myöskään työn perusteella Suomeen saapuneiden määrään (asiaa käsitelty tarkemmin kohdassa Q11). Länsi-Balkanilta Suomeen saapuvien opiskelijoiden ja yrittäjien määrät puolestaan ovat pieniä eikä niissä ole nähtävissä erityisiä trendejä.

Yhteenvedona voidaan todeta, että ainakaan tässä tarkasteltujen indikaattoreiden valossa **Länsi-Balkanin maiden viisumivapauksilla ei nähdä erityisiä positiivisia vaikutuksia Suomelle**, vaan vaikutukset ovat olleet mahdollisesti jopa negatiivisia. On kuitenkin vaikea sanoa, mikä merkitys juuri viisumivapauksilla on ollut kyseisten indikaattorien kehitykseen. Joka tapauksessa Suomi ei vaikuta olevan länsibalkanilaisille tyypillinen kohdemaata turismin, pidempiaikaisen oleskelun eikä liiketoiminnan harjoittamisen suhteen.

Eastern Partnership - Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine:

EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden viisumivapauksien vaikutuksia on vaikea arvioida vielä tässä vaiheessa, koska viisumivapaus on ollut voimassa vasta hyvin vähän aikaa. Lyhyen aikavälin havaintona voidaan todeta kyseisistä maista Suomeen suuntautuneen turismin sekä erityisesti työn perusteella myönnettyjen oleskelulupien määrän kasvaneen viisumivapaussojien solmimisen jälkeen (aiheita käsitelty tarkemmin kohdissa Q10 ja Q11). Määrät ovat kuitenkin

olleet kasvussa jo pidemmän aikaa, vaikkakin viisumivapausvuonna kasvu oli aikaisempaa suurempaa. Siten on vaikea arvioida, mikä yhteys viisumivapauksilla on ollut tarkasteltuihin asioihin. Yhteenvedona voidaan kuitenkin todeta, että **vaikka vaikutuksia on vielä vaikea arvioida, ainakin lyhyellä aikavälillä tarkasteltuna vaikutukset näyttävät pikemmin positiivisina.**

Q7. Did Finland assess the impact of visa liberalisation as positive?

Suomessa ei ole tehty vaikutusarviota viisumivapauksien myöntämisen jälkeen.

Q8. Did your collaboration with relevant third countries improve within the field of migration since the introduction of visa liberalisation?²²

Toistaiseksi ei ole havaittu parannuksia yhteistyössä.

²² For example: in cases of return and readmission.

Q9. Did Finland identify specific economic benefits?²³

Länsi-Balkanin maiden tai EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden viisumivapauksista **ei ole havaittu seuranneen erityisiä taloudellisia hyötyjä Suomelle**. Kysymyksen alaviitteessä kehoitetaan tarkastelemaan esimerkiksi kyseisistä maista Suomeen suuntautuneiden suorien investointien määrien kehitystä. Investointien määrän tarkastelu ei luultavasti ole hyödyllinen indikaattori viisumivapauksien vaikutuksia arvioitaessa. Business Finland²⁴ arvioi,

ettei viisumivapaudella ole olennaista vaikutusta ulkomaisten investointien määrään. Jos yritys on vakavasti kiinnostunut investoimaan Suomeen, yrityksen edustajat saavat yleensä viisumin tullakseen työmatkalle Suomeen. Lisäksi tutkimuksen kohteena olevista viisumivapausmaista Suomeen suuntautuneet investoinnit ovat olleet tarkastelujaksona niin pieniä, ettei niiden perusteella voi tehdä analyysiä syy-seuraus-suhteista.²⁵

Q10. Did Finland experience a growth in tourism²⁶ *from third-country nationals under the visa liberalisation regime?*

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 11. Total number of visitors staying in hotels and other accommodation establishments from the visa-free countries.

Turismin kehitys vaihtelee: joidenkin maiden kansalaisten yöpymiset Suomessa ovat kasvaneet, toisten maiden kohdalla turistien määrät ovat puolestaan laskeneet viisumivapauden myötä. Yleisesti voidaan sanoa, että **Länsi-Balkanilta Suomeen suuntautuva turismi on ollut laskusuunnassa, kun taas EU:n itäisistä kumppanuusmaista saapuvien turistien määrä on kasvanut**.

Länsi-Balkanin maiden viisumivapauksilla ei näyttäisi olleen positiivista vaikutusta kyseisistä maista Suomeen suuntautuvalla turismille. Majoitustilastot kertovat Makedoniasta ja Serbiasta Suomeen saapuneiden turistien määrän laskeneen selvästi ensimmäisenä viisumivapausvuonna: serbialaisten turistien määrä laski neljännekseen viisumivapautta edeltävästä ajasta (hieman yli 1 800:sta alle 400:aan) ja makedonialaisten turistien määrä puolittui (900:sta 400:aan). Serbian kohdalla romahdus tapahtui ensimmäisenä viisumivapausvuonna 2009, kun taas Makedonian kohdalla lasku alkoi jo viisumivapautta edeltävänä vuotena 2008. Sittemmin turistien määrä on lähtenyt uuteen kasvuun, mutta huomionarvoista on, että kummankaan maan kohdalla turistien määrä ei ollut vuonna 2017 saavuttanut vielä vuoden 2007 tasoa. Myös albanialaisia turisteja saapui Suomeen vuonna 2017 vähemmän kuin kymmenen vuotta aikaisemmin. Siten **Makedonian, Serbian ja Albanian kohdalla viisumivapauksilla ei näyttäisi olleen ainakaan positiivista vaikutusta kyseisistä maista Suomeen suuntautuvalla turismille - pikemminkin negatiivinen**. Balkanin maista kasvua on nähtävissä ainostaan Montenegrosta ja Bosnia ja Hertsegovinas-

ta saapuneiden turistien kohdalla. Montenegrolaisten turistien määrä on monikymmenkertaistunut, mutta lähtötason ollessa alhainen (3 turistia vuonna 2007) merkittävästä kasvusta huolimatta turistien määrä jäi vuonna 2017 edelleen alle kahteensataan. Bosnia ja Hertsegovinan kohdalla kasvu on ollut maltillisempaa: turistien määrä on suunnilleen kaksinkertaistunut kymmenessä vuodessa noin 150:stä suunnilleen 300:an. **Montenegrosta ja Bosnia-Hertsegovinasta Suomeen suuntautunut turismi on kasvanut viisumivapauksien voimassaolon aikana.** Ei ole kuitenkaan mahdollista sanoa, vaikuttivatko viisumivapaudet edellä kuvattuihin muutoksiin länsibalkanilaisten Suomeen suuntautuneessa matkailussa. Tietyn maan kansalaisten hotelliyöpymisten määrän kasvuun tai laskuun on useita selittäviä tekijöitä. Viisumivapaus on vain yksi mahdollinen tekijä muiden joukossa, jonka vaikutusta on mahdotonta erotella. Muita todennäköisiä syitä turismin lisääntymiseen on esimerkiksi lähtömaan maan taloudellinen kasvu ja väestön vaurastuminen, joka vaikuttaa heidän mahdollisuuksiinsa matkustella ulkomailla.

Majoitustilastojen perusteella **EU:n itäisistä kumppanuusmaista Suomeen suuntautunut turismi vaikuttaa kasvaneen tarkasteluajanjakson aikana.** EU:n itäisistä kumppanuusmaista eniten turisteja Suomeen saapuu Ukrainasta (noin 9 400 majoittujaa vuonna 2017), seuraavaksi eniten Georgiasta (n. 1 800 majoittujaa) ja vähiten Moldovasta (noin 400 majoittujaa). Turismin kasvu ei ajoitu erityisesti viisumivapauksien solmimisen ajankohtaan, vaan määrät ovat olleet nousussa jo pidempään. Erityisesti Georgian ja Ukrainan kohdalla turismin kasvu on

²³ For example: an increase in direct investments from the respective third countries to your (Member) State.

²⁴ Business Finland on Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriön ohjauksessa toimiva virasto, joka kokoaa saman katon alle innovaatio- ja investointien, kansainvälistymisen ja viennin edistämisen sekä Suomeen suuntautuvien ulkomaisten investointien ja matkailun edistämisen liittyvät palvelut.

²⁵ Lähde: Business Finland, sähköposti 22.8.2018.

²⁶ For example: third-country national visitors staying in hotels and other accommodation establishments increased.

kuitenkin ollut aikaisempia vuosia voimakkaampaa ensimmäisenä viisumivapausvuonna 2017. Näiden tietojen valossa on **vaikea sanoa, kuinka suuri merkitys juuri viisumivapauksien solmimisella on ollut turismin määrän kasvuun**, erityises-

ti kun tarkasteluajanjakso viisumivapauden jälkeen on hyvin lyhyt. Kuten edellä on Länsi-Balkanin maiden osalta todettu, turismin lisääntymiseen on myös muita mahdollisia selittäviä tekijöitä.

Q11. Did Finland experience an impact on its labour market since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 13. Total number of first residence permits issued for remunerated activities reasons to visa-free country nationals.

Länsi-Balkanin viisumivapauksilla ei näyttäisi olevan positiivista vaikutusta työn perustella Suomeen muuttaneiden määrään. Kyseisistä maista Suomeen työn perusteella saapuneiden määrä on laskenut viisumivapauden jälkeen. Työperusteisen oleskeluluvan saaneiden Makedonian, Serbian, Albanian ja Bosnia-Hertsegovinan kansalaisten vuosittainen määrä oli tarkastelujakson lopulla vuonna 2017 merkittävästi alhaisempi kuin ennen viisumivapautta. Siten viisumivapauksilla vaikuttaisi olleen pikemminkin negatiivinen vaikutus työn perusteella Suomeen muuttaneiden määrään, mikäli asioilla ylipäätään on yhteyttä.

EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden kansalaisille työn perusteella myönnettyjen oleskelulupien määrät ovat kasvusuunnassa. Georgian ja Ukrainan kohdalla kasvua tapahtui myös viisumivapausvuonna 2017 ja kasvu oli aikaisempia vuosia voimakkaampaa. Kehitys on kuitenkin ollut samansuuntaista jo pidempään ja tarkasteluajanjakso viisumivapauden jälkeen on hyvin lyhyt, positiivisen kehityksen yhteys viisumivapautteen ei vaikuta

mitenkään selkeältä. Moldovalaiset ja georgialaiset saapuvat Suomeen töihin edelleen verrattain harvoin (alle 20 myönnettyä työntekijän oleskelulupaa vuonna 2017), mutta ukrainalaisille työperusteisia oleskelulupia myönnetään paljon: vuonna 2017 ukrainalaisille myönnettiin yhteensä 1 313 työntekijän oleskelulupaa. Suomessa on voimassa tarveharkinta: EU:n tai ETA-alueen ulkopuolelta tulevien työntekijöiden oleskeluluvan ehtona on työpaikka, johon ei löydy suomalaista työntekijää. Siten ukrainalaisia saapuu töihin aloille, joille on vaikea löytää Suomesta työvoimaa, kuten rakennustyömaille, maataloilta tai marjanpoimintaan. Ukrainan kohdalla työntekijän oleskelulupien lisäksi on tarpeen tarkastella kausityötä. Erityisesti alle 6 kuukauden pituiseen kausityöhön tulevan lupamenettely on normaalia työntekijän oleskeluluvan hakemusmenettelyä edullisempi ja yksinkertaisempi ja siten lyhytaikaisen työskentelyn kohdalla suosittu.²⁷ Suomeen saapuu Ukrainasta vuosittain tuhansia kausityöntekijöitä, joita hyvä palkkataso houkuttelee töihin Suomeen. Ukrainalaiset voivat ansaita Suomessa kotimaansa kuukauden palkan muutamassa päivässä.²⁸

Q12. Did Finland experience a growth in the number of students arriving from third countries since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 14. Total number of first residence permits issued for education reasons to visa-free country nationals.

Länsi-Balkanin maista Suomeen saapuvien **opiskelijoiden määrät ovat pieniä** eikä niissä ole nähtävillä selkeitä trendejä. Albanialaisten ja bosniahertsegovinalaisten opiskelijoiden määrät Suomessa näyttävät kasvun merkkejä, mutta tarkastelujakson lopulla vuonna 2017 määrä oli edelleen alle 20 opiskelijaa vuosittain, joten merkittävästä muutoksesta ei voida puhua.

EU:n itäisistä kumppanuusmaista Suomeen saapuvien **opiskelijoiden määrässä ei ole näkyvillä erityisiä trendejä.** Määrät ovat suhteellisen pieniä, yleisimpänä lähtömaana Ukraina, jonka kansalaisille myönnettiin alle 60 oleskelulupaa opintojen perusteella vuonna 2017.

²⁷ Uusi kausityölaki tuli Suomessa voimaan 1.1.2018. Uuden lainsäädännön mukaan viisumivapaasta maasta alle 3 kuukautta kestäväan kausityöhön saapuvan tulee hakea Maahanmuuttovirastolta kausityötodistus ja yli 3 kuukautta kestäväan kausityöhön saapuvan kausityöoleskelulupa. Aikaisemmin viisumivapaan maan kansalaiselta ei vaadittu mitään todistusta tai lupaa alle 3 kuukautta kestäväan kausityöhön. Yli 3 kuukautta kestäväan kausityöhön vaadittiin työntekijän oleskelulupa.

²⁸ Helsingin Sanomat 18.7.2018: Tuhannet ukrainalaiset tulevat tänne tekemään työt, jotka eivät suomalaisille kelpaa - lisätienestintäkiä ollaan valmiita ikävöimään perhettä kuukausia. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10303168>. Viitattu 3.8.2018.

Q13. *Did Finland experience a growth of entrepreneurship, including of self-employed persons from third countries since the introduction of visa liberalisation?*

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 15. Total number of first residence permits issued to entrepreneurs (including self-employed persons) from visa-free countries.

Länsi-Balkanilta saapuvien **yrittäjien määrät ovat hyvin pieniä** (alle 5 tällä perusteella myönnettyä oleskelulupaa vuosittain) eikä niissä ole nähtävillä mitään trendejä.

Myös EU:n itäisistä kumppanuusmaista saapuvien **yrittäjien määrät ovat hyvin pieniä** (alle 5 oleskelulupaa vuosittain) eikä niissäkään ole nähtävillä trendejä.

Q14. *Did Finland experience a growth in trade with third countries since the introduction of visa liberalisation?*

Ei, **viisumivapauksilla tuskin on juurikaan yhteyttä näiden maiden kaupan kasvuun EU-maiden kanssa.** Suurta vaikutusta on puolestaan sillä, että EU on solminut kyseisten maiden kanssa assosiaatiosopimukset, jotka sisältävät vapakauppaosiot (DFCTA, *Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement*). DCFTA-sopimukset takaavat kyseisten maiden tuotteille tullittoman pääsyn EU-markkinoille sekä muita etuisuuksia. Muita tekijöitä kaupan kasvuun tai laskulle ovat esimerkiksi satokauden kuivuus tai sade, jotka voivat vaikuttaa siihen, paljonko elintarvikkeita voidaan myydä ulkomaille. EU:lla on myös vahvat tukiohjelmät kyseisten maiden tuotantosektoreille ENI-rahoitusinstrumentin ja muiden apurahojen muodossa. Luultavasti ENI:n avustusrahat alkavat myös vuosi vuodelta näkyä siinä, että paikalliset yritykset saavat nostettua tuotantoaan EU-maiden vaatimuksia vastaaviksi ja saavat myytyä enemmän tuotteitaan EU-alueelle. Ulkoministeriön arvio oli, että ENI vaikuttaa varmasti enemmän kuin viisumivapaus. Usein käy myös niin, että yksittäinen iso kauppa jonkin maan kanssa muuttaa koko vuoden kauppatilaston.²⁹

Suomen ulkomaankaupan kehityksessä kyseisten maiden kanssa ei ole nähtävissä mitään trendiä, joka voitaisiin yhdistää viisumivapauksiin. Suomen kaupan Länsi-Balkanin maiden kanssa todettiin olevan vielä vähäisellä tasolla. Kauppa-suhteiden tiivistymisen todettiin liittyvän enemmän siihen, kuinka maat ovat onnistuneet tai onnistuvat sosioekonomisissa uudistuksissa, oikeusvaltion kehittämisessä ja talouden rakennemuutoksissa, liiketoimintaympäristön parantamisessa sekä kilpailukyvyyn kehittämisessä. EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden kanssa käydyn kaupan kasvuun tai laskuun vaikuttavina tekijöinä mainittiin puolestaan Venäjän ruplan kurssi sekä se, millaisia tuontirajoituksia milloinkin Venäjä asettaa entisen Neuvostoliiton maiden elintarvikkeille. Yhteenvetona voidaan todeta, että kaupan kehitykseen vaikuttaa todella moni asia ja viisumivapauden vaikutuksen ulkomaankauppaan voi kyseenalaistaa.³⁰

²⁹ Lähde: Ulkoministeriö, sähköpostit 29.6., 3.7. ja 27.7.2018.

³⁰ Lähde: Ulkoministeriö, sähköpostit 29.6., 3.7. ja 27.7.2018.

3. Viisumivapauksien aiheuttamat haasteet

Q15. Did Finland face certain challenges since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Suomessa on nähty kaksi viisumivapauksiin liittyvää haastetta: **albanialaisten tekemät perusteettomat turvapaikkahakemukset** erityisesti vuonna 2015 ja turvapaikkaprosessia samoin hyödyntävien

georgialaisten liikkuvien rikollisten tekemät omaisuusrikokset vuodesta 2017 lähtien. Katso tarkemmin Q21.

Western Balkans - FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Albanialaisten tekemien turvapaikkahakemusten määrä kasvoi voimakkaasti vuonna 2015. Aihetta on käsitelty tarkemmin kohdassa Q21. Muiden Bal-

kanin maiden kohdalla ei ole havaittu erityisiä haasteita viisumivapauden seurauksena.

Eastern Partnership - Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine:

Suomeen saapui loppuvuonna 2017 georgialaisia liikkuvia rikollisia turvapaikkaprosessin turvin. Aihetta on käsitelty tarkemmin kohdassa Q21. Muiden EU:n

itäisten kumppanuusmaiden kohdalla ei ole havaittu erityisiä haasteita viisumivapauden seurauksena.

Q16. Did Finland encounter a rise in illegal employment since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 20. Total number of nationals from the visa-free countries found in illegal employment.

Aiheesta on saatavilla tilastoja vasta vuodesta 2015 lähtien, joten Länsi-Balkanin maiden kohdalla vertailua ennen viisumivapautta ja viisumivapauden jälkeen ei voida tehdä tilastojen valossa. Tutkimusta varten haastatellut lähteet eivät kuitenkaan mainineet, että laitton työnteko olisi noussut esille erityisesti länsibalkanilaisten kohdalla. **Siten viisumivapaus ei oletettavasti ole aiheuttanut ainakaan voimakasta laittoman työn kasvu Länsi-Balkanin maiden kohdalla.**

EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden kansalaisten kohdalla laitonta työntekoa esiintyy jonkin verran, mutta ilmiötä ei voida yhdistää viisumivapauteen. Ukrainalaiset nousevat esille laittoman työn tilastoissa. Luvut ovat melko matalia (13

tapausta vuonna 2017), mutta kaikki tapaukset eivät tule viranomaisten tietoon. Aluehallintovirastosta todettiin, että tällä hetkellä juuri ukrainalaisten laitton työnteko on osoittautunut haasteeksi. Laittomasti työskentelevien ukrainalaisten kerrottiin kuitenkin saapuvan Suomeen usein toisen EU-valtion myöntämällä viisumilla tai muulla luvalla taikka väärrennettyjen asiakirjojen avulla ja siten ilmiö ei liity viisumivapauteen. Jonkin verran on tullut ilmi myös tapauksia, joissa ukrainalaisia on pyrkinyt maahan turisteiksi viisumivapauden turvin, mutta matkan tosiasialliseksi tarkoitukseksi on paljastunut työnteko. Ilmiö ei kuitenkaan ole sikäli merkittävä, että viisumivapauden voitaisiin sanoa aiheuttaneen laittoman työn kasvu.³¹

³¹ Source: Regional State Administrative Agency, emails 13 June and 14 June 2018.

Q17. *Did Finland encounter a rise in smuggled and/or trafficked persons from the visa-free countries since the introduction of visa liberalisation?*

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Tables 21. Total number of smuggled persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings) and 22. Total number of trafficked persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings).

