# Mapping of primary prevention approaches in southern EU Member States

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RAN
Practitioners

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# Introduction

Globally speaking, primary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in southern EU Member States (MSs) (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain) has not attracted a lot of attention compared to other geographical areas, Spain being a notable exception. One reason for this may be that in many EU MSs, prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) policies and strategies were developed in the 2000s in direct response to dramatic terrorist events and thus conceived as the continuation of counterterrorism, largely driven by security considerations. Social cohesion approaches were adopted only later, in order to address fundamental long-term issues (discrimination, stigmatisation, citizenship, integration, equality, exclusion, racism, education, etc.). Their development differed between regions and countries. Generally speaking, social cohesion approaches are more visible in the northern and western parts of Europe rather than in the south. However, primary prevention efforts in southern EU MSs have never been systematically reviewed and available academic literature tends to focus either on counterterrorism or targeted prevention efforts. Still, good, innovative and promising practices can be found across all above-mentioned MSs.

Just like other European countries, southern EU MSs are currently confronted with a series of challenges including global warming, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated measures, the spread of hate speech, conspiracy theories, fake news and transnational right-wing extremism, as well as the effects of the Russian war against Ukraine. All these conditions feed the breeding ground of radicalisation and violent extremism, regardless of specific national contexts. Primary prevention approaches then become more and more relevant and necessary to address problematic situations before they escalate into violent extremism. And so the time has come to take stock and draw lessons from positive experiences in that field.

> **P/CVE practitioners**
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> This paper is intended for P/CVE practitioners, who are defined as skilled professionals, and sometimes volunteers, who design and implement various P/CVE strategies, programmes and projects. They can work for public authorities, for civil society organisations (CSOs), for companies, or independently (which creates a broad span of professionals who may be considered practitioners and who are represented within the constituencies of the different RAN Working Groups).
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> Practitioners intervene on an operational level and not on a political level. They can also be differentiated from policymakers (who set rules, frameworks and priorities) and academics (who conduct research), but in some instances, the categories are not mutually exclusive: for example, a researcher can also be considered a practitioner if they work on a concrete prevention project at some point. This can be the case when a psychology professor contributes to an intervention programme, for instance.

Primary prevention can be viewed as the first two levels (society and general prevention) of Johan Declerck's Prevention Pyramid, which has been used for, among other things, preventive actions in schools ([1]). In this paper, the notion of primary prevention refers to: preventive measures, policies, projects and approaches aimed at the general population or large social groups, which do not exhibit specific signs of problematic behaviour and/or are not considered particularly likely to adopt such conduct. Simply put, primary prevention takes place before problems of radicalisation and violent extremism appear.

By definition, primary prevention excludes surveillance, detection and referral mechanisms, intervention, disengagement, deradicalisation, hotlines and helplines, victim support and counterterrorism. It also excludes projects of a more general nature, but is aimed at specific groups, based on any sort of consideration (targeted prevention). It will include, on the other hand, a large number of projects run by and/or aimed at young people, since youth can hardly be considered a specific group in society.

Primary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism is not aimed only or even predominantly at preventing specific acts of violence: it serves a much larger purpose, it also supports social cohesion, and it deals with long-term, fundamental issues. Similarly, primary prevention is not conducted by the usual security actors (police, justice, intelligence, etc.), as it involves a much wider range of skills and partners: teachers,

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([1]) RAN (2016). Ex post paper, and RAN (2020).

social workers, youth workers, local practitioners, artists, religious communities, sport coaches, volunteers, ordinary citizens, etc. Local authorities and local actors often play a key part in primary prevention, as they are best positioned to understand the concerns, the aspirations, and the grievances of people and of communities. The line between social cohesion and primary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism is blurry, as the vast majority of social cohesion projects have nothing to do with P/CVE but may still serve the larger purpose. Nevertheless, primary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism requires a specific framing and understanding of the issue and the situation — which usually comes from specific training.

### Mapping as opposed to an international comparison

Even though the concept of primary prevention is widely accepted, the exact definition of the three levels of prevention can vary significantly. Categories, concepts, definitions and approaches vary according to context and circumstances, and prevention work comes in all shapes and sizes. Even though there are international guidelines and recommendations, simply put, there is no universal model of prevention and no scale according to which national situations can be measured. This is why the present paper is in no way an exercise in international comparison. More modestly, it provides a picture of prevention work in six countries, which so far have attracted less attention than other geographical areas.

It is nearly impossible to identify every single primary prevention project, even for a small country, and so the subject of inquiry needs to be defined even more clearly. While there is no real consensus on the objective of primary prevention, there is some form of agreement on the definition of radicalisation and on its root causes, at least between EU MSs. In general terms, according to Magnus Ranstorp, primary prevention addresses: individual socio-psychological factors, social factors, political factors, ideological/religious factors, culture and identity, crisis, trauma and other trigger mechanisms, group dynamics and radicalisers/groomers [2]. All these root causes can combine in a nearly infinite number of ways, and when put together form the breeding ground of radicalisation.

But what constitutes good practice in the absence of systematic monitoring and evaluation? According to Brouillette-Alarie and colleagues: "Negative or iatrogenic effects mostly stemmed from programs aimed at specific ethnic or religious groups or focusing on surveillance and monitoring. Positive effects were noted in programs aimed at improving potential protective factors against violent radicalization" [3]. They also add: "These programs enabled improvements on civic engagement, employability, openness towards others (or integrative complexity), teamwork skills, self-control, conflict management/communication skills, knowledge of violent radicalization dynamics, empathy, self-esteem, sense of identity, critical thinking, and religious knowledge" [4]. The notion of protective and vulnerability factors is rather well established in P/CVE [5]. To put it simply, primary prevention projects that carry a positive message usually give better results. Also, such approaches are more likely to receive the support of local actors and communities. And so, this paper will focus on this sort of practices in southern EU MSs.

