



# National and regional networks focusing on P/CVE across the EU

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Radicalisation Awareness Network

**RAN**   
Practitioners

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## List of Abbreviations

AMF	Association des Maires de France et des présidents d'intercommunalité
ARS	Agence Régionale de Santé
BAG	Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft
BAG Exit	Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Ausstieg zum Einstieg
BAG RelEx	Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft religiös begründeter Extremismus
BAMF	Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
BeFUS	Hat Belgisch Forum voor Preventie en Veiligheid in de Steden
BMB	Bundesverband Mobile Beratung
BMFSFJ	Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth
BMI	Federal Ministry of the Interior
BNED	Bundesweites Netzwerk Extremismusprävention und Deradikalisierung
CCAN	Christchurch Call Advisory Network
CEP	Confederation of European Probation
CIPDR	Secretary General of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation
CRPRS	Resource Centre for the Prevention of Social Radicalisms
CSO	Civil society organization
CT	Countering Terrorism
DBH	Fachverband für Soziale Arbeit, Strafrecht und Kriminalpolitik
DeFUS	Deutsch-Europäisches Forum für Urbane Sicherheit
EC	European Commission
Efus	European Forum for Urban Security
ERCOR	European Research Community on Radicalisation
ERFJ	European Forum for Restorative Justice
ESCN	European Strategic Communications Network
EU	European Union
EUIF	European Internet Forum
EuroPris	European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Service
FEPSU	Forum Espanol para la Prevencion y la Seguridad Urbana

FFSU	Le Forum Français pour la Sécurité Urbaine
FISU	Il Forum italiano per la sicurezza urbana
GIFCT	Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism
GTAZ	German Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre
HLCEG-R	High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation
INACH	International Network Against Cyber Hate
KN:IX	Kompetenznetzwerk Islamistischer Extremismus
KompRex	Kompetenznetzwerk Rechtsextremismus Prävention
MOTRA	Monitoring System and Transfer Platform Radicalisation
MS	Member State
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NPPM	Network of Prevent Policy Makers on Radicalisation
PBC	Project-based collaboration
P/CVE	Preventing and countering violent extremism
PRISONS WG	RAN Prisons Working Group
RAN	Radicalisation Awareness Network
RAN C&N WG	RAN Communications and Narratives Working Group
REDOI	Spanish Network against Hate Crimes and Underreporting
SSCAT	Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team
TPCoE	Terrorism Prevention Centre of Excellence
VBRG	Verband der Beratungsstellen für Betroffene rechter, rassistischer und antisemitischer Gewalt
VVSG	Association of Flemish cities and municipalities
WG	Working Group
WI-REX	Wissensnetzwerk Rechtsextremismus
WNED	Wiener Netzwerk Demokratiekultur und Prävention

## Introduction

The responsibility for preventing and countering radicalisation lies with the individual EU Member States (MSs). Considering the nature of the threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism, it is the task of EU-level policies and collaboration to support national networks, coordination centres and expertise. This was emphasised by the [Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU 2020](#) and its stated intention to support the creation and further development of national networks. In order to support them and build partnerships, it is necessary to recognise and map such national and regional networks, to identify further areas of collaboration between them and the EU level. In 2022, the Radicalisation Awareness Network - RAN Practitioners already started to map parts of these structures. In 2024, RAN carried out another mapping to get a more elaborate understanding of the exact types of structures and their scope in all EU MSs. This could be of significant benefit to increase the impact of EU-level support to European first-line practice.

This paper presents the results of the mapping of national and regional networks working on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in the EU. The focus was on networks facilitating knowledge and practice exchange on P/CVE within EU MSs. It further offers a categorisation of existing networks of practitioners, policymakers, researchers (including mixed networks) and coordination mechanisms, inter alia, aimed at strengthening P/CVE practice across the EU. This categorisation briefly discusses purposes/objectives of these networks along with first ideas on potential mutual benefits of closer cooperation with RAN and the future EU Knowledge Hub on prevention of radicalisation.

This paper serves to improve the knowledge base and impact of collaboration of RAN and from September 2024 onwards the Knowledge Hub with national and regional P/CVE networks in EU MSs. It is also intended to act as a resource for P/CVE practitioners and programme managers to identify further networks to engage in. Finally, this paper formulates recommendations for continuity of this mapping effort and expansion of the repository of identified networks, as well as for potential collaboration and engagement of identified networks within the activities of the Knowledge Hub while taking into account the guidelines of national contact points<sup>1</sup> to ensure better outreach to stakeholders at national and local levels and dissemination of knowledge and expertise.

The paper is structured as follows: First, the background and scope of this paper is outlined. This section also highlights the importance of knowledge networks in P/CVE, provides an overview of central network structures active in P/CVE at EU level and explains the national policy context in EU MSs. Second, the methodology with which the information for this paper has been collected is laid out, as are limitations of this study. Third, the definition of networks as it is used in this paper is stated. Fourth, the networks identified are categorised according to their areas of activities and their main foci are described. Recommendations on how engagement with different types of these networks could be successful close this paper. The information presented in the report is based on data collected from desktop research, surveys and interviews conducted with RAN Working Group chairs, Expert Pool members and other P/CVE experts, as well as the input to an online survey received from members of the Network of Prevent Policy Makers (NPPM). This is the first report on the subject, and in the future, the knowledge base will continue to evolve and become more refined.

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<sup>1</sup> Members of the Network of Prevent Policy Makers (NPPM) are the national contact points for the Knowledge Hub.

## Background and scope of the mapping

### The importance of knowledge networks in P/CVE: EU policy context

The vast body of knowledge on P/CVE recognises the importance of the “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approach and that a diversity of actors plays a role in effective P/CVE work, including state and non-state actors. Whole of society also means efficient coordination between all parts of society and all levels of governance — local, regional, national and European as well as international. In addition to working with local practitioners, it is just as important to involve civil society, communities, families and religious leaders in the field of P/CVE. Effectively addressing the wide range of factors that can fuel radicalisation into violent extremism, and keeping pace with emerging trends and threats, requires **multidisciplinary approaches** that empower and engage with a vast network of actors at the local, national, regional and global levels, as well as meaningful engagement with civil society organisations (CSOs), the private sector and the research community.

The **2020 Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU**<sup>2</sup> stresses the need to improve support to EU MSs on the prevention of radicalisation. The agenda puts forward four axes for action: (i) Countering extremist ideologies online; (ii) Supporting local actors for more resilient communities; (iii) Prisons, rehabilitation and reintegration; (iv) Consolidating knowledge and support. As part of the fourth axis, for a more coordinated action and structured outreach at national level, it identifies setting up an EU Knowledge Hub on prevention of radicalisation for policymakers, practitioners and researchers as a key action. It further sets out the objective to **strengthen coordination and ensure more structured outreach at national level**, for which the Commission will **support the creation and further development of national networks of relevant actors**, including practitioners and national centres of expertise. This paper is therefore responding to the need to better understand the existent networks at national level, by offering a first mapping exercise of such networks and their categorisation, providing a solid basis for work that can be continued within the Knowledge Hub. Our working definition and understanding of networks is therefore guided first and foremost by the EU policy agenda and the experiences and learnings of RAN as one of the main networking mechanisms in P/CVE at EU level.

The High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R) in its final report of 2018<sup>3</sup> recommended to **enhance MS involvement in EU actions** in the field of prevention of radicalisation while maintaining and **reaffirming the bottom-up approach of practitioners and experts** feeding their experiences and learnings into the policy process, based on the exchange of good practices, networking and empowerment of first-line practitioners, as well as the important role of CSOs. Our understanding of networks for the purposes of this mapping is therefore based on the following dimensions:

- The policymakers perspective and **the role of the state/governments in coordinating all relevant stakeholders and facilitating knowledge exchange and networking** among relevant actors involved in P/CVE at different levels (national, local, between research and practice). We therefore base this mapping on insights provided by the NPPM within a dedicated survey.
- The **bottom-up perspective of practitioners and non-state actors and their need for networking** and exchange of knowledge and good practices between them towards the professionalisation of practice but also to feed their learnings into the policymaking process. The role of research and academia in exchanging research insights and knowledge with policy but also practice is also

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<sup>2</sup> European Commission (2020): [A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU](#)

<sup>3</sup> European Commission (2018): [High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation \(HLCEG-R\) Final Report, 18 May 2018](#)

considered in the current mapping of networks. We therefore also collected input from practitioners and research experts involved in the activities of RAN.

This paper therefore looks at both — national coordination mechanisms that, as part of their mandate, facilitate and enable networking and knowledge sharing between different actors at national and local levels (both state and non-state organisations and practitioners), as well as bottom-up approaches to networking and exchange of knowledge and expertise, such as CSO-led efforts or practitioner-driven networks. RAN Practitioners has been one of the key cooperation mechanisms of the EU ensuring such exchanges at EU level. Identifying similar efforts at national level will ensure more targeted and structured dissemination of knowledge and experience between stakeholders at European, national and local levels. Further EU-wide or international networks are also included in the mapping along with recommendations on enhanced cooperation with these.

## EU-level P/CVE networks and cooperation mechanisms

RAN was established in 2011, and since that time the European Commission has been at the forefront of launching initiatives aimed at assembling a network of European experts dedicated to P/CVE. RAN initially comprised individuals with diverse backgrounds, including researchers specialising in radicalisation, social workers, religious and youth leaders, as well as dedicated police officers. Starting with the sharing of experiences and knowledge on specific P/CVE topics, this network evolved into the RAN Centre of Excellence in 2015, expanding its membership to encompass new frontline practitioners like prison officers, psychologists, local authorities and NGOs. Simultaneously, new initiatives emerged to address interconnected facets of radicalisation. The European Internet Forum (EUIF) was established in 2015 to monitor online manifestations of violent extremism, while the Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team (SSCAT), also established in 2015, aimed to exchange best practices in the area of strategic communication in order to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism. In 2016, the SSCAT was followed by its successor, the European Strategic Communications Network (ESCN).