Tilastotietoja ei ole saatavilla, sillä salakuljetettavan tai ihmiskaupan uhrin kansalaisuutta ei tilastoida.

Rajavartiolaitos totesi, että **havainnot ja kyseisten maiden kansalaisten salakuljetuksesta Suomeen ei ole**. Yleisellä tasolla voidaan todeta, ettei viisumivapaus lisää tarvetta salakuljetukselle, vaan ihmissalakuljetuksen riski todennäköisesti pienenee, kun laillinen rajan ylittäminen helpottuu.³²

Ihmiskaupan uhrien auttamisjärjestelmästä todettiin, että auttamisjärjestelmän piiriin on ohjautunut yksittäisiä kyseisten maiden kansalaisia viimeis-

ten kymmenen vuoden aikana. Määrissä näkyy vain normaalia vuosittaista vaihtelua eikä yhteyttä viisumivapauteen ole nähtävissä. Yleisellä tasolla todettiin lisäksi, että viisumivapauden piiriin kuuluvat henkilöt siirtyvät niin nopeasti maasta toiseen, ettei esimerkiksi seksuaalisen hyväksikäytön uhreja tavoiteta helposti. Rajanylityksiin on vaikea puuttua, kun kyseessä on laillisesti rajan ylittävä henkilö.³³ Tässäkin mielessä kysymyksenasettelu voidaan siten kyseenalaistaa ja pohtia, onko viisumivapauden oletettu vaikutus tunnistettuun ihmiskauppaan sitä lisäävä vai vähentävä.

Q18. *Did Finland encounter a rise in the number of identified facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence since the introduction of visa liberalisation?*

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 23. Total number of identified facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence from the visa-free countries (final court rulings).

Ei, **laittoman maahantulon järjestäminen ei yleistynyt** viisumivapauksien myötä. Kyseisten maiden kansalaisia on tuomittu laittoman maahantulon järjestämisestä ainoastaan kaksi kertaa viimeisten kymmenen vuoden aikana: yksi ukrainalainen vuon-

na 2014 ja yksi serbialainen vuonna 2016. Yleisellä tasolla laittoman maahantulon järjestämisen tarve todennäköisesti vähenee viisumivapauden myötä, kun laillinen rajan ylittäminen helpottuu.

Q19. *Did Finland encounter a rise in the number of nationals found to be illegally present from the visa-free countries since the introduction of visa liberalisation?*

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 24. Total number of nationals found to be illegally present from the visa-free countries.

Selvää kasvua laittomasti maassa tavattujen määrissä ei ole havaittavissa. Poikkeuksena on Serbia, jonka kansalaisten kohdalla havaitaan huomattava kasvu viisumivapausvuotta seuraavana vuotena: vuodesta 2009 vuoteen 2010 laittomasti maassa tavattujen serbialaisten määrä kuusinkertaistui 35:stä 230:een. Nousu oli kuitenkin lyhytaikainen

ja laittomasti maassa tavattujen serbialaisten määrä on sittemmin palannut alhaisemmalle tasolle kuin ennen viisumivapautta. Muiden tutkittavien maiden kohdalla laittomasti maassa tavattujen kansalaisten määrissä on normaalia vuosittaista vaihtelua, jolla ei vaikuta olevan selvää yhteyttä viisumivapausso-
pimusten solmimiseen.

³² Lähde: Rajavartiolaitoksen esikunta, haastattelu 14.6.2018.

³³ Lähde: Ihmiskaupan uhrien auttamisjärjestelmä, sähköposti 9.8.2018.

Q20. Did Finland encounter a rise in the number of overstayers since the introduction of visa liberalisation?

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 25. Total number of overstayers from the visa-free countries.

Ei, oleskeluoikeutensa päättymisen jälkeen maahan jääneiden määrissä näkyy **normaalia vuosittaista vaihtelua**, jolla ei vaikuta olevan yhteyttä viisumivapaussopimusten solmimiseen.

Q21. Did Finland encounter any signs of possible misuse of the visa liberalisation?³⁴

Suomessa on nähtävissä **kaksi ilmiötä**, jotka vaikuttavat viisumivapauksien väärinkäytöltä: albanialaisten tekemät perusteettomat turvapaikkahakemukset erityisesti vuonna 2015 ja georgialaisten liikkuvien rikollisten tekemät omaisuusrikokset vuodesta 2017 lähtien.

Albanian kansalaisten tekemien turvapaikkahakemusten määrä alkoi kasvaa vähitellen viisumivapauden voimaantumisen jälkeen. Viisumivapauden ensimmäisinä vuosina 2010 ja 2011 Albaniasta saapui Suomeen noin 10 turvapaikanhakijaa vuosittain. Tästä eteenpäin määrät kohosivat vähitellen siten, että vuonna 2014 Suomesta haki turvapaikkaa 110 albanialaista. **Ennätyksellinen vuosi oli 2015, jolloin 760 albanialaista haki Suomesta turvapaikkaa.** Albanialaisten tekemiä turvapaikkahakemuksia voidaan pitää turvapaikkajärjestelmän väärinkäyttönä, sillä yhdellekään albanialaiselle ei myönnetty kansainvälistä suojelua vuosina 2014 tai 2015.³⁵ Lisäksi valtaosa aineellisesti tutkituista hakemuksista todettiin ilmeisen perusteettomiksi.³⁶ Suomessa tehtiin tiettyjä toimenpiteitä vuonna 2015 (katso Q45), minkä jälkeen albanialaisten tekemien turvapaikkahakemusten määrä on laskenut noin sataan vuosittain. Turvapaikkahakemusten määrän kasvua **ei voida suoraan yhdistää Albanian kanssa solmittuun viisumivapautteen** ja ilmiölle on todennäköisesti myös muita selityksiä. Esimerkiksi elokuussa 2015 Maahanmuuttoviraston tietoon kantautui Albaniassa liikkunut huhu, jonka mukaan Suomesta kannattaa hakea turvapaikkaa. Kuulopuheen mukaan Suomesta olisi saanut helposti töitä, ja mikäli työnhaku epäonnistuu, ainakin paljon rahaa uudelleenkotoutumistukena jos palaa vapaaehtoisesti Albaniaan. Toteutunut turvapaikanhakijoiden määrän kasvu

olisi tuskin kuitenkaan ollut mahdollinen ilman joitakin vuosia aiemmin solmittua viisumivapautta, joten asioiden välillä voidaan nähdä yhteys.

Euroopan itäisistä kumppanuusmaista Suomeen saapuneiden turvapaikanhakijoiden määrä on kasvanut Georgian kohdalla: **georgialaisten turvapaikanhakijoiden määrä kuusinkertaistui** noin 20 hakijasta vuosittain 120 hakijaan vuonna 2017. Ilmiö ei ole saavuttanut samoja mittasuhteita kuin albanialaisten turvapaikanhakijoiden saapuminen kaksi vuotta aikaisemmin. Georgian kohdalla turvapaikanhakijatilanteeseen liittyy kuitenkin **erittäin negatiivinen lieveilmiö georgialaisten liikkuvien rikollisryhmien hyödyntäessä suunnitelmallisesti turvapaikkaprosessia omaisuusrikosten tekemiseen.** Georgialaisrikolliset ovat toimineet jo pitkään EU-alueella, mutta heidän toimintansa on aiemmin vain harvoin yltänyt Suomeen. Viisumivapauden myötä georgialaisia liikkuvia rikollisia on alkanut saapua EU-alueelle laillisesti biometristen passien viisumivapautta hyödyntäen. Loppuvuonna 2017 Suomeen saapui meriteitse muutama joukko georgialaisia, jotka ilmoittautuivat turvapaikanhakijoiksi, käyttivät vääriä identiteettejä ja kätkivät asiakirjojaan. Monet heistä päätyivät poliisin huostaan jäätyään kiinni myymälävarkauksista pian turvapaikan hakemisen jälkeen.³⁷ Toisaalta osa on ilmoittautunut turvapaikanhakijoiksi vasta omaisuusrikoksista kiinni jäätyään.³⁸ Monien georgialaisrikollisten taustalta on paljastunut rekisteritarkastuksissa, että he ovat liikkuneet jo pitkään eri EU-maissa, ja kansainvälisen tiedonvaihdon ansiosta heitä on tunnistettu liikkuviksi rikollisiksi.³⁹ Georgialaisten liikkuvan rikollisuuden osalta tulee huomioda, että **kyse on muutaman rikollisjärjestön toiminnasta.**

³⁴ For example, dealing with cases when persons enter the country legally but later become illegally employed, are staying in the country legally, but are working without a work permit or apply for asylum without reasonable grounds.

³⁵ Suomessa turvapaikkaprosessin yhteydessä selvitetään tietyissä tilanteissa myös muut perusteet oleskeluluvalle. Kahdelle albanialaiselle myönnettiin turvapaikkaprosessissa oleskelulupa muusta syystä vuonna 2014, vuonna 2015 oleskelulupia ei myönnetty lainkaan.

³⁶ Aineellisesti ratkaistujen hakemusten lisäksi osa hakemuksista raukesi hakijan peruutettua hakemuksensa tai kadottua vastaanottokeskuksesta sinne palaamatta.

³⁷ Lähde: Keskusrikospoliisi, Laittomasti maassa oleskelleina tavatut: viranomaisten havaitsemat tapaukset vuonna 2017. Päivätty 22.1.2018.

³⁸ Lähde: Keskusrikospoliisi, Laittomasti maassa olleina tavatut: viranomaisten sisämaassa havaitsemat tapaukset tammi-huhtikuussa 2018. Päivätty 14.5.2018.

³⁹ Lähde: Keskusrikospoliisi, Laittomasti maassa oleskelleina tavatut: viranomaisten havaitsemat tapaukset vuonna 2017. Päivätty 22.1.2018.