The following six countries are considered southern EU MSs: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain. They do not constitute a unified group in any way, and they are exposed to very different threat levels. What they have in common is that primary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism is less visible (but not necessarily less present) in these countries than in some other parts of Europe. Actually, even though most of these countries do have an official national P/CVE strategy in place, access to information varies largely from country to country. In some cases, information on said strategies can actually be rather

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[2] RAN (2016). Issue paper.
[3] Brouillette-Alarie et al. (2022), p. 117.
[4] Idem, p. 140.
[5] For a clear presentation of protective and vulnerability factors, see for example the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV): https://info-radical.org/en/the-radicalization-process/ For another, complementary perspective on protective factors and the design of prevention projects, see RAN (2018).

hard to find (6). While most countries have a counterterrorism strategy in place, such strategies, if available, are only taken into account if they explicitly include a prevention side, which is rarely the case.

For each country, a selection of good, inspiring and promising practices is provided. Specific P/CVE projects are mentioned, as well as projects of a more general nature, which contribute to P/CVE in such fields as community engagement, family support, youth work, etc. Some projects are specific to a certain country, whereas others are implemented on an international scale, sometimes without a clearly identifiable project lead. Many projects were conducted and implemented in the period 2015-2020, in response to the rise of Daesh in Syria and Iraq and the related wave of terrorist attacks in Europe. Only a few of them are still active at the moment. Only projects on which information is still available online (usually in the form of a dedicated website) at the time of writing are taken into account.

### The Barcelona Declaration

The 2017 Barcelona Declaration (7), which was adopted by a large panel of CSOs from the Euro-Mediterranean region, gives an idea of possible fields of action in P/CVE for the area:

- GOAL 1: Monitor the drivers and impact of ALL forms of violent extremism

- GOAL 2: Reinforce education and community resilience

- GOAL 3: Strengthen the responsibility to protect the victims

- GOAL 4: Ensure the protection of Human Rights in Counter Terrorism laws

- GOAL 5: Promote gender justice and expose gender specificities

- GOAL 6: Reinforce the role of youth as actors for change

- GOAL 7: Promote democratic values and protect civil society space

- GOAL 8: Raise alternative narratives in social media and traditional media

- GOAL 9: Promote the adoption of local, regional and National Plans of Actions

- GOAL 10: Establish an Observatory to Prevent Violent Extremism

Not all these goals can be understood as primary prevention, but this document does provide an interesting framework to understand the diversity of possible P/CVE projects.

A selection of international and European projects will be presented first. After that, the paper will follow the same structure for each country: first a brief presentation of the political, cultural and legal contexts, then a presentation of major prevention actors, followed by a selection of relevant primary prevention projects and practices. Projects supported by the RAN Practitioners Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP) will receive particular attention, especially since counter- and alternative campaigns stemming from the programme were evaluated (8). A large part of these practices, but not all of them, are featured in the RAN Collection of inspiring practices (9).

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(6) One significant example is that, on the corresponding page of the European Commission's website, the prevent strategies of Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta are unavailable. The Portuguese strategy is not available in English, and several documents from Spain are not available either. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation/prevent-strategies-member-states_fr
(7) Observatory to Prevent Violent Extremism (2017).
(8) See: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/civil-society-empowerment-programme_en and European Commission (2022)
(9) RAN (2019).

# International and European primary prevention projects

Academic research has not always been kind to southern EU MSs ([10]), which does not do justice to the diversity and complexity of P/CVE approaches present in the region. There has been and still is a significant number of prevention projects present in the six considered countries, especially EU-funded projects. Hopefully, these projects can be part of a growing culture of early prevention in the field of P/CVE.

Again, only projects for which information is easily accessible online are presented here. Unless specified otherwise, descriptions have been gathered from the corresponding websites. The following projects have been implemented in several countries from the region simultaneously, most of the time by consortia without a clearly identified project lead. As such, it is difficult to attach them to any one specific country.

### Armour

The ARMOUR Project aims to address societal polarisation via strengthening the resilience of individuals, communities and vulnerable groups (such as children, youth, etc.) to polarisation, and to promote interaction and cooperation between different local actors from public sectors, that is, law enforcement, social services, etc. that specialise in working with vulnerable groups in preventing extremism through the development of cooperation models. The project will design and create a toolkit for first-line practitioners to employ in reducing polarisation among children and youth.

The ARMOUR methodology is based on a twofold assumption: countering radicalisation in Europe can be done successfully by addressing root causes through education and building strong partnerships at the local level aimed at mobilising local communities.

The project started in January 2019 and ended in June 2021. It was implemented in Spain, Greece, Romania, Austria, Italy, Bulgaria, Malta and the Netherlands.

https://armourproject.eu/

### Community Engagement Against Radicalisation (CEAR)

The general objective of the CEAR project is, primarily, to systematise a practical model of community and civic engagement that can enhance civil society's skills and capacity to prevent and counter radicalisation (PVE/CVE) by developing digital toolkits to disseminate in the local communities. Secondly, to develop support structures offering to all relevant local actors tailored trainings and consultancy services to help them to implement specific initiatives on PVE/CVE.

For that purpose, the project created a platform of consultancy services, in order to provide technical assistance to NGOs in the field of P/CVE.