The **main networks** that are an integral part of the current EU cooperation mechanism on the prevention of radicalisation include:

- The **Steering Board on Radicalisation**, chaired by the Commission and composed of representatives of all MSs at senior official level.
- The **Network of Prevent Policy Makers (NPPM)**, chaired by the Commission and composed of representatives of all EU MSs at expert level.
- The **Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)** with two separate programmes, **RAN Practitioners** and **RAN Policy Support**, functioning as cross-disciplinary, cross-border networks based on EU-level policy priorities approved by the EU Steering Board on Radicalisation and set out in the Strategic Orientations<sup>4</sup>.
  - As part of the above, the **Expert Pool database** of RAN Practitioners and the **European Research Community on Radicalisation (ERCOR)** of RAN Policy Support are valuable expert resources and networks.
- The **EU Internet Forum (EUIF)**, which addresses the misuse of the internet for terrorist purposes by providing a collaborative environment for governments in the EU, the internet industry and other partners to discuss and address these challenges.

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<sup>4</sup> European Commission (2024): [Strategic Orientations on a coordinated EU approach to prevention of radicalisation for 2024-2025](#)



The *2023 Targeted study on the assessment of the RAN Practitioners and RAN Policy Support* stressed the added value of the **RAN** network as a unique mechanism for creating cross-disciplinary connections and networking opportunities at the international level between different stakeholder groups. It concluded that in EU MSs where there is a national-level interdisciplinary network for the prevention of radicalisation, RAN provided an opportunity to **compare national experiences and connect with international peers**. The study further found that RAN has inspired the **adoption of new practices at national level**, e.g. for improving multi-agency cooperation, setting up local prevent structures and their evaluation, and training programmes, among others.

Further **needs identified** by this study in terms of outreach and knowledge exchange include the desire for increased collaboration and dialogue between stakeholder groups (e.g. practitioners and policymakers), and improving outreach at national level through dissemination of RAN products and activities. It also showed that such dissemination and passing on of knowledge gained by participants in RAN activities often happens through informal channels and rarely in a structured way, while the language barrier is also a factor. Engaging key national and local networks in more targeted dissemination would help address these challenges.

In a forward-thinking move for 2024, the European Commission made the decision to merge both initiatives, forming a shared hub dedicated to generating, consolidating and exchanging knowledge among practitioners, researchers and policymakers. This EU Knowledge Hub on prevention of radicalisation was also conceived with the intention of extending its outreach to priority third countries, regions and other relevant networks, thereby enhancing the collective effort in P/CVE.

A workshop held in 2022 with the Commission and MSs on the Knowledge Hub concluded that a clear contact point for the Knowledge Hub in MSs would be useful. In any case, all information and material provided by the Knowledge Hub should always be sent to the NPPM members who are the national contact points in their countries. In order to improve the outreach in MSs, the Knowledge Hub could disseminate the knowledge also to other contact points in the national P/CVE structures at the request of MSs<sup>5</sup>.

## National P/CVE context in EU Member States

P/CVE is in the realm of individual EU MSs and the approaches chosen at the policy level differ widely among them. This also has a bearing on the existence and role of networking structures and initiatives between practitioners, researchers and policymakers in the field of P/CVE at national level, given that the infrastructure of key actors and the coordination mechanisms between them vary, as well as the threat picture in each country.

Previous research by RAN Practitioners has taken stock of these differences in various P/CVE areas.

A RAN mapping study of the **role of CSOs** in tertiary prevention has found that in some MSs CSOs implement various exit programmes in prison settings and in the community for violent extremist or terrorist offenders or for radicalised individuals (e.g. in Germany), while in others such programmes are mainly operated by state actors (e.g. in Denmark)<sup>6</sup>. Hence, in some countries, such as Germany, the multitude of actors involved in this work at state (province) level and the diversity of P/CVE programmes require stronger networking and exchange of experience between practitioners (but also with research and policy) to ensure the professionalisation of the field. This is evident from the multitude of German networks identified and discussed below in the section Categories of networks.

A RAN review of primary prevention approaches in **central and eastern Europe**<sup>7</sup> has shown that many initiatives aimed at networking and exchange of practices in the field of P/CVE are implemented by CSOs,

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<sup>5</sup> European Commission (2022): Final report on the creation of the EU Knowledge Hub on Prevention of radicalisation- workshops in 2022.

<sup>6</sup> RAN (2022): [The role of civil society organisations in exit work](#)

<sup>7</sup> RAN (2023): [Mapping of primary prevention approaches in Central & Eastern EU Member States](#)

but are mostly relying on EU project funding and are not formalised in sustainable networks. The perception of Islamist extremism presenting a limited threat to societies in this region also means P/CVE is not high on the policy agenda and resources devoted to P/CVE programmes and networking are limited, among other contextual factors. At the same time the presence of nationalist and right-wing extremist actors and developments is not sufficiently prioritised as a P/CVE intervention area in policies and there are limited government-led structures or knowledge exchange initiatives addressing this issue. CSOs in the region are very active in addressing local challenges related to radicalisation and violent extremism specifically, but also implementing interventions on broader and related topics such as hate speech and hate crime, disinformation and media literacy, discrimination and xenophobia, and they often initiate frameworks of cooperation with and capacity building efforts for public institutions on these matters. CSO experts from the region have expressed the need for strengthening these efforts through more sustainable networking structures at local level based on the example of RAN<sup>8</sup>.

A review of primary prevention approaches in southern EU MSs has shown a variety of P/CVE strategies with a predominant focus on counter-terrorism measures with security actors playing a central role in some countries<sup>9</sup>. In Greece, for example, the focus is more on preventing terrorist attacks and less on preventing violent extremism through a social approach and wide involvement of different state and non-state actors, with security actors playing a key role. There are important policy and practical initiatives and networks (including with focus on primary prevention) addressing related societal challenges such as crime prevention, combating racism, intolerance and polarisation, fostering media literacy and integration of asylum seekers, but not under the umbrella of a dedicated P/CVE strategic or institutional framework. Hence, the P/CVE architecture (institutional actors or networks focusing specifically on P/CVE) is not so pronounced and visible as in other countries in Europe. This trend is also evident in Italy, Cyprus, Malta and Portugal, although due to the different contexts and threat levels, no generalisation is possible, given also that there are different developments towards specialisation in P/CVE at different levels (including through EU or international projects).

**Centralised versus federal governance** is also an important factor in understanding the contextual differences between existing structures for coordination, networking and knowledge dissemination between different P/CVE actors. In some countries, national government coordination bodies are the main actors providing a framework for networking activities between actors involved in P/CVE, while in others this trend is more bottom-up and such exchange of knowledge and experience is initiated by local authorities, CSOs/communities or different practitioner organisations.

In **France**, due to the centralised nature of the country, the national coordination body on crime prevention and P/CVE plays a central role in coordinating the agencies involved in implementing P/CVE measures at national level (see further below the analysis of national P/CVE coordination structures) and the prefectures at local level<sup>10</sup>. Local networks of prevention coordinators focus mainly on crime and urban development and to some degree also on P/CVE specifically. At the same time, the national-level coordination structures on P/CVE can provide support to local authorities for developing local interventions and plans<sup>11</sup>. CSOs play a less prominent role in partnering with state actors in designing and delivering P/CVE interventions and programmes, although there are funding programmes for P/CVE on national and local levels.

While in many EU MSs counter-terrorism and P/CVE strategies have been elaborated only after 9/11, the P/CVE architecture in **Germany** started taking shape already in the 1980s to address trends of right-wing extremism. Our mapping shows that Germany is the EU country with the most developed infrastructure of P/CVE networks at diverse governance levels, topical foci and actors involved, including a multitude of CSOs delivering P/CVE work across all prevention strands. There are several factors for the emergence of such a diverse landscape of networks in Germany. Due the National Socialism past, there is a strong social consensus that the state cannot be responsible alone for promoting democracy, civic education or P/CVE,

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<sup>8</sup> Interview with a P/CVE expert.

<sup>9</sup> RAN (2023): [Mapping of primary prevention approaches in southern EU Member States](#)

<sup>10</sup> RAN (2021): [National hubs supporting local actors in P/CVE – practitioners' insights](#)

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

and partnerships with CSOs have been fostered early on, including through federal and state funding programmes<sup>12</sup>. The federal structure also results in diversity of approaches and actors, as the 16 states (Bundesländer) define their own P/CVE agenda and interventions, while the federal level has mainly a coordination function, but it cannot impose specific policies and measures directly. A specific feature of the German P/CVE context is that there is no strict division between state and civil society stakeholders in prevention, but instead the work is done hand in hand in partnerships. This is based on “the prevailing view in Germany, that prevention can only succeed if it is implemented by as many active participants as possible, in the spirit of a responsibility borne out of society as a whole”<sup>13</sup>. Prevention is also strongly recognised by research, policy, security and social actors alike, which enables networking on different levels across stakeholders and topics, including towards collaborative multi-stakeholder development of quality standards for the professionalisation of P/CVE work in different areas<sup>14</sup>.

There are many further factors shaping the varying national P/CVE architectures across the EU, as well as the nature, scope, composition, objectives and role of P/CVE networks in the respective national contexts. It is therefore not possible to draw comparison of networks between countries. It is also not the purpose of this report.

## Methodology

Based on the policy context in the EU and at national levels described above, this exploratory mapping relied on several data sources, such as desk research, expert consultations and data from online surveys distributed among the NPPM, as well as the expert network of RAN, such as RAN Working Group co-leaders (WG leaders) and Expert Pool members, among others. The data collection phases are visualised in the figure below, with focus on two main components:

### Stakeholder consultations

- An online survey among leaders of RAN Practitioners Working Groups, RAN ambassadors<sup>15</sup> and other experts (e.g. from the RAN Expert Pool) to identify relevant P/CVE networks across the EU as well as follow-up interviews and consultations with these experts to clarify national context and information on networks.
- The results of an online survey targeted at members of the NPPM.