Q22. *Did Finland as a country of destination face any administrative burden⁴⁰ since the introduction of the visa-free regime?*

Viisumivapauksista **ei ole seurannut Suomessa merkittävää hallinnollista taakkaa**. Edellä kohdassa Q21. mainitut ilmiöt ovat kuitenkin lisänneet myös viranomaisten työtä. Albanialaisten tekemät lukuisat turvapaikkahakemukset erityisesti vuonna 2015 työllistivät ensin Maahanmuuttovirastoa, joka

on vastuussa turvapaikkahakemusten ratkaisemisesta, sekä myöhemmin poliisia, joka vastaa maasta poistamisesta. Myös georgialaisten liikkuvien rikollisten toiminta Suomessa vuoden 2017 lopulta lähtien on lisännyt jonkin verran poliisin työtä.

Q23. *List the institutions that faced administrative burdens.*

Maahanmuuttovirasto ja poliisi.

Q24. *Did Finland as a country of destination face any security risks since the introduction of the visa-free regime?*

Yllä kohdassa Q21 kuvatun georgialaisten liikkuvan rikollisuuden kasvun lisäksi ei ole havaittu muita uhkia.

Q25. *What types of offences⁴¹ were committed by third-country nationals in Finland after the commencement of the visa-free regime?⁴² Were there any significant differences compared to the time before the visa-free regime started?*

Georgialaisten tekemät omaisuusrikokset ovat yleistyneet viisumivapauden jälkeen (katso Q21). Muiden kansalaisuuksien kohdalla rikollisuuden kasvua ei ole ollut nähtävissä.

Q26. *What was the rate of offences (final court rulings) committed by third-country nationals⁴³ in Finland after the commencement of the visa-free regime? Were there any significant differences compared to the time before the visa-free regime started?*

Lainvoimaiset tuomiot 2007-2016 -tilastosta⁴⁴ ei nouse esille piikkejä viisumivapausmaiden kansalaisten rikostilastoissa eikä muitakaan trendejä, jotka voitaisiin yhdistää viisumivapauksiin. Edellä kohdissa Q21 ja Q24 on todettu georgialaisten liikkuvan rikollisuuden kasvaneen loppuvuonna 2017. Tätä kasvua ei kuitenkaan voida nähdä lainvoimaiset tuomiot -ti-

lastosta, jonka tiedot ulottuvat ainoastaan vuoteen 2016 saakka. Sen sijaan ilmiötä kuvaa tilasto rikosepäilyistä, jonka mukaan georgialaisten rikosepäilyt viisinkertaistuivat vuonna 2017 edellisvuoteen verrattuna: georgialaisia epäiltiin lähes kolmestasadasta rikoslakirikoksesta, kun aikaisempina vuosina määrä on ollut noin kuusikymmentä vuosittain.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ For example: significant increase of residence permit applications, increased demand for work permits, more time-consuming border control procedure due to the lack of visas. etc.

⁴¹ Please use this pre-defined list of categories: cybercrime; drugs offences; economic and financial offences; illicit immigration; illicit trafficking (not drug related); offences against property; offences against public order and safety; offences against public trust (e.g. fraud, forgery, counterfeiting); offences against the person; sexual exploitation of children (including child pornography); sexual offences against adults; terrorism-related activity; trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants.

⁴² This applies to third-country nationals who do not live your country, but visited (short stay of up to 90 days).

⁴³ See above.

⁴⁴ Lähde: Tilastokeskus, Tuomitut kansalaisuuksittain 2007□2016. Toimitettu pyydettyä sähköpostilla 13.8.2018.

⁴⁵ Lähde: Keskusrikospoliisi, Laittomasti maassa olleina tavatut: viranomaisten sisämaassa havaitsemat tapaukset tammi-huhtikuussa 2018. Päiväty 14.5.2018.

Q27. *What is the role and impact of irregular migration facilitators that provide their services to third-country nationals with an entry ban? Please provide a short description with specific examples about your (Member) State situation and make a clear distinction between people who assist migrants and people who are profiting from facilitation.*

Answer this question by making a link with the data presented in Table 21. Total number of smuggled persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings), 22. Total number of trafficked persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings) and 23. Total number of identified facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence from the visa-free countries (final court rulings).

Ilmiö ei näy Suomessa erityisesti viisumivapauden saaneiden maiden kohdalla.⁴⁶

Q28. *How did the activities of irregular migration facilitators impact Finland?⁴⁷*

Suomessa ei ole ilmennyt laittoman rajan ylityksen fasilitointia viisumivapauden saaneiden maiden kansalaisten kohdalla.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Lähde: Rajavartiolaitoksen esikunta, haastattelu 14.6.2018.

⁴⁷ Did their activities lead to increases in irregular border-crossings, enhanced border controls or document fraud?

⁴⁸ Lähde: Rajavartiolaitoksen esikunta, haastattelu 14.6.2018.

4. Toimenpiteet viisumivapauksien väärinkäytön ehkäisemiseksi

Q29. Did Finland implement certain measures to deal with the challenges that appeared after the commencement of the visa-free regime?

Yleisesti voidaan todeta, että viisumivapaudet **ei-vät ole aiheuttaneet Suomelle haasteita, joiden takia olisi jouduttu tekemään poikkeuksellisia toimenpiteitä**. Viisumivapauden Suomelle aiheuttamina haasteina tutkimuksessa on mainittu albanialaisten turvapaikanhakijoiden suuri määrä vuon-

na 2015 ja georgialaiset liikkuvat rikolliset vuonna 2017. Albanialaisten turvapaikanhakijoiden johdosta tehtyjä toimenpiteitä on käsitelty alla kohdissa Q30 ja Q45. Georgialaisten liikkuvien rikollisten johdosta tehtyjä toimenpiteitä puolestaan on käsitelty kohdassa Q38.

Western Balkans - FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Albanialaisten turvapaikanhakijoiden määrän kasvun johdosta tehtyjä toimenpiteitä on käsitelty kohdassa Q30 ja Q45. Ei muita mainittavia toimenpiteitä.

Eastern Partnership - Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine:

Georgialaisten liikkuvien rikollisten johdosta tehtyjä toimenpiteitä on käsitelty kohdassa Q38. Ei muita mainittavia toimenpiteitä.

Q30. Did Finland implement measures to increase the efforts to promote voluntary return? If yes, for which nationalities and explain their impact?

Albanialaisia turvapaikanhakijoita kannustettiin vapaaehtoiseen paluuseen. Maahanmuuttovirasto järjesti syyskuussa 2015 albanialaisia turvapaikanhakijoita majoittavassa vastaanottokeskuksessa **tiedotustilaisuuden**, jossa kerrottiin, että albanialaisille myönnetään hyvin harvoin kansainvälistä suojelua ja jos hakemuksen peruuttaa ja lähtee kotiin vapaaehtoisesti, saa matkustaa IOM:n järjestämällä lentolipulla ilman poliisisaattoja ja voi välittyä

maahantulokielloilta. Tiedotustilaisuuteen osallistui noin 30 albanialaista turvapaikanhakijaa, joista noin 10 peruutti hakemuksensa ja lähti kotimaahansa vapaaehtoisesta paluun kautta.⁴⁹ Siten tiedotustilaisuutta pitää kohtalaisen tehokkaana toimenpiteenä, vaikka tästä ei ole tehty virallista vaikuttavuusarviota.

Muita turvapaikanhakijatilanteen johdosta tehtyjä toimenpiteitä on käsitelty kohdassa Q45.

Q31. Did Finland implement measures to expand the legal possibilities of stay? If yes, for which nationalities and explain their impact.

Ei tällaisia toimenpiteitä: viisumivapausmaiden kansalaisten laillista oleskelua ei ole edelleen helpotettu viisumivapauden myöntämisen jälkeen.

Q32. Did Finland implement measures to fight illegal employment? If yes, please explain their impact and add specific examples.

Ei toimenpiteitä. Katso Q16: laittoman työnteon kasvua ei ole havaittu.

⁴⁹ Lähde: Maahanmuuttoviraston vastaanottoyksikkö, sähköposti 25.6.2018.

Q33. Did Finland implement measures to fight the smuggling and/or trafficking of persons from the visa-free countries? If yes, please explain their impact and add specific examples.

Ei toimenpiteitä. Katso Q17: ihmissalakuljetuksessa tai ihmiskaupassa ei ole havaittu kasvua.

Q34. Did Finland implement measures to fight the activities of facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence? If yes, please explain their impact and add specific examples

Ei toimenpiteitä. Katso Q18: laittoman maahantulon järjestämisessä ei ole havaittu kasvua.

Q35. Did Finland implement measures to reduce the incidence of nationals found to be illegally present in your country? If yes, please explain their impact and add specific examples.

Ei toimenpiteitä. Katso Q19: laittomasti maassa tavattujen määrissä ei ole havaittu kasvua.

Q36. What was the effectiveness of the measures listed above and which of them were most successful in reaching their intended goals? Please provide any good practices / lessons learned you have identified.

Vapaaehtoisesta paluusta tiedottamista albanialaisille turvapaikanhakijoille on arvioitu kohdassa (Q30). Muita albanialaisten turvapaikanhakijoiden määrän kasvusta aiheutuneita toimenpiteitä on arvioitu kohdassa Q46.

Ei muita toimenpiteitä tai hyviä käytänteitä.

Q37. Did Finland implement measures to deal with administrative burdens since the introduction of the visa-free regime?⁵⁰ If yes, please list and explain these measures, their impact / effectiveness and add any good practices / lessons learned you have identified.

Albanialaisten turvapaikanhakijoiden voimakas kasvu erityisesti vuonna 2015 aiheutti myös hallinnollista työtä. Kyseisen ilmiön johdosta tehtyjä toimenpiteitä on käsitelty kohdassa Q45.

Q38. Did Finland implement measures to deal with the possible misuse of visa liberalisation?⁵¹ If yes, list and explain these measures, their impact / effectiveness and add any good practices / lessons learned you have identified.

Tutkimuksessa on todettu Suomessa olevan nähtävissä kaksi ilmiötä, jotka vaikuttavat viisumivapauksien väärinkäytöltä: albanialaisten tekemät perusteettomat turvapaikkahakemukset vuonna 2015 ja georgialaisten liikkuvien rikollisten tekemät omaisuusrikokset vuodesta 2017 lähtien. Turvapaikkatilanteen johdosta tehtyjä toimenpiteitä on käsitelty erikseen sille varatuissa kohdassa Q45. **Georgia-**

laisten liikkuva rikollisuus ei ole aiheuttanut poikkeuksellisia toimenpiteitä, vaan on pystytty hoitamaan poliisin normaalin toiminnan puitteissa. Liikkuvia rikollisia tunnustetaan kansainvälisen tiedonvaihdon avulla ja heidän toimintaansa estetään säilössä pidolla.⁵² Asia on nostettu esille myös poliittisella tasolla Georgian kanssa.⁵³

Q39. How did Finland deal with cases when third-country nationals entered the country legally, but did not legalize their stay after 90 days (overstayers)?

