RAN Collection practice template

Name of the practice	**Civic Resilience Course**
Please note that by practice we mean an activity/method/tool that has been used or is in use by professionals and/or community members.	
Description (max. 300 words) Short description of the aim and working method of the practice. Please note that in this description, it must be clear that there is an explicit connection to preventing and/or countering radicalisation and/or violent extremism. This means that in the aims and/or the activities/methods/tools of the practice, there is a link to preventing and countering radicalisation and/or violent extremism. Practices without this link cannot be included in the RAN Collection.	'Radicalisation' is used interchangeably with 'indoctrination'. Essentially, it means creating self-motivation among people to do certain things, and the events of recent years have shown that the line between silent beliefs and violent action can be very thin. As early as May 2019, an FBI assessment warned that the 2020 U.S. presidential election was likely to intensify the domestic terrorist threat from conspiracy-motivated extremists, including QAnon believers. The warnings became true on 6 January 2021, when the world was shocked by pictures of a right-wing mob storming the U.S. Capitol. Justice Department prosecutors have brought criminal charges against more than 130 people with apparent ties to extremist groups, including more than three dozen who appear to have expressed support for QAnon. As an organisation, we do not need to look as far to see the effect conspiracy theories have on radicalising people. On 10 August 2021, a rally against COVID-19 restrictions next to the Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) turned into a violent riot. The most active actors are known supporters and spreaders of conspiracy theories, and as uncovered by LRT investigation, many of them have ties with the Russian government. Our joint investigation with LRT only proved this further. Authoritarian regimes employ information operations as a form of radicalisation. From direct sponsorships to far-right politicians in Europe to using networks of bots and websites to spread conspiracy theories, extremist messaging is used to sow division, and regimes such as the Kremlin exploit weaknesses of Western societies. With the Civic Resilience Course, we aim to teach students to be alert while browsing online, provide them with basic skills

	of source assessment and lateral reading, and offer knowledge about how social media algorithms work (since it is known that the biggest platforms are perfectly aware of the damage they can cause). We believe that to curb the effects of radicalisation and malign foreign influence, improvement of critical thinking and media literacy levels among citizens is crucial alongside the important intelligence work and creating effective policies.
Key themes Please choose 2 key themes most corresponding with the practice.	Formal/informal education Internet and radicalisation
Target audience Please choose a minimum of one target audience most corresponding with the practice.	Youth / Pupils / Students Educators / Academics Add additional target audience.
Geographical scope Please indicate where the practice has been/is implemented (countries, regions, cities).	Digital course is available in three languages: English, Lithuanian and Montenegrin. The course so far was tested in Lithuania and Montenegro.
Start of the practice Please indicate when (year) the practice was developed and implemented to indicate the maturity of the practice. In case the practice is no longer active, please indicate when it ended.	Starting year: 2020 **Ending year:** Select ending year of practice in case practice has ended.
Deliverables Please indicate if the practice has led to concrete deliverables, such as (links to) handbooks, training modules, videos.	Civic Resilience Course: https://www.debunkeu.org/civic-resilience-course The course launched in English in October 2021: https://www.bitdegree.org/course/civic-resilience-course-for-students The course has been translated and adapted to Montenegrin and Lithuanian.
Evidence and evaluation Short description on performance measures of the practice, including	1. The English version of the course was completed by 369 students. 2. We asked the participants to complete pre- and post-course surveys so we could measure the impact made. As of December 2021, we had 282 responses

1. <u>qualitative views and quantitative (statistical) data</u> e.g. measure of the success of your project or intervention.
2. <u>evaluation and feedback</u>, including surveys and/or anecdotal evidence e.g. have you done either an internal or external evaluation, have you encouraged any feedback from your target group?
3. <u>peer review</u> which feedback did the practice receive in the RAN working group and/or study visit where the practice was discussed.