The project was implemented in Portugal, Italy, Sweden, Hungary, France, Cyprus, Poland, Austria and Greece.

https://cearproject.eu/

### Dialogue about Radicalisation and Equality (DARE)

The DARE project investigates young people's encounters with and agents of radicalisation, how they receive and respond to those calls, and how they make choices about the paths they take.

The project aims to broaden understanding of radicalisation, demonstrate that it is not located in any one religion or community, and explore the effects of radicalisation on society. DARE focuses on people aged between 12 and 30, as they are a key target of recruiters and existing research suggests they may be particularly receptive to radicalism. It approaches young people neither as victims nor perpetrators of radicalisation, but as engaged, reflexive, often passionate social actors who seek information they can trust, as they navigate a world in which calls to radicalisation are numerous.

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([10]) See for example, Leão Varela et al. (2021).

The project started in May 2017 and the final event took place on 21-23 September 2021. It was implemented in the following countries: United Kingdom (UK), Turkey, Poland, France, Croatia, Germany, Belgium, Russia, the Netherlands, Norway, Greece, Tunisia and Malta.

https://www.dare-h2020.org/


Global Education and Active Response (GEAR)

The goal of the GEAR project is to contribute to intercultural understanding through cooperation of CSOs with formal education systems, teachers and students and to encourage the exchange, improvement and up-scaling of the existing best practices of global, civic and intercultural learning among schools at the local, regional, national and transnational levels. Its general objective is to prevent violent radicalisation and to promote democratic values, fundamental rights, intercultural understanding and active citizenship.

The project is proposing to build on the existing programmes for social inclusion and civic/intercultural education of youth and teachers implemented by the project partners, programmes developed both by schools and CSOs. Some of these individual programmes have a long tradition of implementation at national levels in each country, but they will be enhanced and upgraded in accordance with the actual needs and expanded transnationally, as well as enabling a transnational exchange of existing successful practices among partners and teachers in different countries.

The project started on 31 December 2016, with the final conference taking place in Madrid on 26-27 October 2018. It was implemented in Croatia, Slovenia, Italy, Spain and North Macedonia.

https://web.archive.org/web/20210314130944/https://gear.gong.hr/


MINDb4ACT

This project is only partly devoted to primary prevention. MINDb4ACT (Mapping, IdentifyiNg and Developing skills and opportunities in operating environments to co-create innovative, ethical and effective ACTions to tackle radicalization leading to violent extremism) responds to the European need to reassess and improve the copious P/CVE structures and programmes currently existing, by covering knowledge gaps in the field and introducing innovative, effective techniques to detect and prevent violent extremism.

All actions were developed in five specific domains: prisons and judiciary system; migration hotspots and asylum centres; schools; cities (peri-urban contexts); and the internet and media. A special contribution of the project is the integration of technology-based practical solutions with the contribution of the industry.

The project ran from 1 September 2017 to 31 August 2020. It was implemented in the UK, Denmark, France, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Spain, Italy and Austria.

https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/740543


Rethink

This is another project that only partly deals with primary prevention. The general objective is to prevent vulnerable audiences from starting a process of radicalisation by offering them resilience and critical thinking mechanisms, as well as convince those already engaged within a process of radicalisation to abandon it or dissuade them from going further by providing an alternative narrative that deconstructs extremist rhetoric, in order to change violent behaviour.

The project is composed of such campaigns as 'Narratives from global Islam', 'The true face of extremism', 'Critical thinking tools' and 'Community heroes'.

The final conference took place on 22 October 2020. The project was implemented in Portugal, Sweden, Italy, Hungary, Romania and France.

https://www.rethinkproject.eu/

Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project (YEIP)

YEIP was created in response to a current social need to have more effective youth policies that can enhance young people's social inclusion and minimise the risk of radicalisation with greater 'buy in' from youth themselves.

To this end, YEIP will construct and test an innovative policy intervention that will generate a set of actions that will help address this need at the local, national and European levels. This measure is founded upon restorative justice and the Good Lives Model, which assumes that we are goal-influenced and all seek certain 'goods' in our lives, not 'material', but qualitative, all likely to increase or improve our psychological well-being.

The project started in March 2017, and the findings were presented at a conference in London on 29 January 2020. It was implemented in the UK, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and Romania.

https://yeip.co.uk

# Cyprus

The overall risk of radicalisation and the terrorism threat level in Cyprus are usually considered low, even though the country has seen a rise of both right-wing and left-wing extremism in recent years. The most pressing issue appears to be hateful, nationalist and racist rhetoric, particularly in relation to the tensions between the Greek and Turkish communities. Dilmaç and colleagues observe that "it is not uncommon to hear from Cypriots that '[t]here is no such thing in Cyprus' when speaking of hate speech. In fact, that is a clear sign of the level of widespread unawareness about the concept" ([11]).

Cyprus' national counterterrorism strategy is unavailable to the public, but supposedly does not include a P/CVE part. Still, P/CVE preoccupations are not entirely absent: for example, the Center for Social Innovation (CSI, see below) is taking part in a large transnational project on the protection and security of places of worship called Prosecuw ([12]). This however cannot be considered primary prevention.

A practitioner from the country, who was interviewed for this paper, considered that, even though there is a lack of training on P/CVE, many positive practices can be linked to P/CVE. Among the issues that were mentioned were activities related to youth unemployment, information technologies, trust in institutions, racism and migration. The dominant approaches are related to youth and education, communication and awareness raising.