Tutkimuksen aiheena olevien kansalaisuuksien kohdalla viisumivapausajan ylitykset eivät näy ilmiötasolla.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ For example: significant increase of residence permit applications, increased demand for work permits, more time-consuming border control procedure due to the lack of visas. etc.

⁵¹ For example, dealing with cases when persons enter the country legally but later become illegally employed, are staying in the country legally, but are working without a work permit or apply for asylum without reasonable grounds.

⁵² Lähde: Keskusrikospoliisi, Laittomasti maassa oleskelleina tavatut: viranomaisten havaitsemat tapaukset vuonna 2017. Päivätty 22.1.2018.

⁵³ Sisäministeriö, haastattelu 29.6.2018.

⁵⁴ Rajavartiolaitoksen esikunta, haastattelu 14.6.2018.

Yleisesti tavattaessa viisumivapausajan ylittänyt henkilö hänelle annetaan sakko ja ryhdytään maastapoistamistoiimiin. Poliisi totesi, että yleensä tällaisessa tilanteessa henkilö otetaan säilöön, lentojen järjestämiseksi ja muiden palautusjärjestelyjen hoi-

tamiseksi.⁵⁵ Rajavartiolaitos totesi, että mikäli viisumiajan ylitys on merkittävä, Maahanmuuttovirastolle tehdään maastapoistamisesitys, sillä Maahanmuuttovirasto voi määrätä maahantulokiellon kahta vuotta pidemmäksi ajaksi.⁵⁶

Q40. In the case of overstayers from the visa-free countries, does Finland apply a different return procedure compared to the usual procedure?

Ei, katso Q39.

Q41. Does Finland apply any special procedures in cases where overstayers have lost their identification documents or in instances where there are problems with their identification?

Ei kansallisia erityiskäytäntöjä. Viisumivapausmaiden kohdalla takaisinotto on määrätty EU-tason asiakirjoissa.⁵⁷

Q42. How did your cooperation with the visa-free countries evolve over time in terms of assistance and information exchange, before and after the visa-free regime commencement? ⁵⁸

Ei ole havaittu muutosta yhteistyössä.

Q43. How effective was the cooperation with third countries to reach your desired goals? Were there any particular differences in your interactions with different third countries and did you identify any good practices / lessons learned?

Ei sovellu. Suomella ei ole kyseisten maiden suhteen erityisiä tavoitteita, EU:lla on viisumivapausneuvotteluissa suurempi intressi.

Q44. How did Finland respond to the influx of asylum seekers from the visa-free countries? ⁵⁹

Kohdassa Q21 on todettu, että **albanialaisten turvapaikanhakijoiden määrä kasvoi viisumivapauden jälkeen**. Erityisen paljon albanialaisten tekemiä turvapaikkahakemuksia vastaanotettiin vuoden 2015 heinäkuussa (281 hakemusta) ja elokuussa (161 hakemusta).⁶⁰ Hakemukset olivat pääasiassa ilmeisen perusteettomia. Samaan aikaan Maahanmuuttovirastoon kantautui tieto Albaniassa kiertäneestä huhusta, jonka mukaan Suomesta kannattaa hakea turvapaikkaa. Kuulopuheen mukaan Suomesta olisi saanut helposti töitä, ja mikäli työnhaku epäonnistuu, ainakin paljon rahaa uudelleenkotoutumistukena, jos palaa vapaaehtoisesti Albaniaan. Elokuussa 2015 **albanialaisille myönnettävää vapaaehtoisien paluun tukea alennettiin** siten, että käteistuesta ja hyödyketuesta luovuttiin ja vapaaehtoisen paluun tukena myönnettiin tyypillisesti vain matkat.⁶¹

Lisäksi Maahanmuuttovirasto järjesti albanialaisia turvapaikanhakijoita majoittavassa vastaanottokeskuksessa **tiedotustilaisuuden**, jossa turvapaikanhakijoita kannustettiin palaamaan vapaaehtoisesti (aiheesta tarkemmin kohdassa Q16). Viisumivapauden saaneiden maiden kansalaisten turvapaikkahakemukset myös ohjattiin **Fast Track -prosessiin**, jossa turvapaikkahakemukset käsitellään erityisen nopeasti. Lisäksi syksyllä 2015 useita Balkanin maita, Albania mukaan luettuna, linjattiin **turvallisiksi alkuperämaiksi**, jolloin kyseisen maan kansalaisen tekemä turvapaikkahakemus voidaan katsoa ilmeisen perusteettomaksi ja hakemus voidaan ratkaista nopeutetussa menettelyssä. Tällöin ratkaisun yhteydessä tehty käännytyspäätös on täytäntöönpanokelpoinen jo kahdeksantena päivänä päätöksen tiedoksiannosta.⁶²

⁵⁵ Poliisihallitus, haastattelu 15.6.2018.

⁵⁶ Rajavartiolaitoksen esikunta, haastattelu 14.6.2018.

⁵⁷ Lähde: Poliisi.

⁵⁸ For example, in terms of information campaigns in the third countries working on the elimination of 'push factors' – unemployment, poverty, poor conditions in the national health system, assistance to visa-free countries from Member States and reintegration assistance to returnees.

⁵⁹ For example, using the concept of safe country of origin.

⁶⁰ Lähde: Maahanmuuttoviraston tilastopalvelu, tilastot.migri.fi.

⁶¹ Lähde: Maahanmuuttovirasto, vastaanottoyksikkö, sähköposti 25.6.2018.

⁶² Lähde: Maahanmuuttovirasto, turvapaikkayksikkö, sähköposti 28.6.2018.

Euroopan itäisistä kumppanusmaista Suomeen saapuneiden turvapaikanhakijoiden määrä on kasvanut Georgian kohdalla: georgialaisten turvapaikanhakijoiden määrä kuusinkertaistui noin 20 hakijasta vuosittain 120 hakijaan vuonna 2017. Ukrainan ja Moldovan kohdalla hakijamäärät ovat pysyneet entisellä

tasollaan tai laskeneet. Vuonna 2017 käynnistettiin selvitys, voidaanko Georgiaa, Ukrainaa ja Moldovaa pitää turvallisina alkuperämaina. Tutkimuksen kirjoitushetkellä (elokuu 2018) **Georgia on määritetty turvalliseksi alkuperämaaksi**. Ukrainan ja Moldovan osalta linjausta ei ole vielä tehty.

Q45. *Were the measures of Finland effective to manage the influx of asylum seekers from the visa-free countries? Please provide a short description of your national situation highlighting any good practices / lessons learned you have identified.*

Albanian turvapaikanhakijatilanteen johdosta elosyyskuussa 2015 tehtyjä toimenpiteitä **voidaan pitää tehokkaina, sillä Albaniasta saapuneiden turvapaikanhakijoiden määrä alkoi laskea heti**

loppuvuotta 2015 kohti. Toimenpiteistä ei ole tehty virallista vaikuttavuusarviota, mutta oletettavasti ainakin paluutuen alentamisella ja turvapaikanhakijoiden määrän laskulla on yhteys.

Q46. *How did Finland cooperate with other (Member) States found in a similar situation (i.e. influx of asylum seekers from the visa-free countries)?*

Ei sovellu.

Q47. *Did Finland receive assistance from the EU to deal with the influx of asylum seekers from the visa-free countries?*

Ei.

5. Johtopäätökset

Q48. *With regard to the aims of this Study, what conclusions would you draw from the findings reached in elaborating your National Contribution?*

Länsi-Balkanin maiden viisumivapauksien vaikutukset Suomelle näyttävät melko vähäisiltä.

Sikäli kun vaikutuksia voidaan havaita, ne näyttävät Suomen näkökulmasta pikemminkin negatiivisina. Toisin kuin voisi olettaa, esimerkiksi kyseisistä maista Suomeen suuntautunut turismi ja työperusteinen maahanmuutto ovat vähentyneet tarkasteluajanjaksoilla. Voimakkaita negatiivisia vaikutuksia ei kuitenkaan ole havaittavissa.

EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden viisumivapaudet ovat olleet voimassa niin lyhyen aikaa, että niiden vaikutuksista on vielä vaikea tehdä johtopäätöksiä.

Moldovan kanssa viisumivapaus sopimus solmittiin vuonna 2014, joten tarkasteluajanjakso on hieman pidempi kuin Ukrainan ja Georgian kohdalla, joiden kohdalla viisumivapaus tuli voimaan vuonna 2017. **Moldovan kansalaisten rajanylitykset** ovat nousseet merkittävästi viisumivapauden jälkeen, mutta vastaavaa kasvua ei ole nähtävissä esimerkiksi hotelliyöpymisten määrässä

tai työperusteisessa maahanmuutossa, jotka ovat edelleen vähäisiä. Siten Moldovan viisumivapautta ei voida pitää Suomen kannalta erityisen merkittävänä. Tutkimuksen kohdemaista vahvimmat yhteydet Suomeen ovat Ukrainalla. **Ukrainasta Suomeen suuntautuva turismi ja työperäinen maahanmuutto ovat olleet kasvusuunnassa jo pidemmän aikaa ja jatkoivat kasvuaan myös ensimmäisenä viisumivapausvuonna 2017.** Myös Georgian kohdalla myönteistä kasvua oli nähtävissä erityisesti Suomeen suuntautuvan turismin kohdalla. Toisaalta eräs negatiivinen ilmiökin oli havaittavissa **georgialaisen liikkuvan rikollisuuden** rantauduttua Suomeen loppuvuonna 2017. Kuten edellä on todettu, tarkasteluajanjakso Ukrainan ja Georgian kohdalla on kuitenkin hyvin lyhyt ja sen takia on vielä erittäin vaikea tehdä johtopäätöksiä viisumivapauksien vaikutuksista: ei ole vielä tietoa, kuinka tilanne tulee kehittymään pidemmällä aikavälillä, eikä edellä mainittuja kehityskulkujakaan voida varmuudella yhdistää viisumivapauksiin.