### Desktop research

- A systematic review of previous RAN publications regarding the mention of networks was conducted (including RAN Collection, conclusion papers from meetings and specialised papers, reports on relevant project-based collaboration (PBC)<sup>16</sup>) to identify references to networks.
- Further desk research based on existing academic and grey literature on P/CVE structures and networks in the EU, including for example national strategies or action plans.

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
<sup>12</sup> Interview with a leading P/CVE practitioner expert.

<sup>13</sup> Ben Slama & Kemmesies (2020): [Handbook of PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM. An integrative cross-phenomenal approach for governmental agencies and civil society](#)

<sup>14</sup> BAMF (2020): [Standards in counselling for the social environment of \(potentially\) radicalised Islamist individuals](#)

<sup>15</sup> Since 2021, RAN Ambassadors have been acting as effective multipliers of the RAN Practitioners activities in their respective countries. They are actively involved in disseminating information about relevant RAN activities within regional and national networks. Based in 10 EU Member States, they are the bridges between activities at EU and national levels. See who the RAN Ambassadors are here: [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/ran-ambassadors\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/ran-ambassadors_en)

<sup>16</sup> e.g. European Commission (2019): [Reports of the project-based collaborations on prevention of radicalisation led in 2019](#)



## Limitations of the study

**Contextual analysis:** The P/CVE context in EU MSs differs significantly — both in terms of the risks and manifestations of radicalisation and violent extremism, but also in terms of national responses. The existence and nature of P/CVE networks as defined in this paper in each MS, as well as the perceived need for such and their impact, will be contingent on many different factors in each national context, including overall P/CVE policy approach, the level of perceived threat in relation to radicalisation and violent extremism, and the related prioritisation of P/CVE in national strategies and policy priorities, resource and needs assessment, governance structures, institutional set-up, legislative framework and many others. In addition, the level of involvement of non-state actors in P/CVE and their roles vary across MSs. It is outside the scope of this paper to analyse in depth these contextual differences that precondition the existence of national or local P/CVE networks, or the need for such networks.

This paper is focused on taking stock of existing networks as per the working definition and in the context of the key objectives of the EU policy agenda on P/CVE and the objectives of RAN and the future Knowledge Hub.

### Not comprehensive:

- **Definitions and scope:** This mapping is not aimed at being a comprehensive list of all networks of relevant stakeholders at national or local level that are dealing with P/CVE, as such a mapping would also differ depending on how broad a definition of a network is adopted and what are considered relevant stakeholders and by whom. It has a relatively narrow scope based on our working definition, presenting a first attempt to provide a basis for further exploration based on set criteria. A common understanding of networks based on EU-wide discussion would support the refinement of the definition and the inclusion criteria. Furthermore, the current list of networks should be updated and complemented on a regular basis by including new networks.
- **Inclusion criteria:** There are many organisations (state and non-state) that play important and diverse roles in disseminating knowledge and act as “knowledge hubs” at national or regional level, yet they do not constitute networks. Similarly, other instruments such EU- or nationally funded projects also have an important role in knowledge exchange and dissemination and might even result in or greatly contribute to network building at national, local or EU-wide level. However, these are excluded from the current analysis due to the often-temporary nature of projects. The focus is on more sustainable structures that are active at the time of drafting. Nonetheless, networks that emerged based on project funding are included as far as possible.
- **Data sources:** The present mapping relies mostly on feedback by national P/CVE practitioners/experts and NPPM members and previous RAN knowledge (based on papers and meeting outcomes), whereas desktop research was limited to the EU languages spoken among the authors of the paper (English, German, Dutch, Bulgarian).

## Defining networks

### Literature review

The review of academic and grey literature on knowledge networks identified several definitions and conceptual frameworks. Much of the literature on networks used here focuses primarily on multi-agency cooperation. In the context of P/CVE, there is very little work until today. This section briefly introduces these general definitions of networks and their potential benefits and challenges, before describing the specific understanding of networks derived from these definitions and used in this paper. What do we actually understand by a network?

A network is a set of ties connecting different actors (persons, organisations, state). Networks aim at facilitating communication lines between different subgroups and connecting different organisations<sup>17</sup>. The central goals of a network are improvement of specific processes or activities, broadening opportunities and sharing resources<sup>18</sup>.

Networks can be classified along different dimensions/criteria, for example by voluntarism or coercion, power relations, network density, external involvement, different time frames or geographical spread<sup>19</sup>. Other key dimensions can also be the purpose of a network, the network composition or the degree of formality<sup>20</sup>. The decision in favour of a particular criterion ultimately also determines which networks we understand as networks.

Networks are important, because a network structure has an impact on both outcomes for the individuals and organisations involved in the respective network as well as for the network<sup>21</sup>. In contrast to a single actor, a network is more able to cope with the inherent complexity of social problems such as extremism and radicalisation. Networks are also important from a policymaking perspective. Central governments need multiple, diverse local and civil society partners to mobilise the knowledge and resources needed<sup>22</sup>. This makes networks indispensable for governments both in the context of P/CVE work as well as in multi-agency cooperation.

A challenge for networks in all kinds of fields is to balance too much diversity, which can lead to a lack of coherence within the network<sup>23</sup>. Although networks are usually assumed to fare better with regard to the inclusion of civil society within decision-making processes compared to vertical arrangements (i.e. formally established intergovernmental agencies), the latter raise fewer legitimacy concerns<sup>24</sup>. The chances for a successful network fall and rise with the availability of resources (especially financial).

Within a world full of social complexity and global connection, multi-agency cooperation can solve and help to overcome many challenges within European societies. Shared goals, information sharing, partner awareness and coordination can be seen as important conditions for multi-agency cooperation<sup>25</sup>. CSOs can play an important role in fostering multi-agency cooperation. CSOs should therefore establish local civil society networks, develop an online directory of strategy-relevant network activities, and convene a wide range of government/non-government stakeholders to develop strategy implementation plans<sup>26</sup>.

**Systematic review of EU policy documents and RAN publications** (e.g. specialised papers, Collection of inspiring practices, conclusion papers) has not identified a coherent definition of a network or what its

<sup>17</sup> Katz & Anheier (2005): [Global connectedness: The structure of transnational NGO networks](#)

<sup>18</sup> Muijs et al. (2010): [Why network ? Theoretical perspectives on networking](#)

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 16-21.

<sup>20</sup> Stephens & Sieckelinck (2019): [Working Across Boundaries in Preventing Violent Extremism : Towards a typology for collaborative arrangements in PVE policy](#) (pp. 279-280).

<sup>21</sup> Katz & Anheier (2005): [Global connectedness: The structure of transnational NGO networks](#) (p. 246).

<sup>22</sup> Dalgaard-Nielsen (2016). [Countering Violent Extremism with Governance Networks](#)<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26297713?seq=2> . See also: Reuge (2020): [White Book on CVE. A collection of policy papers.](#)

<sup>23</sup> Katz & Anheier (2005): [Global connectedness : The structure of transnational NGO networks](#) (p. 246).

<sup>24</sup> den Boer et al. (2007): [Legitimacy under Pressure: The European Web of Counter-Terrorism Networks](#)

<sup>25</sup> RAN (2017): [Local Action Plan Academy](#)

<sup>26</sup> Rosand et al. (2008): [Civil Society and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy – Opportunities and Challenges](#)

features are. Networks of practitioners are discussed in a more loose and informal way. Beyond the review of papers, our methodology considers attendance of representatives of networks during meetings and overall engagement with the RAN Practitioners activities, based on feedback by RAN Practitioners staff and review of participants lists in WG meetings. For example, some international (EU) networks such as EuroPris and European Forum for Restorative Justice would regularly nominate representatives to participate in RAN PRISONS or RAN REHABILITATION WG meetings or other formats, and engagement is more frequent than with other networks that are potentially relevant for the activities of the Knowledge Hub, but with whom cooperation has not been established yet. Furthermore, representatives of several networks such as the [European Forum for Urban Security](#) (Efus) would sign up for specific relevant activities. However, beyond such participation, there has not been a structured cooperation and exchange with relevant networks along common needs and objectives.

One of the terms that has been discussed in several RAN Practitioners papers is that of “national hubs”, understood as national-level structures that coordinate the implementation of P/CVE policies (strategies and action plans), and support the local level in various ways<sup>27</sup>. While we discuss these structures in a separate chapter (see further below) with focus on their networking functions, we understand the term network in a broader sense.

We present below a working definition of networks adopted for the purposes of this paper. It should be noted, however, that there has been no structured discussion within RAN or among the EU MSs and the European Commission on what a network is and what their role should be in the future Knowledge Hub. The definition and criteria for networks we present here should be further expanded and discussed within the Knowledge Hub to arrive at a common understanding.

## What is a network? A working definition

For the purpose of this paper, the following definition is put forth:

**A (knowledge) network** connects more than two actors who work in the same field and have similar interests and/or work on similar tasks (such as practitioners, policymakers and researchers). The common goal is not only to facilitate dialogue and knowledge exchange between the respective actors involved, but also to pool specialist knowledge and experience in order to pass this on in a structured manner and thus expand the knowledge and know-how of all members and interested parties.

**National and regional networks focusing on P/CVE** across the EU further consist of members that can come from different disciplines (e.g. security authorities, social work, educational professionals, mental health, youth work, prison and probation, etc.) and have different areas of specialisation. But they have in common that they work in the area of P/CVE within at least one of the MSs of the EU.

We use the following framework of inclusion and exclusion criteria for the purposes of this mapping of networks.