One organisation deserves special mention, as it is one of the few to work on P/CVE specifically: Synthesis. The organisation puts emphasis on social cohesion and human rights. According to its website ([13]):

SYNTHESIS' Counter Extremism and Radicalisation Unit aims to prevent and counter violent extremism and radicalisation that may lead to violence and/or terrorism, and to offer in-depth education and learning on the topic by:

Identifying the social roots of radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism.

Monitoring and detecting radicalisation and indoctrination techniques for the purposes of understanding the complexity of the radicalisation process.

Embracing cultural pluralism for building foundations for intercultural dialogue and busting stereotypes.

On 13 and 14 December 2017, the Youth Board of Cyprus with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education organised the conference 'Youth Cooperation for Peace: Building bridges to counter radicalization and extremism' in Nicosia ([14]). Additionally, the Council of Europe's No Hate Speech

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([11]) Dilmaç et al. (2021), p. 2.
([12]) See: https://prosecuwproject.eu/
([13]) See: https://www.synthesis-center.org/pcve-radicalisation
([14]) Youth Board of Cyprus (2017).

campaign has also been implemented in the country ([15]). This shows that, even though primary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism is less visible than in other countries, it is not absent from the public agenda.

The following Cyprian organisations participated in the CSEP but do not have a specific mandate on P/CVE:

- CSI – A team of professionals, focusing on developing disruptive solutions to systemic social, education and market challenges. https://csicy.com/

- Future Worlds Center – An innovative non-profit initiative of social entrepreneurs, aspiring to harness the power of emerging technologies and the science of structured democratic dialogue to accelerate positive social change. http://www.futureworldscenter.org/

- Research and Education in Social Empowerment and Transformation (RESET) – With over 20 years of combined experience in research and education, RESET develops constructive and education-centred solutions to the most demanding societal challenges of our time. https://resetcy.com/

Lastly, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Foundation for social democracy, the oldest political foundation in Germany, has an office in Cyprus ([16]). Among other subjects, FES works in relation to hate speech ([17]) and supports the peace process between the two parts of the island.

No specific project or approach was found on primary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism.


# Greece

Greece has a history of political extremism, both from the far right and far left. In recent years, the main challenge has been the Golden Dawn movement, which used to be represented in the national parliament, until it was declared illegal in 2020. The country has been deeply affected by the economic crisis, as well as the situation with migrants and refugees.

In the absence of a publicly available P/CVE national action plan, Greece's approach seems to rely largely on hard security measures implemented by security actors: "It could be considered that Greece has focused more on the security measures to prevent attacks than the prevention of violent radicalisation" ([18]). This however does not mean that primary prevention is absent in Greece.

In fact, in 2020 the Ministry of Justice adopted the National Action Plan against Racism and Intolerance (NAPRI ([19])), which features a large number of actions that can be considered to contribute to P/CVE. The link between racism and violent right-wing extremism is very strong. The action plan includes actions on:

- discrimination, stereotypes and prejudices;

- fight against racist crime;

- awareness raising – information;

- integration / empowerment; and

- cross-sectoral policies.

In a similar vein, the country recently adopted a new National Strategy for the Integration of Asylum Seekers, which "focuses on the integration of refugees into Greek society and not in the creation of parallel social systems that lead to ghettos and increased social marginalization, poverty, radicalization and crime" ([20]). Another strategy for youth empowerment seems to be in the making. According to a local practitioner, addressing issues like racism, intolerance and integration is more publicly acceptable than radicalisation and extremism, which are considered too sensitive, or even controversial.

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([15]) See: https://www.coe.int/en/web/no-hate-campaign/home
([16]) See: https://cyprus.fes.de/
([17]) Dilmaç et al. (2021).
([18]) Leão Varela et al. (2021), pp. 164-165.
([19]) Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Justice (2020).
([20]) See: http://www.forintegration.eu/pl/greece-s-new-national-strategy-for-the-integration-of-asylum-seekers-published-in-december-2021

On the local level, Greece established Local Councils for Crime Prevention ([21]), which, under the right conditions, could potentially form the basis of local P/CVE networks. One major obstacle, however, could be the lack of training and knowledge on extremism, as one practitioner from the country explained.

The following organisations were involved with the CSEP:

- European Institute for Local Development (EILD) – This was founded in 2009 as an independent NGO whose members are European citizens, entities and organisations devoted to supporting regional development activities and transnational collaboration. https://eurolocaldevelopment.org/

- Family and Childcare Centre (KMOP) – One of the oldest CSOs in Greece, with extensive experience in direct provision of social services and implementation of social initiatives. https://www.kmop.gr/

- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) – Its mission is to conduct policy-oriented research and provide policymakers, academia and the public at large with authoritative information, analysis and policy recommendations for the development of evidence-based responses to major European and foreign policy challenges. https://www.eliamep.gr/en/

- Solidarity Now – An NGO committed to improving vulnerable people's lives in order to pursue a better future, with dignity and perspectives. https://www.solidaritynow.org/en/

One particularly significant actor in P/CVE is the Center for Security Studies (Kentro Meleton Asfaleias – KEMEA ([22])), which runs a large number of programmes and activities, including research and training. Its mandate covers public order, correctional services, terrorism prevention, crime prevention, integrated border management and civil protection as well as various other security and societal issues. Although not central in its approach, primary prevention is occasionally addressed. For example, KEMEA took part in the following European research projects: ARMOUR, I_DO, PRACTICIES and RAD2CITIZEN (all are presented on the organisation's website).