Q49. *What do you consider to be the relevance of your findings to (national and/or EU level) policymakers?*

Tutkimuksen merkittävimpana johtopäätöksenä voidaan pitää sitä, että **viisumivapauksien seuraukset vaikuttavat joiltain osin yllättäviltä.**

Länsi-Balkanin kohdalla yllättävää on ensinnäkin se, kuinka **vähän viisumivapaudet näkyvät eri tilastoissa:** läheskään kaikkien indikaattorien kohdalla ei ole nähtävissä mitään selkeää trendiä, jonka voisi yhdistää viisumivapauksiin. Joidenkin indikaattoreiden kohdalla puolestaan yllättävää on ollut **kehityksen suunta:** esimerkiksi Albanian ja Serbian kohdalla rajanylitysten määrät ovat lisääntyneet tarkasteluvälillä, mutta turismin määrä⁶³ näyttäisi päinvastoin vähentyneen. Länsi-Balkanin maiden kohdalla kasvua ei ole nähtävissä myöskään oleskelulupahakemusten määrässä, toisin kuin olisi voinut olettaa. Toisaalta myöskään kansainvälinen rikollisuus ei näytä lisääntyneen.

EU:n itäisten kumppanuusmaiden kohdalla johtopäätösten tekeminen on vielä vaikeaa, koska

viisumivapaudet ovat niin tuore asia. Selkeästi viisumivapauden liittyvänä ilmiönä voidaan pitää moldovalaista huomattavasti kasvanutta rajanylitysten määrää, mutta kyseessä ei ole merkittävä asia etenäkään, kun vastaavaa kasvua ei ole nähtävissä majoitustilastoissa. Ukrainan kohdalla on jatkunut sama positiivinen trendi kuin ennen viisumivapautta niin turismin kuin työperusteisen maahanmuutonkin jatkaessa kasvuaan. Tätä trendiä ei kuitenkaan voida yhdistää viisumivapaudteen, koska sama ilmiö oli vahvasti näkyvä jo ennen viisumivapautta. Myös Georgian kohdalla on nähtävissä pientä kasvua turismin määrässä, mutta toisaalta negatiivisena ilmiönä Suomeen vuoden 2017 lopulla rantaudunut liikkuva rikollisuus. Johtopäätösten tekeminen pidemmän aikavälin vaikutuksista ei kuitenkaan ole mahdollista juuri Ukrainan tai Georgian kohdalla, jotka vaikuttavat Suomen kannalta kiinnostavimmilta mailta seurata tutkimuksen aihepiiriin liittyen.

⁶³ Suomeen suuntautunutta turismia on mitattu tarkastelemalla hotelleihin ja muihin majoitusliikkeisiin saapuneiden kyseisen maan kansalaisten määrää vuosittain.

Annex 1: National statistics / Kansalliset tilastot (englanniksi)

N/A – not applicable
 NI – no information
 0 – data is available and the result is 0

Table 1: Total number of external border-crossings (persons) by nationals of visa-free countries¹

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (Insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of external border-crossings (persons) by nationals of visa-free countries															
FYROM	332	193	119	122	148	456	896	1 066	1 087	916	1 116				
Montenegro	1	1	19	88	121	171	312	208	412	412	438				
Serbia	0	49	387	1 245	1 589	2 333	2 922	3 109	3 911	3 920	4 628				
Albania	253	102	59	59	104	416	792	856	963	957	1 301				
Bosnia and Herzegovina	823	242	186	330	301	856	1 174	1 606	1 492	1 261	1 612				
Moldova	2 085	1 697	1 470	1 491	1 921	2 078	2 405	5 380	14 802	22 160	28 759				
Georgia	500	324	397	314	559	669	1 183	1 488	1 492	1 484	1 894				
Ukraine	46 485	48 869	47 699	49 431	57 600	68 109	76 612	67 007	64 868	69 312	76 466				
Total	50 479	51 477	50 336	53 080	62 343	75 088	86 296	80 720	89 027	100 422	116 214				Source: The Finnish Border Guard

¹ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities. The indicator refers to border-crossings at the external borders of the EU plus NO.

Table 2: Total number of detections of irregular border-crossings from nationals of visa-free countries²

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of external border-crossings (persons) by nationals of visa-free countries															
FYROM	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Montenegro	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Serbia	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	10	12	5				
Albania	0	4	0	0	1	1	2	8	7	8	15				
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1				
Moldova	5	7	3	0	4	3	1	23	42	17	17				
Georgia	0	2	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1				
Ukraine	22	27	15	19	16	26	26	31	21	23	56				
Total	27	40	18	19	21	34	39	65	81	60	96				
Total number of detections of irregular border-crossings³	1 606	1 485	1 190	1 169	1 305	1 576	1 673	1 601	1 078	1 021	1 343				

Source: The Finnish Border Guard

² Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities. Also see Frontex: Number of detections of illegal border-crossings by sea and land; Available at: <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-mab/>

³ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of irregular border crossings.

Table 3: Total number of short-stay visa applications by third country⁴

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)					
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017						
Total number of short-stay visa applications by third country																	
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Albania	NI	NI	NI	NI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	NI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	157	208	247	275	145	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	44	65	70	87	81	68	77	18						
Ukraine	NI	NI	NI	12887	14682	16211	18597	14770	16134	17685	13461						
Total	NI	NI	NI	13 088	14 955	16 258	18 959	14 996	16 202	17 762	13 479						
Total number of short-stay visa applications – all third countries⁵	7 18 483	806 156	795 936	1 020 400	1 258 999	1 391 860	1 569 851	1 204 948	784 264	550 004	827 475						
																	Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs

⁴ See DG HOME Schengen Visa statistics, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy_en#stats. For MS that still apply visa requirements, please remove the N/A and complete the table in full.

⁵ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of short-stay visa applications.

Table 4: Total number of short-stay visa application refusals by third country⁶

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of short-stay visa applications by third country															
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Albania	NI	NI	NI	NI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	NI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	16	10	12	45	16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	7	7	9	22	7	7	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ukraine	NI	NI	NI	285	472	272	241	669	679	438	177	177	177	177	177
Total	NI	NI	NI	308	489	293	308	692	686	439	178	178	178	178	178
Total number of short-stay visa application refusals – all third countries⁷	11 670	11 850	10 829	10 335	12 078	14 169	14 197	11 296	9 549	7 940	9 285	9 285	9 285	9 285	9 285

Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs

⁶ See DG HOME Schengen Visa statistics, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy_en#stats. For MS that still apply visa requirements, please remove the N/A and complete the table in full.

⁷ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of short-stay visa application refusals.

Table 5: Total number of asylum applications received from visa-free countries⁸

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of asylum applications received from visa-free countries															
FYROM	3	5	10	20	15	30	10	10	50	10	20				
Montenegro	1	0	0	0	10	10	5	10	20	0	0				
Serbia	139	80	40	155	70	85	50	40	30	30	10				
Albania	13	15	10	10	10	20	50	110	760	80	100				
Bosnia and Herzegovina	22	10	10	10	15	90	10	15	25	10	0				
Moldova	23	5	10	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	0				
Georgia	6	10	20	55	70	30	15	40	20	20	120				
Ukraine	5	10	5	10	10	15	5	300	75	65	45				
Total	212	135	105	260	200	280	145	525	995	215	295				
Total number of asylum applications – all third countries⁹	1 505	3 670	4 910	3 085	2 915	3 095	3 210	3 620	32 345	5 605	4 990				

Source 2007: Finnish Immigration Service;
2008-2017: Eurostat

⁸ See Eurostat: Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asyappctza]. For Georgia and Ukraine, monthly date may be considered.
⁹ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of asylum applications.

Table 6: Total number of positive decisions on asylum applicants from visa-free countries¹⁰

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017					
Total number of positive decisions on asylum applicants from visa-free countries																
FYROM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Montenegro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Serbia	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Albania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Ukraine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Source: The Finnish Immigration Service

¹⁰ See Eurostat: First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asydcfstst]; Total positive decisions, including only refugee status and subsidiary protection, rounded up to the unit of 5.

Table 7: Total number of negative decisions on asylum applicants from visa-free countries¹¹

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
FYROM	5	0	0	10	10	15	20	5	15	15	0	
Montenegro	1	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	5	0	0	
Serbia	72	65	30	100	50	75	30	35	35	5	5	
Albania	13	5	5	5	5	20	25	70	380	70	20	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	20	5	10	10	5	70	10	10	20	5	0	
Moldova	12	5	0	5	0	0	0	5	0	5	0	
Georgia	7	5	10	35	35	15	0	10	20	10	20	
Ukraine	5	10	5	5	5	5	15	195	60	50	15	
Total	135	95	60	170	110	220	100	330	535	160	60	Source 2007: Finnish Immigration Service; 2008-2017: Eurostat [migr_asydcfsta]

¹¹ See Eurostat: First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex, Annual aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asydcfsta]

Table 8: Total number of positive and negative decisions on asylum applicants (top five nationalities, not limited to visa-free countries)¹²

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (Insert all available data)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)		
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		Total 2007- 2017	
Total number of positive decisions on asylum applicants (top five nationalities, not limited to visa-free countries)														
Iraq	221	235	370	580	330	385	640	405	605	2 770	1 300	7 841		
Afghanistan	122	45	65	165	135	255	200	110	105	1 645	560	3 407		
Somalia	232	150	385	610	230	235	225	170	465	455	190	3 347		
Syria	6	0	0	5	30	145	145	100	135	1 065	680	2 311		
Iran	37	30	25	50	40	120	95	85	40	210	140	872		
Total	618	460	845	1410	765	1140	1305	870	1350	6145	2870			
Total number of negative decisions on asylum applicants (top five nationalities, not limited to visa-free countries)														
Iraq	91	185	345	450	230	220	290	125	110	9 000	2 200	13 155		
Afghanistan	36	20	130	225	165	105	95	35	50	2 565	775	4 165		
Somalia	11	170	580	345	170	120	40	20	25	905	255	2 630		
Russia	118	110	120	345	180	195	190	105	75	105	70	1 495		
Iran	49	30	65	100	45	65	90	45	10	125	125	700 (also Kosovo: 700)		
Total	305	515	1 240	1 465	790	705	705	330	270	12 700	3 425		Source 2007: Finnish Immigration Service; 2008-2017: Eurostat [migr_asydcfst]	

¹² This is to provide a broader context; any nationality may be included in the top five. See Eurostat: First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asydcfstaj]; Total positive decisions, including only refugee status and subsidiary protection, rounded up to the unit of 5.