Please elaborate on the outcomes of your monitoring and evaluation efforts.

in the pre-survey, which we did a rough data analysis on already. Here is a summary of the insights:

Most respondents belong to Gen Z (ages 18-25), accounting for 244 persons, or 86.5 % of the total.

Most respondents were in years 1 and 2 of university (30.3 % and 20.5 %, respectively), followed by 16.0 % in their third year, 17.2 % in their fourth year, 11.1 % in their fifth year, and 4.9 % in the fifth year or beyond.

In terms of social media usage, a very large percentage report using Instagram daily (n=195), YouTube (n=177) and Snapchat (n=106). These three platforms are used daily by the majority of 19–21 year olds in our sample. Facebook and Facebook Messenger are used daily mostly by older students (over 22 years old).

Unsurprisingly, most get their news from social media (70.3 % reporting that they check the news on social media platforms daily). Friends and family are the second major source of news (53 % daily), followed by news websites (42.6 %) and TV (23.4 %), followed distantly by blogs, radio and newspapers.

In terms of trust, most of our Gen Z-ers trust the radio (52.9 %), followed closely by the written press (49.6 %) and the TV (48.8 %), with only 30.3 % trusting "the internet" and 15.6 % trusting social networks. The strongest sense of distrust (57.8 %) is associated with social networks; the least (23.0 % and 24.6 %) with radio and written press, respectively.

Most of our Gen Z respondents have heard of disinformation – 89.3 %. Just 4.5 % claim to have not heard of it before, and only 6.1 % say they're uncertain.

3. There was no feedback received from RAN Working Groups.

Sustainability and transferability
(maximum of 200 words)

Short description on the sustainability and transferability of the practice, including e.g. information on the costs of the practice. <u>Please elaborate on which elements are transferrable and how.</u>

The course can be adapted to any language; all that is needed is a translator or a native speaker who is a skilled writer. When the curriculum is translated, all that is left to do is to adapt the visuals, record a new voiceover and upload the new version of the course to the BitDegree platform.

In terms of costs, it depends on the rate that the people translating/editing the course are charging. As the course is quite short (90 minutes), it does not require many hours of labour. Moreover, as we have introduced the Civic Resilience Course in those countries where we already work, our local staff members helped with translations and checking the quality.

What is the most important while introducing the course in a new country is a strong cooperation with local education institutions, which help to carry out the communication

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	campaign about the course and encourage students to take part.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting Please note that to be included in the Collection, the practice is preferably nominated through one of the RAN meetings. Add name of the RAN Working Group/event, date, place and subject of meeting.	Name: RAN C&N Meeting on 'Digital frontrunners in P/CVE work' Date: 16/06/2022 Place: Riga, Latvia Subject: How early prevention, trend monitoring, individual interventions, and counter messaging are used online by practitioners
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding (maximum of 100 words) Please indicate how your project was funded, if your practice is linked to other EU initiatives or projects, AND explicitly note if it is (co-) funded by the EU, and if so, by which funds? Such as Erasmus +, Internal Security Funds (ISF), European Social Fund (ESF), Horizon 2020, etc.	The project was not funded by the EU. The project was funded by DT Institute.
Organisation (enter maximum of 100 words and select organisation type) Please briefly describe the organisation behind the practice including the legal status e.g. NGO, governmental, limited company, charity etc.	Debunk.org is an independent technology think tank and an NGO that analyses disinformation and runs educational media literacy campaigns. Debunk.org provides disinformation analyses in the Baltic countries, Poland, Montenegro, and Georgia, as well as in the United States and North Macedonia together with our partners. More about our activities: https://www.debunk.org/about Type of Organisation: NGO
Country of origin Country in which the practice is based.	EU or EEA country: Lithuania or: Non-EU country: Enter name if non EU country
Contact details Please provide contact details of who can be contacted within the organisation, with name and email address.	Address: Sturmanu g. 4, Klaipeda, Lithuania Contact person: Viktoras Dauksas Email: viktoras@debunkeu.org Telephone: +370 (615)57007 Website: www.debunkeu.org

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