As in other countries, Greece saw many P/CVE efforts in the period 2015-2020, often with EU funding. Very few projects are still active. The INSPEC2T (Inspiring CitizeNS Participation for Enhanced Community PoliCing AcTions) project was managed by KEMEA ([23]). The official presentation of the project states:

> INSPEC2T is a three-year project that started in May 2015. The project's scope is to develop a sustainable framework for Community Policing that effectively addresses and promotes seamless collaboration between the police and the community.

> The INSPEC2T approach based its conceptual foundations on EU crime prevention and Member States' specific Internal Security Policies, validated research results and best practices from cooperation between police and local, regional and national communities. This is perceived as an origin to apprehend special characteristics, particularities and determinants for trust between all stakeholders.

> Special focus is given to Community Policing awareness raising activities for both police and citizens. Among others, INSPEC2T will help prevent radicalization by including in the test cases tackling with minority groups and by helping increase the bonds between various user groups and the police.

# Italy

Despite Italy's past experiences with terrorism, especially in the 1970s (the Years of Lead), a comprehensive P/CVE policy does not yet exist. While a bill to this effect was discussed in 2017, the legislative process was never completed. However, this does not translate into an absence of primary prevention per se, but rather an absence of an overarching strategy or framework. On the local and civil society level for example, the city

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([21]) See: http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=194&Itemid=191&lang=EN
([22]) See: http://www.kemea.gr/en/
([23]) See: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-practices/inspec2t-inspiring-citizens-participation-enhanced-community-policing-actions-project_en

of Palermo has been an active member of the Strong Cities Network ([24]) for several years, promoting a P/CVE approach based on human rights and its experience with the Mafia.

One significant development is the recent and rapid increase of the Muslim population, which generates tensions between issues of P/CVE on the one hand and integration on the other hand, as Islamist extremism was seen as the biggest extremist threat in the country[25]. For a long time, Italy has used deportation measures of convicted and suspected criminals as one of their key means to combat terrorism. However, in recent years, more and more people of foreign origin have received Italian citizenship and the perspective on extremist threats has evolved a little bit, hence the need for a more comprehensive prevention strategy. Much like in Greece but for different reasons, the Italian approach to P/CVE could be further developed and involve more actors from different fields and backgrounds.

In an interview, a practitioner from Italy mentioned many valuable prevention projects for children and young people, including peer education, media literacy, use of testimonies (victims of terrorism, religious leaders and migrants), and communication campaigns. There are also many practices related to countering hate speech, racial and gender discrimination, xenophobia and so on, mainly in schools and youth centres.

The following organisations took part in the CSEP:

- Center for International Studies (CeSI) – The activity of the institute has always focused on the analysis of international relations and the dynamics of security and defence, with particular attention devoted to areas of crisis and the dynamics of radicalisation and extremism, afterwards expanding its analytical tools also in the field of geoeconomics and conflict prevention. https://www.cesi-italia.org/en

- CESIE - European Centre of Studies and Initiatives – Established in 2001, it is inspired by the work and theories of sociologist Danilo Dolci (1924-1997). Its mission is to promote educational innovation, participation and growth. https://cesie.org/en/

- Fondazione Hallgarten - Franchetti – This foundation carries on the tradition of the Centro Studi e Formazione founded in 2001 at Villa Montesca where in 1909 Maria Montessori organised a seminar that gave birth to the first publication of the scientific pedagogic method universally known as the Montessori method. https://www.montesca.eu/2.0/?lang=en

- Psychoanalytic Institute for Social Research – Since 1987 the organisation has been using its expertise in the fields of psychology and social science to study and analyse the changes occurring in contemporary society. https://www.iprs.it/en/

A large number of P/CVE projects have been conducted in Italy over the years, despite the absence of a national strategy:

Counter-Narration for Counter-terrorism (C4C)

The main aim of the project is to support and use the testimonies and the stories of the victims of terrorism. Assuming a role analogous to the one played by the victims and the survivors of the prosecution and of the concentration camps during the Second World War in the construction of a European anti-totalitarian identity. Because it becomes very relevant to establish which stories take part in creating our idea of terrorism and because terrorism searches the spectators' gaze, spreading fear and terror, our aim was to counter-narrate such stories improving the victims' gaze: their narratives, feelings and positions. Our assumption is that stories of the survivors, of the victims' family members, may create a counter-narrative bearing positive values: those of dialogue, tolerance, peace, non-violence, respect of diversity and of democratic values, offering an alternative model of language, values and rhetoric with the purpose of reinforce critical skills and awareness among young people towards the use of violence.

Videos are available on the project's YouTube page: https://www.youtube.com/@c4cproject332

The project ran from December 2012 to November 2014.

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([24]) See: https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/en/
([25]) Groppi (2017).

https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-practices/c4c-counter-narration-counter-terrorism_en

Inclusive Sport Project Opposed to Radicalization Tenets (I SPORT)

The objectives of the project are:

- to remove the physical and cultural barriers impeding young people from prison and /or reception centres for migrants to participate in sport activities with local peers;

- to awaken and divulge the values of sports among young people living in prisons and to lower the lure of radicalisation by proposing them an alternative to violence and solitude;

- to equip young people with lower opportunities with sound knowledge and skills to make the best use of sport over a 9-month preparation training course;

- to emphasise important European values through sport participation such as gender balance, fair-play collaboration and social acceptance; and

- to bring together young people of different backgrounds (detainees, local young people, migrants and refugees) and religions (Muslims, Christians, Hindus) and to cooperate together in the realisation of the final tournament.