Table 9: Total number of residence permits applications (all residence permits) by visa-free country¹³

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (Insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of residence permits applications (all residence permits) by visa-free country															
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	71	70	68
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	10	28	15
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	336	304	281
Albania	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	230	271	303
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	339	302	332
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	58	57	58
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	44	49	94
Ukraine	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	2 787	2 915	3 311
Total	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	3 875	3 996	4 462
Total number of residence permits applications (all residence permits)¹⁴	20 371*	22 904*	20 790*	24 547*	49 333	48 155	48 308	50 027	57 220	61 855	65 167				

Source: Finnish Immigration Service

¹³ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities. Also see Eurostat - Number of first residence permits issued by reason, EU-28, 2008-2016 [migr_resfirst]
¹⁴ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of residence permit applications.

Table 10: Total number of identity document fraud instances by visa-free country¹⁵

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017					
Total number of identity document fraud instances by visa-free country																
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Albania	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Ukraine	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Total	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Total number of identity document fraud instances¹⁶	NI	NI	NI	76	107	77	86	77	185	100	70					

Source: The Finnish Border Guard

¹⁵ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities.

¹⁶ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of identity document fraud instances.

Table 11: Total number of visitors staying in hotels and other accommodation establishments from the visa-free countries¹⁷

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)		
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Total number of visitors staying in hotels and other accommodation establishments from the visa-free countries														
FYROM	913	585	440	562	530	572	615	611	544	2156	782			
Montenegro	3	2	9	50	7	22	37	30	160	152	181			
Serbia	1521	1825	369	623	759	828	703	1030	1051	1192	1121			
Albania	544	540	505	360	268	332	184	278	408	348	388			
Bosnia and Herzegovina	148	245	227	210	287	237	170	363	306	244	301			
Moldova	164	109	114	94	204	263	176	253	179	346	405			
Georgia	1338	1117	976	924	1176	1385	1246	1489	1389	1249	1836			
Ukraine	3442	4700	4179	4606	5895	7246	8251	7713	7710	8211	9420			
Total	8073	9123	6819	7429	9126	10885	11382	11767	11747	13898	14434			
Total number of visitors staying in hotels and other accommodation establishments¹⁸	19036665	19465116	18567338	19248057	19987871	20317582	20241057	19785412	19738123	20343433	21914154			

Source: Statistics Finland

¹⁷ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities.¹⁸ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of tourism visitors staying in hotels and other accommodation establishments.

Table 12: Total number of first-time residence permit applications received from visa-free country nationals¹⁹

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	NI	41	40	37	27	26	29	30	
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	NI	4	7	3	1	8	10	8	
Serbia	475	NI	NI	NI	97	105	91	89	204	180	112	
Albania	NI	NI	NI	NI	55	74	103	83	130	151	162	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	NI	116	237	109	117	144	112	95	
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	NI	45	30	34	34	28	26	36	
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	NI	23	25	14	30	18	32	51	
Ukraine	1151	929	698	831	968	1019	1026	1271	1520	1692	1937	
Total	1626	929	698	831	1349	1537	1417	1652	2078	2232	2431	
Total number of first-time residence applications²⁰	20371	22904	20790	24547	23664	21262	21257	22063	22870	26066	26350	Source: Finnish Immigration Service

¹⁹ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities.²⁰ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of first-time temporary residence applications.

Table 13: Total number of first residence permits issued for remunerated activities reasons to visa-free country nationals²¹

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of permits issued for remunerated activities reasons to visa-free country nationals															
FYROM	NI	128	55	22	6	5	7	9	4	5	12				
Montenegro	NI	0	0	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	2				
Serbia	NI	158	49	54	29	46	36	29	67	89	49				
Albania	NI	44	6	4	5	14	16	18	19	22	33				
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	246	70	184	51	150	48	45	49	35	30				
Moldova	NI	12	22	19	27	14	10	9	20	14	18				
Georgia	NI	1	0	1	4	4	5	4	1	6	8				
Ukraine	NI	657	356	445	633	639	695	832	956	1083	1313				
Total	NI	1246	558	730	757	874	819	946	1117	1255	1465				
Total number of permits issued for remunerated activities reasons²²	5280*	5722	2754	2936	5024	4648	4719	4786	5026	5381	6221				

Source 2007: Finnish Immigration Service, *Residence permit for an employed person; Source 2008-2017: Eurostat

²¹ See Eurostat: Number of first residence permits issued by reason, EU-28, 2008-2016 [migr_resfirst]

²² All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of permits issued for remunerated activities reasons.

Table 14: Total number of first residence permits issued for education reasons to visa-free country nationals²³

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of permits issued for education reasons to visa-free country nationals															
FYROM	NI	1	0	2	7	4	4	2	2	5	3				
Montenegro	NI	1	2	0	1	3	0	1	2	8	1				
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	22				
Albania	NI	6	2	6	12	14	10	11	7	21	17				
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	2	2	1	2	5	0	3	2	8	14				
Moldova	NI	5	6	5	6	8	9	10	5	2	0				
Georgia	NI	4	1	1	2	5	3	9	6	14	21				
Ukraine	NI	28	35	28	47	63	66	64	60	70	59				
Total	NI	47	48	43	77	102	92	100	84	128	134				
Total number of permits issued for education reasons²⁴	3810*	4441	3949	4433	5370	5405	5314	5528	5756	6235	5094				

Source 2007: Finnish Immigration Service, *Residence permit for studies; Source 2008-2017: Eurostat

²² All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of permits issued for remunerated activities reasons.

²³ See Eurostat: Number of first residence permits issued by reason, EU-28, 2008-2016 [migr_resfirst]

²⁴ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of permits issued for education reasons.

Table 15: Total number of first residence permits issued to entrepreneurs (including self-employed persons) from visa-free countries²⁵

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)					
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017						
Total number of first residence permits issued for entrepreneurs (including self-employed persons) from visa-free countries																	
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	NI	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0				
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Albania	NI	NI	NI	NI	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	0	0				
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Ukraine	NI	NI	NI	NI	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	3				
Total	NI	NI	NI	NI	5	2	1	5	4	2	2	3	3				
Total number of first residence permits issued for entrepreneurs (including self-employed persons)²⁶	68	67	57	43	55	61	65	89	50	51	49						

Source: Finnish Immigration Service

²⁵ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities.²⁶ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of first residence permits issued for entrepreneurs (including self-employed persons).

Table 16: Total number of nationals from the visa-free countries refused entry at the external borders²⁷

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of nationals from the visa-free countries refused entry at the external borders															
FYROM	NI	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	NB: Data not collected before 2008 in a comparable format.
Montenegro	NI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Serbia	NI	0	0	0	0	5	0	5	0	0	15	5	5	5	
Albania	NI	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	5	10	15	15	15	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Moldova	NI	10	5	0	5	5	5	0	25	45	15	20	20	20	
Georgia	NI	5	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	10	10	10	
Ukraine	NI	30	15	20	15	20	20	25	30	20	25	65	65	65	
Total	NI	50	20	20	20	25	30	40	70	85	55	115	115	115	
Total number third-country nationals refused entry at the external borders²⁸	NI	1775	1300	1185	1420	1640	1735	1590	1070	950	1400	1400	1400	1400	Source: Eurostat FI-data [migr_eirfs]

²⁷ See Eurostat: Third-country nationals refused entry at the external borders - annual data (rounded) [migr_eirfs]
²⁸ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number third-country nationals refused entry at the external borders.

Table 17: Total number of return decisions issued to nationals from the visa-free countries²⁹

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (Insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of return decisions issued to nationals from the visa-free countries															
FYROM	NI	0	0	20	30	30	35	55	25	30	25	25			
Montenegro	NI	0	0	0	0	20	5	15	10	5	0	0			
Serbia	NI	75	35	60	75	85	55	10	45	50	20	20			
Albania	NI	15	15	15	15	30	50	105	660	200	140	140			
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	5	10	10	15	105	30	20	40	35	15	15			
Moldova	NI	10	5	10	5	10	5	75	20	20	10	10			
Georgia	NI	10	15	50	50	20	15	25	30	20	100	100			
Ukraine	NI	25	25	40	55	70	110	275	165	155	160	160			
Total	NI	140	105	205	245	370	305	580	995	515	470	470			
Total number of return decisions issued to third-country nationals³⁰	NI	1915	3230	4040	4930	4670	4635	3940	5900	18490	7725	7725			Source: Eurostat FI-data [migr_eiord]

²⁹ See Eurostat: Third-country nationals ordered to leave - annual data (rounded) [migr_eiord]

³⁰ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of nationals ordered to leave.

Table 18: Total number of voluntary returns (all types) by nationals of visa-free countries³¹

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (Insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of voluntary returns (all types) by nationals of visa-free countries															
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	7*	12	23	6	4	9	22	27				
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	0*	0	0	1	0	9	3	0				
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	50*	7	44	48	20	32	27	8				
Albania	NI	NI	NI	0*	2	3	17	27	207	167	85				
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	7*	4	22	32	6	7	30	5				
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	2*	0	1	1	5	5	1	5				
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	0*	11	6	8	8	8	19	35				
Ukraine	NI	NI	NI	1*	3	16	23	57	95	69	76				
Total	NI	NI	NI	67*	28	109	136	127	372	338	241				
Total number of voluntary returns (all types) – all third-country nationals³²	NI	NI	NI	303*	646	653	835	850	1506	3322	1932				

Source: 2010* IOM (only AVR-s); 2011-2017 the Police and IOM

³¹ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities. Also see Eurostat: Number of voluntary and forced returns [migr_eirt_vol];
³² All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of voluntary returns.