**Table 1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for networks**

	Inclusion criteria	Exclusion criteria
<b>Objectives</b>	Strengthening P/CVE practice	Objectives do not include P/CVE application-orientation (e.g. purely foundational research)
<b>Geographical scope</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EU-wide and international (connecting at least two MSs, (connecting at least two MSs, if international –</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hyperlocal (single towns, municipalities)</li> <li>EU-external</li> </ul>

<sup>27</sup> RAN (2021): [National hubs supporting local actors in P/CVE – practitioners' insights](#)

	covering the EU) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National level</li> <li>• State/province level</li> <li>• Local (connecting at least two municipalities or cities)</li> </ul>	
<b>Types of activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitate dialogue</li> <li>• Facilitate knowledge exchange and mutual learning</li> <li>• Pool specialist knowledge and experience to pass it on in a structured manner</li> <li>• Connect different P/CVE actors for the purpose of further topical/professional exchange (aimed at the general advancement of the practical field)</li> <li>• Advocacy on behalf of members/ representing its members</li> <li>• Coordination of different stakeholders on an overarching professional level (establishing guidelines, frameworks)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational case work (e.g. mobile teams)</li> <li>• Multi-agency case work (e.g. info-houses)</li> <li>• Operational information sharing/intelligence sharing/fusion centres</li> <li>• Helplines/hotlines</li> </ul>
<b>Stakeholders involved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• P/CVE practitioners</li> <li>• Research &amp; policymaking, IF the aim is to strengthen P/CVE practice</li> </ul>	
<b>Thematic scope</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focusing on one or more P/CVE area specifically (e.g. rehabilitation/prison &amp; probation, the online dimension)</li> <li>• Addressing P/CVE in the framework of a broader topic (e.g. security or media literacy or hate speech, prison &amp; probation, etc.)</li> </ul>	Networks on topics relevant to P/CVE (e.g. general and civic education fields such as media literacy or combating discrimination and hate, community resilience), but not addressing P/CVE in any way in their work
<b>Status</b>	Must be active	Inactive
<b>Formalisation</b>	Must be formalised to some degree (e.g. a functioning website, secretariat, any foundational/process/programmatic documents evidencing the set-up, objectives and activities of the network)	Informal initiatives/exchange formats
<b>Objectives</b>	Strengthening P/CVE practice	Objectives do not include P/CVE application-orientation (e.g. purely foundational research)

Source: authors

Based on these criteria, we include 60 networks in the analysis for this paper. We define three main categories of these networks, based mainly on their scope of activities: A) Networks focusing on P/CVE specifically; B) Networks on broader topics, which deal with P/CVE as part of their wider mandate; and C) National P/CVE coordination bodies.

## Categories of networks

This section will focus on discussing some of the networks in terms of their focus, target group and activities to give a better understanding of the networks identified per category. In Appendix A, an overview can be found of networks discussed in this paper. Recommendations on how these networks could be engaged with in a quest for enhanced cooperation are included at the end of the paper. The full list of networks containing additional information collected in the course of the mapping (including on geographical scope, thematic focus, main objectives and types of activities, target groups, type of funding, level of formalisation, agenda-setting and decision-making approach within a network) can be provided to the European Commission upon request.

It should be noted that our research has not identified networks in all MSs that fit the working definition and criteria, while in others, such as Germany, there is a highly developed infrastructure of such networks at federal and state level, covering a diversity of P/CVE topics and target groups. The reason for this is that, as stressed previously, in each MS the P/CVE infrastructure is different, as is the historical context, threat level and governance approach. Hence, a direct comparison between MSs is not possible and is not the aim of this paper. Networks are therefore assessed not based on country of operation/origin, but on their objectives, topics covered and actors they connect in the field of P/CVE. This perspective will benefit the activities of the future Knowledge Hub in extending outreach and strengthening cooperation and dissemination at national levels.

## A. Networks focusing on P/CVE specifically

This first category describes networks that have a specific focus on P/CVE, or on one or more areas related to P/CVE. This can be networks that are built on specific forms of prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism (i.e. primary, secondary or tertiary), and networks that focus on specific P/CVE subtopics, such as religiously motivated extremism, right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism and the online dimension. It can also be networks that focus on a variety of these topics within the field of P/CVE.

Based on the focus of the network, the members and target group can differ from (specific) practitioner groups (e.g. prison and probation professionals, mental health workers, local authorities), policymakers, security forces, research, civil society, or it can be a mix of the different professions. A variety in geographical scope can be seen, ranging from networks at the local to the national level, with also five identified networks that have an international focus.

Many of the networks listed are funded by governmental support structures either through long-term collaborations or by specific funding for individual projects. Examples of government-funded networks are the Austrian Nationwide Network for Extremism Prevention and Deradicalisation, the German Federal working groups, called *Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaften* (“BAG”), or the German competency networks (*‘Kompetenznetzwerke’*), which focus on different subtopics such as right-wing extremism or religiously inspired extremism, and which are part of the federal government-led programme ‘Live democracy!’ (*Demokratie Leben!*). These competency networks will be supplemented at the end of 2024 in Germany with the aim of building a nationwide sustainable structure focusing on knowledge exchange and establishing a long-term collaboration in these fields.

### *Networks focusing on P/CVE more broadly*

Several networks can be categorised as networks with a broader focus on P/CVE. Within Austria, an important network that is active at the national level is the [Nationwide Network for Extremism Prevention and Deradicalisation \(“Bundesweites Netzwerk Extremismusprävention und Deradikalisierung \(BNED\)”](#)). In order to counteract the threat of various forms of extremism, this network was founded in 2017 and is coordinated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Representatives from multiple ministries, federal states, civil society, the association of cities and municipalities, as well as experts from science and research are involved in the network and meet regularly on strategic aspects of extremism prevention and deradicalisation in Austria. The network sees itself as a strategic and policy advisory network<sup>28</sup>. At the more local level in Austria, one of the networks identified is the [Vienna Network for Democracy Culture and Prevention \(“Wiener Netzwerk Demokratiekultur und Prävention \(WNED\)”](#)). This network focuses specifically on the prevention of radicalisation of children and youngsters. Together with network members, such as the departments of kindergartens, child and youth welfare, integration and diversity, and psychology and pedagogy, interventions are being developed and education and training courses are offered.

In Germany, one of the important national practitioner networks is the [“Bundesverband Mobile Beratung \(BMB\)”](#). BMB was founded in 2014 and is also part of the government-led programme ‘Live democracy!’. It is an umbrella organisation of 50 nationwide mobile counselling teams (with around 200 consultants) that provide free-of-charge advice on how to deal with right-wing extremism, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-feminism

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<sup>28</sup> See: [The Austrian Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism and De-radicalisation](#)



and conspiracy narratives. The network connects the various teams, bundles their experiences in publications, organises internal and external conferences and trainings, and represents the mobile teams and their interests towards politics and the media.

An example of a local/regional network focused on primary prevention in France is the [Resource Centre for the Prevention of Social Radicalisms](#) (CRPRS). Based in Lille, it services local authorities in the north of the country. Established in 2019, the CRPRS aims to provide professional and voluntary actors involved in prevention of different forms of radicalisation with useful resources and activities, including research and good practices, awareness-raising and training actions, networking and exchanges of practices. This resource hub addresses a wide audience of local actors: community agents and elected officials, state services, employment, health, housing and education, among others. By promoting a common culture between these, it can help them get accustomed to P/CVE and a common understanding of radicalisation<sup>29</sup>. There are further similar regional networks in France for local authorities, but they focus more on crime prevention and urban development and are discussed in the next category.

At the (EU) international level, the [Strong Cities Network](#) is an important global network of more than 220 cities and other local governments, dedicated to addressing all forms of hate, extremism and polarisation at a local level. By connecting relevant actors of different cities, organising conferences and trainings, and sharing good practices, peer learning and exchanges are facilitated and cities are equipped with tools they need to not only address a complex and evolving threat environment but also to build strong, socially cohesive and resilient cities.

#### *Networks with focus on a specific P/CVE sub-area*

Several German networks have been identified that share a main focus on the prevention and countering of **right-wing extremism**. However, the scope (geographical and topical) and target group of these networks vary. At the national level, the [Competency Network Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism](#) ("[Kompetenznetzwerk Rechtsextremismus Prävention \(KompRex\)](#)") and the [Knowledge Network for Research on Right-Wing Extremism](#) ("[Wissensnetzwerk Rechsextremismus \(WI-REX\)](#)") can be seen. Where KompRex offers trainings, education, counselling and networking events for a mixed target group (practitioners, policymakers and researchers), WI-REX focuses mainly on researchers. It aims to contribute to the networking and consolidation of the research field of right-wing extremism. It does so by combining knowledge from different disciplines, creating spaces for reflection and interaction, the development of tailor-made formats for knowledge transfer between research, practice and civil society, and the offering of targeted support to young researchers working on the topic of right-wing extremism.

Focusing also on the topic of right-wing extremism at a national level, but on tertiary prevention specifically, is the [Federal Association Exit to Entry](#) ("[Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Ausstieg zum Einstieg e.V. \(BAG Exit\)](#)"). BAG Exit is the nationwide umbrella organisation of civil society actors who help people to exit and distance themselves from extreme right-wing contexts. It aims to promote civil society structures and connects individual advice centres across national borders. With the same focus, but at a more regional scale, is the [Northern Association Exit Right](#) ("[Nordverbund Ausstieg Rechts](#)"), which is a network of civil society distancing and exit programmes of the northern German States (i.e. Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein). It combats right-wing extremism by offering training (e.g. pedagogical dealing with people who make extreme right-wing statements), counselling and support on exit work.

A competency network with another topic of interest, in particular **left-wing extremism**, is the [Centre of Excellence in the field of Left-Wing extremism](#) ("[Kompetenzzentrum im Themenfeld Linker Extremismus](#)"). It conducts research on the causes and expressions of left-wing extremism, offers historical-political education on left-wing extremism, develops argumentation aids for multipliers from schools and (youth) social work, and develops educational concepts for work in schools and in youth work.