The project was conducted in 2018.

https://ceipes.org/project/i-sport-inclusive-sport-project-opposed-to-radicalization-tenets/

SAFE ZONE

SAFE ZONE (@SafeZoneEU) responds to the educational challenges posed by radicalisation with the objective of influencing the processes that can lead young people to approach violent extremist groups. In line with this objective, the project focuses on the educational relationship established within sports between coaches/educators and the youth who participate in sports.

The field of sports finds itself in a strategic position in the fight against radicalisation and youth violence: sport represents one of the primary areas for informal socialisation for a vast number of youth throughout Europe and hence an ideal context for defining adequate prevention strategies centred on the promotion of a culture based on respect for adversaries, fair play, living together and peace.

The project ran from 24 March 2020 to 25 March 2022.

https://www.safezoneproject.eu/

COMMIT

COMMIT aims to prevent and dissuade vulnerable young people in four partner countries (Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Greece) from extremism, radicalism and terrorism, providing them with skills relevant to co-create counter-narratives challenging extremist online propaganda and alternative narratives promoting democratic values, tolerance and cooperation, and to identify and resist extremist online content.

COMMIT also addresses university students, media professionals and CSOs, to improve their capacity to meet the new challenges linked to extremist online propaganda and violent radicalisation, training them through a tailor-made capacity-building programme in alternative and counter-narratives for preventing radicalism.

COMMIT adopts a trans-medial approach combining online campaigning and face-to-face activities (workshops, contest, events).

The project started in January 2020 and ended in June 2022.

https://commitproject.eu/

# Malta

The issues of radicalisation and violent extremism do not occupy a large policy space in Malta. The country is overall more concerned with issues of migration and integration. Due to Malta being a small territory, with a population of less than half a million people and a low threat level, local organisations do not have the resources and/or do not feel the need to be too specialised in primary prevention. That certainly explains why Malta does not have a specific P/CVE infrastructure, nor has it adopted a national action plan.

However, the government did establish a national network, called Prevent Network Malta, in 2018. This network is coordinated by the Ministry for Home Affairs, and brings together representatives from different departments and administrations. Its main focus is rather on secondary prevention, with a holistic approach: radicalisation is tackled in relation to other, more global issues. As a local practitioner told us: "We don't prepare for radicalisation, but we do programmes which will be useful for radicalisation."

The National Youth Agency [26] presents an interesting case of an integrated approach, running a significant number of social cohesion programmes and schemes. For example, it offers the following empowerment services:

- outreach services,

- art and culture programmes,

- civic and life skills programmes,

- Youth.inc (for vulnerable youth aged 16-19, without training or qualification).

The agency "provides young people with the time and space to make friends, learn in new ways and develop their talents through our regional youth services and our extensive empowerment programme" [27].

These programmes focus on active citizenship, democracy, voting, the ability to take informed decisions and so on without prevention being the main concern. The words 'extremism' and 'counterterrorism' are hardly used, being considered intimidating.

No local organisation has been taking part in the CSEP.

The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law [28] (IIJ) is located in Malta, but it does not operate on the local level, and its mandate only marginally covers primary prevention. It operates in the field of criminal justice and targeted prevention.

Another organisation worth mentioning is the People for Change Foundation [29]. According to its website:

> The People for Change Foundation (PfC) is a Malta-based human rights think tank with a Maltese, European and global scope.
>
> PfC provides evidence-based, independent, practical and creative ideas on the protection, respect and promotion of human rights in Malta and across the European Union. Our work involves inter-disciplinary analysis, debate and action on a variety of contemporary human rights issues, informed by engagement in a multilateral process with all communities and stakeholders, and at all levels. The Foundation operates at the intersection between law, policy and social science, delivering analysis that is practical in input and pragmatic in outcome.
>
> The People for Change Foundation was set up with the express aim of contributing to a multilateral process between a range of stakeholders and entities - governmental, non-governmental and academic - to conduct research in areas of direct relevance to the livelihood and quality of life of the populations we work with and for, and to address human rights concerns by working towards the safeguarding of international and national legal obligations and development.

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[26] See: https://youth.gov.mt/
[27] See: https://youth.gov.mt/our-agency/
[28] See: https://www.theiij.org/
[29] See: https://www.pfcmalta.org/

The organisation has conducted projects on racism and discrimination, migrant rights, hate crime, hate speech, human trafficking, intercultural dialogue, migration, etc. It also contributed to the aforementioned DARE project.

Lastly, even though Malta has not established a P/CVE hotline or helpline, the Kellimni project ([30]) allows vulnerable people to receive individual support on a voluntary basis:

> If you have something on your mind and you are not sure who you trust, who can listen to you right now, or who will understand you.
>
> Kellimni.com wishes that all individuals are safe, respected, dignified, feel well and realise their goals and potential. The Kellimni.com operational team is here to support you in your journey towards achieving these.
>
> The Kellimni.com team can be contacted through email, chat and smart messaging, so feel free to communicate with us any way you prefer.
>
> If you'd rather not speak to anyone at the moment, we invite you to have a look at the "Inform Yourself" section on this website.

This service contributes to primary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism, in the sense that it carries positive messages on a wide range of issues, without violence being the main topic.


# Portugal

According to Magalhães Sampaio and Beleza da Silva, P/CVE is "not a priority" in Portugal ([31]). It is a fact that the country has been spared from any major terrorist attack in recent history, and that it usually is not considered a target. Very few cases of radicalisation have been identified ([32]), and other issues attract more attention, especially the integration of migrants (not necessarily refugees). Still, some authors consider that Portugal still has some areas that could benefit from other countries' experiences in prevention practices:

> it can be stated that Portuguese pre-criminal prevention does exist … . However, it is scarce, and it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the few programs that do exist. As it stands, it cannot be stated that Portuguese P/CVE programs fit within the scope of combating terrorism effectively in the pre-criminal space ([33]).