Table 19: Total number of forced returns by visa-free country³³

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017					
Total number of forced returns by visa-free country																
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	NI	3	5	20	7	3	2	6					
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	5	0	0	7	0	1					
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	NI	15	25	23	11	3	26	12					
Albania	NI	NI	NI	NI	2	14	22	48	323	87	39					
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	NI	1	73	6	6	5	12	4					
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	NI	1	5	2	0	12	11	3					
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	NI	14	14	7	14	6	2	46					
Ukraine	NI	NI	NI	NI	16	13	32	54	52	36	52					
Total	NI	NI	NI	NI	52	154	112	140	411	176	163					
Total number of forced returns - all third-country nationals³⁴	NI	NI	NI	NI	1525	1986	2190	2152	2280	4230	2110					Source: The Police

³³ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities. Also see Eurostat: Number of voluntary and forced returns [migr_eirt_vol];

³⁴ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of forced returns.

Table 20: Total number of nationals from the visa - free countries found in illegal employment³⁵

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)					
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017						
Total number of nationals from the visa-free countries found in illegal employment																	
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	1	0	
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	0	0	
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	1	3	0	
Albania	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	2	5	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	1	0	
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	0	0	
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	0	0	0	
Ukraine	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	7	7	13	
Total	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	8	14	24	
Total number third-country nationals found in illegal employment³⁶	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	136	190	257	

Source: The Police

³⁵ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities. Also see Eurostat: Third-country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded) [migr_eipre]
³⁶ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number third-country nationals found in illegal employment.

Table 21: Total number of smuggled persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings)³⁷

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017					
Total number of smuggled persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings)																
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NB: Data not collected based on the nationality of the victim.
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	
Albania	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	
Ukraine	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	
Total	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	
Total number of smuggled persons from third countries (final court rulings)³⁸	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	

³⁷ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities.

³⁸ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of smuggled persons from third countries.

Table 22: Total number of trafficked persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings)³⁹

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017					
Total number of trafficked persons from the visa-free countries (final court rulings)																
FYROM	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Montenegro	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Serbia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Albania	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Moldova	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Georgia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Ukraine	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Total	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
Total number of trafficked persons from third countries (final court rulings)⁴⁰	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI

NB: Data not collected based on the nationality of the victim.

³⁹ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities.

⁴⁰ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of trafficked persons from third countries.

Table 23: Total number of identified facilitators⁴¹ of unauthorised entry, transit and residence⁴² from the visa-free countries (final court rulings)⁴³

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017					
Total number of identified facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence from the visa-free countries (final court rulings)																
FYROM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Montenegro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Serbia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Albania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ukraine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Total number of identified facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (final court rulings)⁴⁴	19	18	27	45	38	36	41	32	70	99	36					36

Source: Statistics Finland

⁴¹ This refers to the nationality of the facilitators. EU nationalities can be provided in the second part of the table.

⁴² Facilitators of the unauthorised entry, transit and residence - intentionally assisting a person who is not a national of an EU Member State either to enter or transit across the territory of a Member State in breach of laws on the entry or transit of aliens, or for financial gain, intentionally assisting them to reside within the territory of a Member State in breach of the laws of the State concerned on the residence of aliens (see Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of Council Directive 2002/90/EC).

⁴³ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities.

⁴⁴ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of identified facilitators of unauthorised entry, transit and residence.

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)										
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1. Finland	3	2	4	6	6	8	1	4	8	4	5
2. Sweden	0	0	0	10	1	2	3	3	6	12	0
3. Estonia	2	0	0	5	0	0	2	0	0	1	0
4. Greece	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
5. The Netherlands	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Statistics Finland

Table 24: Total number of nationals found to be illegally present from the visa-free countries⁴⁵

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)			
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017				
Total number of nationals found to be illegally present from the visa-free countries															
FYROM	NI	0	10	10	5	25	10	5	15	5	0				
Montenegro	NI	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Serbia	NI	140	35	230	105	80	35	20	15	15	5				
Albania	NI	20	5	10	0	10	20	25	35	15	5				
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NI	15	10	5	0	35	10	15	10	5	0				
Moldova	NI	0	30	5	5	5	0	0	5	0	0				
Georgia	NI	10	20	55	65	15	10	20	5	0	10				
Ukraine	NI	25	25	25	30	40	35	70	40	25	35				
Total	NI	210	140	340	210	210	120	155	125	65	55				
Total number of third-country nationals found to be illegally present⁴⁶	NI	5375	6660	3755	3305	3620	3365	2930	14285	2130	930				

Source: Eurostat FI-data [migr_eipre]

⁴⁵ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities. Also see Eurostat: Third-country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded) [migr_eipre]
⁴⁶ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of third-country national found to be illegally present.

Table 25: Total number of overstayers from the visa-free countries⁴⁷

Indicator	Period of interest (2007-2017) (Insert all available data or at least 2 years prior and after the visa waiver agreement date)											Additional Information (e.g. data source(s), explanation of trends and numbers for this indicator)				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017					
Total number of overstayers from the visa-free countries																
FYROM	2	0	1	3	2	3	7	6	4	3	2					
Montenegro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0					
Serbia	5	5	7	3	3	6	6	0	2	5	7					
Albania	0	4	1	2	0	5	7	10	3	8	10					
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3	6	3	4	1	4	10	4	4	4	2					
Moldova	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	0	4	0	3					
Georgia	4	1	1	8	0	4	3	0	0	0	1					
Ukraine	14	25	22	18	26	39	33	48	39	24	41					
Total	31	44	37	40	33	65	71	69	59	45	67					
Total number of third-country nationals overstayers⁴⁸	951	1087	1073	1073	1096	1218	1462	1323	1139	1009	1347					

Source: The National Bureau of Investigation

⁴⁷ Information to be provided by inserting national data as gathered by competent authorities. Also see Eurostat: Third-country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded) [migr_eipre]

⁴⁸ All nationalities apply, to calculate the proportion out of the total number of third-country national overstayers.

Annex 2: Definitions / Määritelmät (englanniksi)

The following key terms are used in the Common Template. The definitions are taken from the EMN Glossary 5.0.¹

When discussing about illegal or irregular migration there is no unified terminology concerning foreigners. The UN and EU recommend using the term irregular rather than illegal because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying humanity to migrants. Entering a country in an irregular manner, or staying with an irregular status, is not a criminal offence but an infraction of minor offences or administrative regulations. As a result, referring to Resolution 1509 (2006) of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 'illegal' is preferred when referring to a status or process, whereas 'irregular' is preferred when referring to a person.

Asylum seeker – In the global context, a person who seeks protection from persecution or serious harm in a country other than their own and awaits a decision on the application for protection under the Geneva Convention of 1951 and Protocol of 1967 in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken.

Country of destination – The country that is a destination for migration flows (regular or irregular).

Facilitators of the unauthorised entry, transit and residence – Intentionally assisting a person who is not a national of an EU Member State either to enter or transit across the territory of a Member State in breach of laws on the entry or transit of aliens, or, for financial gain, intentionally assisting them to reside within the territory of a Member State in breach of the laws of the State concerned on the residence of aliens. Definition is based on Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence.²

Fraudulent travel or identity document – Any travel or identity document: (i) that has been falsely made or altered in some material way by anyone other than a person or agency lawfully authorised to make or issue the travel or identity document on behalf of a State; or (ii) that has been improperly issued or obtained through misrepresentation, corruption or duress or in any other unlawful manner; or (iii) that is being used by a person other than the rightful holder.

Illegal employment of third-country nationals – Economic activity carried out in violation of provisions set by legislation.

Illegal employment of a legally staying third-country national – Employment of a legally staying third-country national working outside the conditions of their residence permit and / or without a work permit which is subject to each EU Member State's national law.

Illegal employment of an illegally staying third-country national – Employment of an illegally staying third-country national.

Irregular entry – In the global context, crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the receiving State. In the Schengen context, the entry of a third-country national into a Schengen Member State who does not satisfy Art. 6 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code).

¹ Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_en

² Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0090:EN:NOT>

Irregular migration – Movement of persons to a new place of residence or transit that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country.

Irregular stay – The presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Art. 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code) or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in force in that Member State.

Overstay(er) – In the global context, a person who remains in a country beyond the period for which entry was granted. In the EU context, a person who has legally entered but then stayed in an EU Member State beyond the allowed duration of their permitted stay without the appropriate visa (typically 90 days), or of their visa and / or residence permit.

Passport – One of the types of travel documents (other than diplomatic, service/official and special) issued by the authorities of a State in order to allow its nationals to cross borders³. All third-country nationals subject to the visa-free regime have to carry a biometric passport to qualify for visa-free travel in the EU (except for UK and Ireland). Non-biometric passport holders from the visa-free third countries require a Schengen visa to enter the EU.

Pull factor – The condition(s) or circumstance(s) that attract a migrant to another country.

Push factor – The condition(s) or circumstance(s) in a country of origin that impel or stimulate emigration.

Refusal of entry – In the global context, refusal of entry of a person who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in the national legislation of the country for which entry is requested. In the EU context, refusal of entry of a third-country national at the external EU border because they do not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Art. 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 399/2016 (Schengen Border Code) and do not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Art. 6(5) of that Regulation. Regulation (EU) 2017/458 subsequently amended the Schengen Borders Code to reinforce the rules governing the movement of persons across borders and the checks against relevant databases at external borders.

Regularisation – In the EU context, state procedure by which irregularly staying third-country nationals are awarded a legal status.

Return decision – An administrative or judicial decision or act, stating or declaring the stay of a third-country national to be illegal and imposing or stating an obligation to return.

Schengen Borders Code – The rules governing border control of persons crossing the external EU borders of the EU Member States.

Short-stay visa – The authorisation or decision of a Member State with a view to transit through or an intended stay on the territory of one or more or all the Member States of a duration of no more than 90 days in any 180-day period.

Third-country national – Any person who is not a citizen of the European Union within the meaning of Art. 20(1) of TFEU and who is not a person enjoying the European Union right to free movement, as defined in Art. 2 (6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code).

³ Available at: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52011XC0722\(02\)](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52011XC0722(02))

Third-country national found to be illegally present – A third-country national who is officially found to be on the territory of a Member State and who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the conditions for stay or residence in that EU Member State.

Travel document – A document issued by a government or international treaty organisation which is acceptable proof of identity for the purpose of entering another country.

Visa – The authorisation or decision of a Member State required for transit or entry for an intended stay in that EU Member State or in several EU Member States.

Visa Code – Regulation outlining the procedures and conditions for issuing visas for transit through or intended stays in the territory of the Schengen Member States not exceeding 90 days in any 180-day period.