Focusing on **religiously motivated extremism** is the [Competency Network Islamist Extremism](#) ("[Kompetenznetzwerk Islamistischer Extremismus \(KN:IX\)](#)"). The work of KN:IX is focused on analysing

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<sup>29</sup> RAN (2021): [National hubs supporting local actors in P/CVE – practitioners' insights](#)

current developments and challenges in the prevention of Islamism, in order to support preventive actors from civil society, public institutions at the federal, state and local levels, as well as specialists from schools, youth welfare, the prison system and security authorities. It works closely with another German network that is of great importance at a national scale, namely the National committee on [Religiously Motivated Extremism](#) ("[Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft religiös begründeter Extremismus e. V. \(BAG RelEx\)](#)"). BAG RelEx facilitates networking and the sharing of knowledge between CSOs, practitioners and researchers working in the area of religiously motivated extremism. With the same thematic focus, but with another target group, is the [Monitoring System and Transfer Platform Radicalisation \(MOTRA\)](#). MOTRA is a research network in the context of civil security research funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Homeland. The project was created as part of the establishment of a leading-edge research cluster for the early detection, prevention and combating of Islamist extremism and terrorism, and it is a central point of contact over the 5-year term (December 2019 to November 2024).

One more German competency network is identified with a specific topical focus: the [Competency Network 'Antisemitism'](#) ("[Kompetenznetzwerk Antisemitismus](#)"). This network supports people affected by anti-Semitism as well as actors from education, politics, administration and civil society who want to get involved in combatting anti-Semitism. It does so by offering analysis on the topic, education and consulting.

When looking at the **online dimension** of P/CVE, a trend can be seen towards a more global and multi-stakeholder consideration of extremist/terrorist use of the internet, which led to the emergence of networks focusing particularly on online phenomena. Especially since the launch of the [Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism \(GIFCT\)](#) in 2017 — an organisation founded by Facebook, Microsoft, X and YouTube — there has been much progress recognising and addressing harmful content on the internet and on tech platforms. In addition, [The Christchurch Call Advisory Network \(CCAN\)](#) as a multinational response to terrorism was introduced in 2019.

#### *Cooperation with the networks of category A*

Given the important role that the networks identified within this category play in P/CVE, the connections they have with relevant organisations and the members they have within their network, enhancing cooperation between these networks and the Knowledge Hub can be of great importance for disseminating and exchange on knowledge and good practices in a more structured and systematic way.

For example, once the future Thematic Panels within the Knowledge Hub are defined, it would be important to assess which of the networks working within a specific P/CVE area such as addressing specific extremist ideologies or type of prevention need to be engaged in future activities, and how. Within RAN Practitioners, WGs such as PRISONS and REHABILITATION have benefited from input by some specific national networks focused on exit or tertiary prevention (such as BAG Exit and KN:IX), while disseminating invitations to meetings via national-level networks such as BAG RelEx has resulted in new practitioners joining activities of interest. Similarly, the Communications & Narratives (C&N) WG has cooperated with global networks such as GIFCT on the online dimension of extremism, while their input to cross-cutting events on this topic has been very valuable. It would be important to continue such cooperation and enhance the depth and scope of outreach and exchange with such relevant networks. We provide further forward-looking suggestions in the last chapter.

## B. Networks around broader topics

Based on the information collected via the survey among NPPM members and P/CVE practitioners/experts, another category of networks was identified. The networks in this category generally focus on broader topics, such as security or community cohesion, but at the same time deal with P/CVE as part of their wider mandate. In contrast to those networks assigned to category A, networks in category B thus have more diverse thematic foci. When looking at these networks in greater detail, it becomes visible that the majority of them deal with urban security, while others focus on prison and probation, online hate, justice and health.

Enhancing engagement and cooperation with such networks can be of great benefit, as they either support wider primary prevention objectives, address relevant root causes, or enhance a specific professional field such as prison and probation or the work of local authorities. Hence, future Thematic Panels or other activities within the Knowledge Hub are advised to assess how their work can further benefit from topical input or exchanges with some of these networks and how to ensure continuous learning from adjacent fields can be integrated within P/CVE<sup>30</sup>.

It should be noted that there are many more networks active in the EU that deal with issues relevant to P/CVE and the primary prevention field, such as on addressing polarisation, disinformation, discrimination, etc. However, we have not included networks that do not address P/CVE as part of their broader mandate. The Knowledge Hub can decide to do so in the future, based on further assessment of the needs of practitioners, researchers and policymakers and in line with its objectives.

Several of the networks listed under this category primarily deal with **urban security and crime prevention** within urban spaces — alongside their support for (local) actors active in the field of P/CVE. Some of these are nation-wide or regional associations of cities or municipalities, while others are international/EU-wide city networks and their local branches. An example for this latter type are the five national branches of Efus. Efus works as a network that fosters dialogue, cooperation and support among local and regional authorities within different EU MSs. Efus seeks to represent the diversity that these local and regional authorities bring to the network and fosters the exchange of diverse experiences between cities. The work of Efus is based on three core objectives: the promotion of a vision of urban security that equally includes prevention, sanction and social cohesion as topics; support for local and regional authorities when designing, implementing and evaluating their security policies; and reinforcing the role of elected officials within the respective MSs and within the EU. To reach these goals, Efus organises working groups, cooperation projects, online seminars and field visits, among other activities that member local and regional authorities can participate in. In addition to the national Efus branches in Belgium ([Belgian Forum for Urban Security \(“Hat Belgisch Forum voor Preventie en Veiligheid in de Steden \(BeFUS\)”\)](#)), France ([French Forum for Urban Security \(“Le Forum Français pour la Sécurité Urbaine” \(FFSU\)\)](#)), Germany ([German-European Forum for Urban Security \(“Deutsch-Europäisches Forum für Urbane Sicherheit \(DeFUS\)”\)](#)), Italy ([The Italian Forum for Urban Security \(“Il Forum italiano per la sicurezza urbana \(FISU\)”\)](#)), and Spain ([Spanish Forum for Prevention and Urban Security \(“Forum Espanol para la Prevencion y la Seguridad Urbana \(FEPSU\)”\)](#)), other national and transnational networks exist in the EU that deal with similar topics. One of these is the [Association of Flemish cities and municipalities \(VVSG\)](#) in Belgium. VVSG provides social services, knowledge, training and capacity building and contributes with its expertise to policies and a deepened understanding of a variety of topics related to social injustices and challenges. The [Association of Mayors of France \(“Association des Maires de France et des présidents d’intercommunalité \(AMF\)”\)](#) is another national network that focuses on a broad variety of topics in relation to urban policy, concerning local authorities and cities. AMF generally represents and supports mayors and local representatives in their day-to-day tasks and, for example, provides legal expertise. [Nordic Safe Cities](#) is a network active in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden and helps cities to prevent extremism and to safeguard local democracies; it seeks to counteract societal polarisation by developing and implementing new initiatives, by engaging in knowledge transfer and the exchange of experiences, and by connecting authorities, cities, organisations and young people to collectively work for better social cohesion and safe cities. In France, with its generally more centralised structure, local authorities with a focus on crime prevention and urban development were especially encouraged in 2016 to contribute to P/CVE work<sup>31</sup>. FFSU is one of the organisations that will support local actors in doing so.

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<sup>30</sup> RAN (2020): [Transgenerational Transmission of Extremist Ideologies – learning from adjacent fields: Cults and Gangs](#)

<sup>31</sup> RAN (2021): [National hubs supporting local actors in P/CVE – practitioners’ insights](#)

Four networks have been identified that share their main focus on countering **online hate and hate crimes**: [International Network Against Cyber Hate \(INACH\)](#), German [Competency Network against Digital Hate \(“Kompetenznetzwerk gegen Hass im Netz”\)](#), German [Federal Association against Digital Hate \(“Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft \(BAG\) Gegen Hass im Netz”\)](#), and Spanish [Network against Hate Crimes and Underreporting \(“Red Española contra los Delitos de Odio y la Infradenuncia \(REDOI\)”\)](#). INACH operates both globally and within the EU and consists of a number of CSOs; it uses a holistic approach to combating cyber hate and combines methods such as monitoring, removal of content, educational methods and international cooperation. Two networks in Germany are active in the fight against online hate: the competency network and the federal association. The competency network fosters knowledge transfer, engages in monitoring and research, and brings together CSOs that fight against digital hate. The federal association contributes to the networking of CSOs, conducts research, and supports knowledge transfer between different disciplines and experts. Apart from bringing together experts through multi-agency cooperation, REDOI, which was founded in 2023, also fosters the creation of synergies, data sharing and possible cooperations in research projects.

At European level, the [Confederation of European Probation \(CEP\)](#), the [European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Service \(EuroPris\)](#) as well as the German national network [Professional Association for Social Work, Criminal Justice and Crime Policy \(“Fachverband für Soziale Arbeit, Strafrecht und Kriminalpolitik e.V. \(DBH\)”\)](#) may be categorised as organisations active in the field of **probation and correctional services**. The first of these organisations, the CEP, acts as a European network that promotes research, policy and practice development. It connects experts in formats such as working groups, which focus on the topics of foreign nationals, radicalisation, sex offenders, domestic violence, mental health and technology. EuroPris acts as a network of national prison authorities from EU countries. It is a non-political, non-governmental organisation, represents prison practitioners and promotes ethical and rights-based imprisonment, seeks to advance operational capabilities and professionalism of prison and correctional practitioners, and contributes to prison-related policy and regulation within the EU, among other activities; it supports these goals with expert assistance and furthers cooperation between the national prison authorities to eventually improve the lives of prisoners and their families, and improve public safety and security, among other goals. DBH in Germany works to foster practice and reform of constitutional, social criminal justice, works to reduce causes for criminality, advocates for victim–offender mediation, and supports the reintegration of prisoners, among other activities and engagement in project work.