In 2015, Portugal adopted the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism ([34]), which revolves largely around security measures, even though one pillar is devoted to prevention. More than anything, this shows the gap between government policies, and local, often isolated, prevention practices. According to a local practitioner, a large part of prevention work remains informal (in the sense that it is not embedded in any sort of formal or official structure or organisation, but rather based on loose collectives of actors), which is made possible by the small size of the country. Partners from different backgrounds established informal prevention networks, especially around Lisbon. There are now discussions to officially establish these networks. Priorities include the prevention of hate speech and hate crime, by fostering critical thinking and community engagement. Unfortunately, resources are limited, both in terms of personnel and finances.

Several organisations participated in the CSEP. Only those that intervened in primary prevention are listed here:

- APAV | Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima (Portuguese Victim Support) – Among other things, the association runs a campaign called 'This is my story' : "#thisismystory is the motto of this campaign that brings positive examples of integration of migrants and refugees, of different nationalities and socio-cultural contexts, in Portugal. Come and see these stories! We hope that these paths, narrated in the first

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([30]) See: https://kellimni.com/
([31]) Magalhães Sampaio & Beleza da Silva (2021).
([32]) One very recent notable exception: in March 2023, several people were stabbed and two women were killed at a Muslim centre in Lisbon. The case is currently under investigation, with terrorism being treated as a possible motive, as well as potential mental health issues of the perpetrator.
([33]) Idem, p. 147. A similar observation is made by Leão Varela et al. (2021), p. 179.
([34]) See: https://www.safecommunitiesportugal.com/portuguese-government-approves-a-national-strategy-for-combatting-terrorism/

person, support the deconstruction of prejudices and are catalysts for multicultural communities, prevailed by tolerance and respect." https://apav.pt/apav_v3/index.php/en/ and https://apav.pt/thisismystory/?lang=en

- Catholic University of Porto – The university contributes to several prevention projects, for example, SAFE ZONE in the field of sports (see Italy). https://www.porto.ucp.pt/en

- Lusófona University – Quite similarly, this university supports several large prevention projects (see below) and has a special department that provides technical assistance to local actors. https://www.ulusofona.pt/en/

- Youth Coop - Coperativa de trabalho em prol da juventude – YouthCoop is a non-profit and social solidarity cooperative for the empowerment and awareness of young people, on local and international level, acting in the field of Citizenship and Human Rights Education, Youth Participation and Youth Work using Non-Formal Education methods and community-oriented approaches. https://youthcoop.pt/en/

Community policing is also present in Portugal ([35]): one organisation active in that field is Safe Communities Portugal ([36]). As already noted for Greece, given the right circumstances, local prevention structures could potentially intervene in matters related to P/CVE. However, at the moment, it seems that the mandate of Local Safety Contracts remains limited to 'traditional' crime prevention topics.

When it comes to actual primary prevention projects, Portugal is a bit of a paradox, in the sense that several local organisations do contribute actively to large transnational projects, and yet it does not seem to translate into a locally rooted culture of prevention. In particular, the Lusófona University participates in the already mentioned projects CEAR, Prosecuw and Rethink. Similarly, the Catholic University of Porto contributes to the SAFE ZONE project, which is implemented for the most part in Italy (see that country).

# Spain

Spain is a country where P/CVE is particularly developed. Likely, this has to do with a history of political violence, first by ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), which is held responsible for more than 800 deaths since the late 1960s, and subsequently with jihadist terrorism (Madrid in 2004, Barcelona in 2017). And unlike some other countries in the region, Spain is regarded as a serious potential target for terrorist activities.

In 2019, the National Counter-terrorism Strategy replaced the 2012 Integrated Strategy against International Terrorism and Radicalisation (Spanish acronym: EICTIR ([37])). For the first time, the national counterterrorism strategy was made available to the general public. Previous strategies were not publicly available, which, according to several of our interviewees, drastically limited the participation of civil society in prevention efforts. Spain also adopted a specific P/CVE strategy, the National Plan to Fight Violent Radicalisation (PEN-LCRV ([38])), in 2015. In summary, Spain possesses a robust P/CVE infrastructure, both on the security side and on the prevention aspect.

Nonetheless, the Spanish case has remained until now strongly marked by security considerations:

> the Spanish case provides an illustration of the transition from a paradigm marked by counter-terrorism to one that is more focused on combatting the factors and conditions that can lead to terrorism (CVE policies). Nevertheless, … it cannot be said that Spain has [yet fully] moved from a predominantly CVE framework to one in which PVE prevails ([39]).

More specifically, prevention tends to relate to detection and surveillance by security forces. Similarly, the main concern is Islamist terrorism, with several practitioners mentioning that other forms of extremism attract much less attention in comparison.

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([35]) Amante et al. (2021).
([36]) See: https://www.safecommunitiesportugal.com/
([37]) See: https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/news/Paginas/2019/20190226terrorismstrategy.aspx
([38]) For a presentation of the PEN-LCRV, see https://www.firstlinepractitioners.com/fr/practice/national-plan-to-fight-violent-radicalisation-pen-lcrv-2015-plan-estrategico-nacional-de-lucha-contra-la-radicalizacion-violenta-pen-lrcv-2015
([39]) Bourekba (2021), p. 100.