The [European Forum for Restorative Justice \(ERFJ\)](#) is a network organisation that connects members who work in the field of **restorative justice**, either as practitioners, academics or policymakers — throughout Europe and beyond. It promotes research, policy and practice development and seeks to ensure that every person gets access to high-quality restorative justice services. The ERFJ furthermore fosters international information exchange, promotes the development of effective restorative justice policies, and supports the development of principles, ethics, trainings and good practices, among several other activities.

Three further networks operate in rather niche fields: one is the [Competency Network ‘Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Discrimination’ \(“Kompetenznetzwerk ‘Islam- und Muslimfeindlichkeit”\)](#) in Germany, which acts as a network of four partners that themselves act as networks or alliances of different projects. The competency network is a hub for expertise and education, and it offers services for victims of **anti-Muslim racism** and for other organisations, institutions and the general public. The second one is the [Association of Counselling Centres for Victims of Right-Wing, Racist and Anti-Semitic Violence \(“Verband der Beratungsstellen für Betroffene rechter, rassistischer und antisemitischer Gewalt \(VBRG\)”\)](#) under which specialist counselling centres are connected. VBRG ensures that victims get access to counselling but also supports this field of expertise with monitoring of right-wing violence and statistical surveys, among other activities. The third one is the [Regional Health Agencies \(“Agence Régionale de Santé \(ARS\)”\)](#) in France that works to manage and implement national policies at regional level. It is responsible for the steering of **public health policy**, and it defines, finances and evaluates preventive and health promotion actions. It

furthermore seeks to prepare for health crises, regulates healthcare and social care options, and prepares campaigns and events on health-related topics.

The selection of networks described in the paragraphs above demonstrates their high diversity with regard to the kind of network partners, level and area of deployment, and topics they engage with. Some of these networks have obvious connections to the field of P/CVE; how other networks contribute to P/CVE may be less clear. These networks were added to this paper as experts and those consulted during the research stage of this paper highlighted their importance and/or relevance. One conclusion that can be drawn by simply looking at the list of networks in category B is that a broad variety of topics and fields of expertise may contribute to comprehensive and holistic deradicalisation and prevention approaches. P/CVE work can be approached through a number of different avenues, for example, through health services, urban security or prison work. This provides RAN and the future Knowledge Hub with a variety of opportunities for engagement that may also take into account the specific national or local conditions or existing structures. Engaging with these networks may foster deeper understanding for the different challenges that exist in certain fields of activity or professions and thus can help identify gaps that future projects realised by the Knowledge Hub should fill. Pooling the expertise that CSOs and authorities in different EU countries have acquired over the years may furthermore facilitate EU-wide exchange of best practices and allows for the transfer of knowledge across professions and specialist areas. Cooperation with networks that may not have direct connections to P/CVE at first glance could broaden the horizon and lead to innovative ideas and projects — potentially beyond traditional security-focused approaches. As it is well known that a variety of circumstances contribute to potential radicalisation paths, approaching deradicalisation from different angles may be fruitful as well. Trusting the expertise that organisations and networks have acquired over the years and setting up multi-stakeholder frameworks built on transparency and equality will support successful cooperation.

## C. National P/CVE coordination structures and knowledge hubs

Recognising that the local level is best positioned to implement P/CVE interventions as part of national strategies, the HLCEG-R encouraged MSs to complement EU networks and initiatives with corresponding coordination and cooperation structures at national, regional or local level. The EU Strategic Orientations 2024-2025 stress that under the local P/CVE dimension, an important aspect is to “support creating multi-professional networks at local level and establishing better links between local and national approaches”<sup>32</sup>.

The present research as well as insights from previous RAN activities<sup>33</sup> showed that government coordination bodies on P/CVE in some EU MSs play a key role in facilitating networking and knowledge exchange/dissemination between relevant actors at national level, as well as between the national and local levels. Moreover, RAN Practitioners, RAN Policy Support<sup>34</sup> as well as a dedicated PBC implemented in 2019 by eight MSs with European Commission support<sup>35</sup> have explored and analysed different practices of “national hubs” supporting the local level in P/CVE, highlighting the networking functions of some of these structures. While some act more as “centres of excellence” or national knowledge hubs, others focus to a greater degree on operational coordination and information sharing between different actors.

In this category we differentiate between those structures with predominantly coordination and “knowledge hub” function in the field of prevention (including developing guidelines, sharing best practices, connecting P/CVE actors at national and local level — e.g. the Danish or Swedish P/CVE national centres, as well as for example the federal advice centre in Germany) and so-called “fusion centres” that are primarily focused on terrorism and security threat assessment and intelligence gathering and analysis, or coordinating sharing

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<sup>32</sup> European Commission (2024): [Strategic Orientations on a coordinated EU approach to prevention of radicalisation for 2024-2025](#)

<sup>33</sup> European Commission (2019): [Reports of the project-based collaborations on prevention of radicalisation led in 2019](#)

<sup>34</sup> RAN Policy Support (2021): National support to local prevention of radicalisation: structures, processes and guiding principles.

<sup>35</sup> European Commission (2019): [Reports of the project-based collaborations on prevention of radicalisation led in 2019](#)

of operational information and operational (counter-terrorism) responses between security actors (such as the German Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre, GTAZ). The latter are not discussed here as they fall outside the scope of the working definition of “knowledge network” adopted. We also acknowledge that there are many different multi-agency cooperation formats at national and local levels such as info-houses, safety councils and case conferences, which gather different actors around the table to discuss specific cases of radicalisation or violent incidents from an operational perspective and decide on a course of action and respective roles of the practitioners involved. These are also not discussed here, as they are focusing on operational case management rather than on sharing knowledge and experience that spans beyond individual cases, although such structures might have a networking function as well.

We focus on the broader networking and knowledge/experience consolidation and dissemination function of national P/CVE coordination structures, and which also include diverse (including non-state) actors in their activities.

Previous RAN Practitioners research identified that from the side of local practitioners engaged in P/CVE, there is the need for national hubs to be able to smoothly provide knowledge to local P/CVE actors about extremist milieus and dynamics, etc. — and a suggestion was made that national hubs set up and facilitate networks between local P/CVE professionals, where they can learn from each other’s initiatives and what has been learned from case work<sup>36</sup>. Many of the national coordination structures identified in this mapping have such a role — namely to support local-level prevention efforts, to disseminate knowledge and to enable exchange of experiences from different P/CVE actors. We can name only a few examples here.

In Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, among other EU MSs, the national coordination of P/CVE is rooted in crime prevention and there is a strong link and partnerships between national-level coordination bodies of P/CVE strategies and local-level multi-agency networks such as the Info Houses in Denmark, the Anchor groups in Finland and the Safety Houses in the Netherlands.

- The [Danish Centre for Documentation and Counter Extremism](#) is an example of a government coordination national centre on P/CVE with a broad mandate that provides tailored support of local networking activities and exchange of practice, and also acts as a knowledge hub. It further supports the network of 12 Info Houses (one for each police region), which are a crime-preventive collaboration at local level where the key actors are the police and the municipalities, but also including other authorities like the regional psychiatry and the Prison and Probation Service. According to input from the NPPM survey, there is potential for strengthening collaboration between the Info Houses and psychiatric departments.
- The role of the [Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism](#) is to promote the development of preventive work aiming to attain a higher degree of coordination and effectiveness in respect of the preventive measures, to provide support to the needs of municipalities and different state agencies, to collect and disseminate knowledge, based on research and proven experience, and enhance knowledge-based practices.
- In **Finland**, P/CVE work is developed, coordinated and led by the National Cooperation Network set up by the Ministry of the Interior<sup>37</sup>. The members of the National Cooperation Network represent the key national, regional and local authorities and NGOs. An example of a **local coordination network in Finland** that was highlighted in our survey of the NPPM is the local network on prevention of violent extremism in the city of Oulu, coordinated by the Oulu Police Department. The main objective is for the stakeholders in the city of Oulu to work on preventing violent extremism based on a shared situational picture, sharing of expertise between the different stakeholders in joint workshops or

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<sup>36</sup> RAN (2021): [National hubs supporting local actors in P/CVE – practitioners’ insights](#)

<sup>37</sup> Ministry of the Interior Finland (2019): [National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2019-2023](#)

seminars, and providing inputs for national-level networks. Similar networks exist in other cities in Finland, according to the National Action Plan 2019-2023, but we have not received any up-to-date information on these in the course of this research.

In Germany, due to the federal government system, there are several coordination structures as well as “knowledge hubs” at both federal and state levels (within the 16 *Bundesländer*). At the national level, the two federal ministries that play a central role in P/CVE (the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community and the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ)), have established their own networks and coordination structures. One important example is the [Advice Centre on Radicalisation](#) of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), which functions on the federal and regional levels. The Advice Centre coordinates a network<sup>38</sup> of state-led and CSO-led family support and tertiary prevention programmes and partners across Germany and therefore acts at the heart of cooperation in the context of secondary and tertiary prevention of Islamist extremism in Germany<sup>39</sup>. To achieve successful cooperation in this regard, it has put in place continuous platforms for exchange between all involved actors, both formal and informal, on practical challenges and developments beyond each organisation’s geographical and professional focus. One concrete example of an outcome of this networking activity is the increasing degree of professionalisation of counselling work in this area, including through the development of joint standards for counselling work in secondary and tertiary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism<sup>40</sup>.

In France, the main coordination body of the national P/CVE strategy and action plan is the [Secretary General of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation](#) (CIPDR), which is leading the implementation of the country’s policies on crime prevention and P/CVE. It brings together professionals from different ministerial departments (interior, justice, education, health, social affairs), under the authority of the Prime Minister. It can support local authorities either directly, or indirectly via the prefectures<sup>41</sup>. It further disseminates knowledge through handbooks, manuals and guidelines and provides trainings to organisations. CIPDR further coordinates a network of local prevention coordinators and is the contact point for RAN and the NPPM.

In Poland, the [Terrorism Prevention Centre of Excellence](#) (TPCoE) is a unit of the Internal Security Agency and its focus is on prevention of terrorism and security threats more narrowly. It has a knowledge gathering and consolidation role, which also takes into account input from academic research. It remains to be seen if this structure would expand its activities to the prevention of radicalisation and will also extend its engagement with non-state and non-security actors in the future, including at the local level.

These are just a few examples of coordination bodies at national level across EU MSs that connect the national and local levels and perform a variety of functions, including those relevant for this paper, namely knowledge and experience sharing and networking between relevant P/CVE actors. Such structures are established also in Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands and Austria, among other MSs. Not all of these can be discussed in detail here. However, their importance for ensuring proper coordination and knowledge dissemination at national level is undisputed, and when engaging with these structures in the future, the EU Knowledge Hub would need to take stock of the diversity of national approaches to P/CVE coordination. These national hubs and P/CVE coordination structures can be important actors in not only disseminating knowledge but also through support with identifying key organisations or practitioners on national and local levels to be further included in the Knowledge Hub. They could also serve as partners to the Knowledge Hub

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<sup>38</sup> See a map of the network members here: [https://violence-prevention-network.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/VPN\\_Handreichung\\_Netzwerkkarte.pdf](https://violence-prevention-network.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/VPN_Handreichung_Netzwerkkarte.pdf)

<sup>39</sup> RAN (2022): [Cooperation between NGOs, non-security and security stakeholders in Germany](#)

<sup>40</sup> BAMF (2020): [Standards in counselling for the social environment of \(potentially\) radicalised Islamist individuals](#)

<sup>41</sup> RAN (2021): [National hubs supporting local actors in P/CVE – practitioners’ insights](#)

in organising regional activities. The Knowledge Hub will implement a regional approach when it adds value. This would require a more tailored engagement approach to be formulated by the EU Knowledge Hub together with MSs and the Commission, based on an in-depth assessment of what the needs from both sides are and what the scope of this engagement should be. We provide suggestions in the next section.

## Towards enhanced cooperation between national P/CVE networks and the EU Knowledge Hub

This paper presented a working definition of P/CVE networks focusing on knowledge exchange and strengthening P/CVE practice, and described the results of an exploratory mapping of such networks at national and regional levels. We identified 60 networks with different geographical scope and thematic foci. We further grouped them in three main categories based on their thematic scope and functions, namely 1) networks specialising in P/CVE or a specific sub-field of P/CVE; 2) networks on broader or related topics (but still addressing P/CVE as part of their broader mandate); and 3) national P/CVE coordination structures or hubs. We discussed several examples in each category, as well as similarities and differences.

The working definition and the criteria presented here, as well as the mapping results, should serve as a basis and starting point for future debates and analyses towards a common understanding of networks and their role in P/CVE and more systematic and targeted engagement with such networks within EU-level cooperation mechanisms.

As described in the technical specifications for the EU Knowledge Hub on prevention of radicalisation, it should support the EU MSs in their efforts to prevent and counter radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism. The Knowledge Hub will thereby be the platform within Europe where all relevant stakeholders (strategic, tactical and practice level and research) in the MSs of the EU and those of priority third countries will exchange expertise and good practices, develop effective responses and initiate implementation strategies of P/CVE policies. In addition, the Knowledge Hub will disseminate and share consolidated knowledge and expertise to target audiences such as first-line practitioners, CSOs, policymakers and researchers through training (including e-learning and webinars), research and papers (including topical papers, factsheets and other publications), and audio-visual products (including shareable videos and podcasts.).

To reach the relevant target audience and thereby support knowledge exchange, it is of great importance to continue and enhance engagement and cooperation with the networks identified in this paper, and also future networks. How this cooperation takes place can differ per type of network (e.g. based on its target group and members, or its objectives and specific topics addressed). As can be seen in this paper, within each of the three categories defined, there is still a great variety of types of networks and specialisation. We suggest the following next steps and factors to be considered for enhancing the understanding of networks and their role, and for continuing efforts to identify additional networks and foster cooperation with them in a more structured way.



## Enhancing the mapping of and cooperation with national and regional P/CVE networks

- Given the variety of networks identified, it is advised to **further segment and categorise** the networks mapped in this paper (e.g. networks focusing specifically on exit work, right-wing extremism, hate speech, or those catering to the needs of specific professional groups — e.g. the mental health sector). Based on this further segmentation, assess and identify needs for further engagement, support and cooperation with the EU Knowledge Hub.
- Based on the input of the mapped networks, **a clear cooperation strategy, objectives and activities per type of network** can be defined.
- To **keep evaluating and thereby improving cooperation in a more systematic way**, it is advised to develop a fixed format for **dedicated regular meetings** (e.g. on an annual basis) with support of the national contact points and designated points of contact within relevant networks.
- To make sure that newly emerged networks are also included in the outreach strategy, continue mapping networks, and establish a **dynamic open database** that will be updated through inviting input on a regular basis, based on a common understanding, definitions and criteria for networks.
- To create this **common understanding** on the definition of networks within the EU, the Commission could facilitate dialogue and discussion between policy, practice and research.
- **Cooperation with networks that are only partially involved in P/CVE** should be seen as an asset, as this could broaden the horizon and lead to innovative projects and ideas. Focus on **understanding the challenges that exist in the different fields and professions** these networks represent in order to identify potential gaps for future projects and activities.

## Enhancing cooperation with national P/CVE coordination structures and knowledge hubs

- The European Commission via the Knowledge Hub could provide support upon request to national P/CVE coordination bodies if they wish to **establish national or local networks/knowledge hubs or centres of excellence for knowledge exchange between practitioners and researchers** towards the professionalisation of the P/CVE field or subfields. This could entail tailored MS support activities or developing specialised resources with good practices in network development.
- The Knowledge Hub is advised to conduct a more in-depth **mapping of national government P/CVE coordination structures** and their networking and knowledge dissemination functions across EU MSs. This would contribute to a better understanding of their network-building roles and capacities and a more targeted strategy for engagement and outreach with these in the future.
- The Knowledge Hub — in coordination with the European Commission and the NPPM — could **engage more closely with these national hubs and coordination structures** to define what cooperation is needed and desired at national and local levels and what support can be provided beyond the dissemination of Knowledge Hub activities and products.
- In some MSs, the NPPM might not be a sufficient mechanism for dissemination of important information to national-level actors — for example, in Germany, due to the federal structure, it would be more effective to engage with specific large networks that can better reach the different target groups in different states, recommend participants for certain activities or request tailoring of activities as per local needs.

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## Appendix: Overview of networks

### Networks of Category A

Member State	Name of network	Focus and target group	Geographical scope
Austria	<a href="#">Nationwide Network for Extremism Prevention and Deradicalisation (BNED)</a>	Representatives from multiple ministries, federal states, civil society, the association of cities and municipalities, as well as experts from science and research are involved in the network and meet regularly on strategic aspects of extremism prevention and deradicalisation.	National
Austria	Lower Austrian network extremism prevention and deradicalisation (NÖ NED)	Organising network meetings, workshops, seminars and lectures for representatives of family, education and youth work, specialist departments at the Office of the Lower Austrian Provincial Government, state-related organisations, communities, the Lower Austrian State Office for State Protection and Combating Extremism (LSE NÖ) and representatives of the Lower Austrian judicial police. It aims to provide orientation on the current situation and ongoing activities in the context of extremism prevention and deradicalisation as well as to provide space for open questions and exchange of experiences.	Local/regional
Austria	PEP – Plattform Extremismus Prävention Wien	PEP facilitates networking and the sharing of experiences and recent developments within the field for P/CVE practitioners, such as teachers, social workers in rehabilitation or community work, law enforcement, prison staff and mental health professionals.	Local
Austria	<a href="#">Vienna Network for Democracy Culture and Prevention (WNED)</a>	Focuses on the prevention of radicalisation of children and youngsters. Together with network members, such as the departments of kindergartens, child and youth welfare, integration and diversity, and psychology and pedagogy, interventions are being developed and education and training courses are offered.	Local
EU-international	<a href="#">European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues (EEnet)</a>	Network for policymakers and researchers from EU MSs. Focuses on monitoring, cooperation and research on terrorism.	EU MSs
EU-international	<a href="#">Strong Cities Network</a>	Focuses on mayors, local officials and other stakeholders, such as youth, civil society, national governments, multilateral bodies and the private sector, and training. It offers them good practices, peer learning and exchange of knowledge on the topic of hate, extremism and polarisation, capacity building, online Resource Hub, partnerships, monitoring and evaluation.	International

France	<a href="#">Resource Centre for the Prevention of Social Radicalisms</a>	A resource hub focused on primary prevention of radicalisation. Based in Lille, it develops resources and networking activities targeted at local actors in the north of France, including community agents and elected officials, state services, employment, health, housing, or education agencies and practitioners, among others.	Regional
Germany	<a href="#">Frankfurt state offices network against extremism</a>	Focuses on the prevention and countering of religious extremism (especially Salafism) by offering training for professionals and programmes for young people and potentially at-risk individuals. Its network members are policymakers, youth and social services, and security forces.	Local
Germany	<a href="#">Hesse Advisory Network - Together for Democracy and Against Right-Wing Extremism</a>	The network members include numerous institutions, organisations and associations – state and independent providers – from Hesse. They aim to strengthen democratic structures and counter right-wing extremism and racism. It does so by publishing studies and providing free advice and education to schools, parents and family members, municipalities, clubs and other people seeking help throughout Hesse in cases of right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism and racism.	Local
Germany	<a href="#">AG Penitentiary and Probation Services</a>	A network of around 30 CSOs that implement extremism prevention and distancing advice in the prison system and help for offenders.	National
Germany	<a href="#">The Bavarian Network for Prevention and Deradicalisation</a>	This network is anchored at the Bavarian State Ministry of Interior, for Sport and Integration and consists of key state and non-state actors involved in P/CVE with focus on Salafism. It provides information, training and advice for a variety of professionals, including those working in education and youth work as well as in child and youth welfare. It offers information and assistance related to the prevention of radicalisation based on religion and on attitudes hostile to democracy and freedom.	Local
Germany	<a href="#">Federal Association Exit to Entry (“Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Ausstieg zum Einstieg e.V. (BAG Exit)”)</a>	Nationwide umbrella organisation of civil society actors who help people to exit and distance themselves from extreme right-wing contexts. It aims to promote civil society structures and connects individual advice centres across state (province) borders.	National
Germany	<a href="#">National Committee on Religiously Motivated Extremism (BAG ReIEX)</a>	Facilitates networking and the sharing of knowledge between CSOs, practitioners and researchers working in the area of religiously motivated extremism.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Federal Association of Mobile Advice (Bundesverband Mobile Beratung)</a>	An umbrella organisation of 50 nationwide mobile counselling teams (with around 200 consultants) that provide free-of-charge advice on how to deal with right-wing extremism, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-feminism and conspiracy narratives. The	National

		network connects the various teams, bundles their experiences in publications, organises internal and external conferences and trainings, and represents the mobile teams and their interests towards politics and the media.	
Germany	<a href="#">Competency centre on deradicalisation and extremism prevention KODEX Bremen</a>	KODEX is the contact point in the state of Bremen for security-related cases of radicalisation. The focus of the advice is on the areas of religiously based radicalisation, right-wing extremism and the scenes of so-called delegitimisers, i.e. people who adhere to the Reich Citizens' Movement, the milieu of lateral thinkers and comparable conspiracy beliefs. Together with official and civil society partners, it offers support and advice for those affected and those around them.	Local
Germany	<a href="#">Competency Network 'Antisemitism'</a>	This is a network of practitioners, researchers and policymakers. It supports people affected by anti-Semitism as well as actors from education, politics, administration and civil society who want to get involved in tackling anti-Semitism. It does so by offering analysis on the topic, education and consulting.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Competency Network 'Islamist Extremism' (KN:IX)</a>	Focuses on analysing current developments and challenges in the prevention of Islamism, in order to support preventive actors from civil society, public institutions at the federal, state and local levels, as well as specialists from schools, youth welfare, the prison system and security authorities.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Competency network left-wing militance</a>	Conducts research on the causes and expressions of left-wing extremism, offers historical-political education on left-wing extremism, develops argumentation aids for multipliers from schools and (youth) social work, and develops educational concepts for work in schools and in youth work.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Competency Network 'Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism' (KompRex)</a>	Offers trainings, education, counselling and networking events for practitioners, policymakers and researchers.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Connecting Research on Extremism in North Rhine-Westphalia (CORE NRW)</a>	Research and knowledge exchange between academia, practice and civil society on P/CVE.	Local
Germany	<a href="#">Knowledge Network for Research on Right-Wing Extremism (WI-REX)</a>	Focuses on researchers. Combines knowledge from different disciplines, creates spaces for reflection and interaction, develops tailor-made formats for knowledge transfer between research, practice and civil society, and offers targeted support to young researchers working on the topic of right-wing extremism.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Monitoring System and Transfer Platform Radicalisation (MOTRA)</a>	Research network in the context of civil security research. The project was created as part of the establishment of a leading-edge research cluster for the early	National

		detection, prevention and combating of Islamist extremism and terrorism and will be a central point of contact over the 5-year term (December 2019 to November 2024).	
Germany	<a href="#">Northern association Exit Right</a>	A network of civil society distancing and exit programmes of the northern German States (i.e. Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein). It combats right-wing extremism by offering training (e.g. pedagogical dealing with people who make extreme right-wing statements), counselling and support on exit work.	Regional
Germany	<a href="#">RADIS knowledge transfer project</a>	A research project on the social causes and effects of radical Islam in Germany and Europe. RADIS supports networking and methodological synergies between the 12 projects involved by organising joint events (interdisciplinary working groups) and taking care of the dissemination of research results to a wider audience by making videos and podcasts, and by facilitating dialogue with stakeholders such as policymakers.	National
International/ New Zealand	<a href="#">Christchurch Call Advisory Network (CCAN)</a>	The Christchurch Call is a community of over 130 governments, online service providers and CSOs acting together to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.	International
International	<a href="#">Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT)</a>	Brings together the technology industry, government, civil society and academia to foster collaboration and information sharing to counter terrorist and violent extremist activity online.	International
International	<a href="#">Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET)</a>	GNET is the academic research arm of the GIFCT and is focusing on online violent extremists' behaviours. Its goal is to promote rigorous academic research that produces policy-relevant outputs aimed at guarding against real-world harms. During annual conferences, knowledge and expertise is being shared between partners.	International
Netherlands	<a href="#">Platform youth prevention extremism and polarisation (JEP)</a>	Supports youth practitioners on topics related to polarisation, radicalisation and extremism.	National

### Networks of Category B

Member State	Name of network	Focus and target group	Geographical scope
Belgium	<a href="#">Belgian Forum for Urban Security (BeFUS)</a>	Pooling of ideas, knowledge and people through the association of towns and municipalities, to effectively work together on crime prevention and urban security.	National
Belgium	<a href="#">European Forum for Restorative Justice (ERFJ)</a>	Connection of members active in the field of restorative justice as practitioners, academics and policymakers throughout Europe and beyond; promotion of research, policy and practice development	Europe

		to ensure that every person may have access to high-quality restorative justice services; fostering of international information exchange, among other activities.	
Belgium	<a href="#">Association of Flemish cities and municipalities (VVSG)</a>	Provision of social services, knowledge, training and capacity building, policies and research on broad variety of topics, such as the work with children at risk of social exclusion, social integration, homelessness, gender equality and poverty; association of cities and municipalities as network partners.	National
Denmark	<a href="#">Nordic Safe Cities</a>	Safeguarding of local democracies and counteracting of polarisation by developing and pioneering new initiatives with authorities, cities, organisations and young people for better safety, security and social cohesion; exchange of knowledge and experiences.	Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland)
France	<a href="#">Association of Mayors of France (AMF)</a>	Representing and supporting of mayors and local representatives in their day-to-day tasks and inter-communal work; provision of legal expertise, decision-making tools and information.	National
France	<a href="#">Regional Health Agencies (ARS)</a>	Implementation of national policies at regional level; steering of public health policy; defining, financing and evaluation of preventive and health promotions actions; preparation for health crises; regulation of healthcare and social care options; e.g. coordination of local partnerships with professionals.	Regional/national
France	<a href="#">European Forum for Urban Security (Efus)</a>	Fostering discussion, cooperation and support among local and regional authorities in the field of crime prevention and urban security.	Europe
France	<a href="#">French Forum for Urban Security (FFSU)</a>	Strengthening of local urban security policies by connecting local authorities; promoting of the role of local authorities in policymaking at national and European levels; prevention and social cohesion.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Association of Counselling Centres for Victims of Right-Wing, Racist and Anti-Semitic Violence (VBRG)</a>	Connecting institutions and supporting victims with professional support and counselling services; documentation of developments and publication of reports, monitoring, statistics and analyses, among other activities.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Competency Network against Digital Hate</a>	Knowledge transfer, monitoring and research, counselling services, networking of CSOs active in the field of digital hate and hate speech.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Competency Network 'Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Discrimination'</a>	Hub for expertise and education; services for victims of anti-Muslim racism and for organisations, institutions and the general public.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Federal Association against Digital Hate</a>	Networking of CSOs, research and knowledge transfer between different disciplines and experts.	National
Germany	<a href="#">German-European Forum for Urban Security (DeFUS)</a>	Organisation and representation of the interests of German Efus members; support in voicing of security concerns of	National

		urban residents; and designing and management of safe, secure and accessible public spaces, and crime prevention through environmental design, among other activities.	
Germany	<a href="#">German Prevention Congress (DPT)</a>	Organisation of annual congress on prevention in Germany; research and seminars on prevention in several fields of expertise; fostering of dialogue between partners from research, practitioners and policy.	National
Germany	<a href="#">Professional Association for Social Work, Criminal Justice and Crime Policy (DBH)</a>	Education, public relations, networking of partners from theory and practice, social work, criminal law and criminal policy, and initiation of dialogue; fostering of social criminal justice and criminal policy; support for the reintegration of prisoners, among other activities and project work.	National/international
Italy	<a href="#">The Italian Forum for Urban Security (FISU)</a>	Networking of Italian cities, municipalities and regions; promoting of urban security policies.	National
Netherlands	<a href="#">Confederation of European Probation (CEP)</a>	Promotion of research, policy and practice development; connecting members active in the field of restorative justice as practitioners, academics and policymakers.	Europe
Netherlands	<a href="#">European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Service (EuroPris)</a>	Networking and representation of prison practitioners in the EU; promotion of ethical and rights-based imprisonment, exchanging of information, provision of expert assistance to support this agenda, and improvement of cooperation among European Prison and Correctional Services, with the aim of improving the lives of prisoners and their families, among other aims.	Europe
Netherlands	<a href="#">International Network Against Cyber Hate (INACH)</a>	Combating of cyber hate using a holistic approach that combines different methods, such as monitoring, educational methods and international cooperation; networking of international CSOs active in the fight against online discrimination.	EU
Spain	<a href="#">Spanish Network against Hate Crimes and Underreporting (REDOI)</a>	Networking of experts involved in the fight against hate; prevention of hate crimes and hate speech through a multi-agency cooperation approach, creation of synergies, data sharing and possible research collaborations.	National
Spain	<a href="#">Spanish Forum for Prevention and Urban Security (FEPSU)</a>	Networking of Spanish cities and regions; promotion of exchange of knowledge in the field of urban security and coexistence through working sessions, events, congresses and trainings.	National



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