Only a limited number of local authorities and CSOs contribute to P/CVE as such. Spain offers a lot of general prevention initiatives, but only a minority of them are connected to radicalisation and violent extremism. Among the priorities that were mentioned by interviewees are far-right extremism, hate speech, racism, inequalities and lack of trust in institutions. Target groups are youth, practitioners, CSOs and local actors. Training and awareness raising are frequently used.

Fuenlabrada (near Madrid) and Malaga have joined the Strong Cities Network. The case of Malaga is very instructive: in 2017 the city adopted a comprehensive action plan for the prevention of radicalisation: its First Cross-cutting Plan for the Conviviality and Prevention of Violent Radicalisation in the City of Malaga (2017-2020 [40]). Interestingly, this plan intends to carry very positive messages: "the main goal of this Plan is to raise awareness and build an active and resilient society which favours social cohesion, improves conviviality, respects religious freedom and avoids marginalisation and violent radicalism" [41].

Given its particular history, Spain has a large number of victims associations, in relation to either ETA or Islamist terrorism. These actors can contribute to primary prevention, for example by giving testimonials, or raising awareness. Only a few of them are presented here:

- The Association of Aid for the Victims of March 11 was formed by a group of people who met either at the time of the attack or later in medical centres and who found common needs, not only in themselves but in others affected. This organisation participates in the CSEP. https://ayuda11m.org/en/

- Founded in 1988 in the Basque Country to fight ETA's terrorism through words, the Victims of Terrorism Collective, COVITE, is an organisation dedicated to the fight against terrorism and the prevention of violent radicalisation. This organisation also takes part in the CSEP. https://covite.org/en/

- The Fundación Centro para la Memoria de las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Victims of Terrorism Memorial Centre), or FCMVT, is a state public sector foundation with the objective of preserving and disseminating the democratic and ethical values embodied by the victims of terrorism, building the collective memory of the victims, and raising awareness among the population as a whole for the defence of freedom and human rights and against terrorism. https://www.memorialvt.com/en/

Several organisations from Spain participated in the CSEP:

- Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) – CIDOB is an international affairs research centre that, through excellence and relevance, seeks to analyse the global issues that affect political, social and governance dynamics, from the international to the local. https://www.cidob.org/en/

- Euro-Arab Foundation – The Euro-Arab Foundation for Higher Studies is a highly specialised institution that works within the fields of cooperation, training and research. https://www.fundea.org/en

- Fundación Fernando Buesa Blanco – The foundation is a non-profit organisation founded in Vitoria-Gasteiz on 3 November 2000 in memory and honour of Fernando Buesa, assassinated together with his bodyguard by ETA on 22 February 2000. Its goal is keeping his example of supporting the culture of peace, democracy and social progress alive. http://fundacionfernandobuesa.com/web/en/

- NOVACT – Through the use of non-violent action, NOVACT endeavours to achieve a society based on human security and non-violence, as well as a society free of armed conflicts and violence in all its dimensions. Understanding non-violence as a strategy for transformation, NOVACT aims to contribute to a peaceful, just and dignified world. NOVACT is also responsible for the creation of the Observatory to Prevent Extremist Violence (OPEV). https://novact.org/?lang=en and https://opev.org/

Another important organisation is CIFAL Malaga:

> CIFAL Malaga's mission is to offer training opportunities and exchange of best practices, tools and strategies between local and regional authorities, international organizations, private sector and civil society; and to support local actors, improving their decision-making processes by increasing their leadership in the implementation of innovative solutions at the local level, having an impact on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda [42].

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[40] City of Malaga (2017).
[41] Idem, p. 7.
[42] See: https://cifalmalaga.org/web/en/

This organisation contributes to various prevention projects on a regular basis.

Considering the number of primary prevention practices in Spain, the following are presented only briefly:

- Awake the World – This project aims to counter radical and violent extremism through online and offline actions. We challenge religion- or culture-based prejudices, promote tolerance and social coexistence, actively counter Islamophobia and employ social networks in a bid to raise awareness. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-collection-search/awake-world_en

- Concordia Bloggers video games 'I survived terrorism' – The series of video games Concordia Bloggers appeared in 2014. Each Concordia Bloggers game suggests some ideas and possible situations in real life. Young people should apply their critical spirit and turn it around according to their own convictions. Developing and expressing your own opinion is the key, always with regard for the respect and knowledge of human rights. https://www.concordiabloggers.com/

- Move IN Involved Sport – The Move IN Involved Sport project is specifically designed with the aim of preventing at-risk behaviour and radicalisation and coaching and guiding children and young people (from 10 to 16 years old). We organise sports activities in sports clubs, open neighbourhood centres, centres specifically for young minors and secondary schools to prevent at-risk behaviour and radicalisation and to foster social inclusion. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-collection-search/move-involved-sport_en

- Sport for Prevention of Extremism in Youth (SPEY) – SPEY is a project led by the Union of Sport Federations of Catalonia (UFEC) and co-funded by the European Commission involving seven institutions from different EU countries. The project focuses on the development and implementation of sports activities and transversal skills among youth, most of them at risk of social exclusion. https://ufec.cat/spey/

- Testimonies of Victims of Terrorism in the Classrooms – The purpose of this project is twofold: to teach students about the history of terrorism in Spain (which is already included as part of the official educational study plan) and to sensitise the younger generations against violence in order to prevent radicalisation by showing the painful and senseless consequences of terrorism through the voices of those who have suffered them. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-collection-search/testimonies-victims-terrorism-classrooms_en

# Key Lessons and Challenges

Southern EU MSs are in very different situations with regard to primary prevention of violent extremism. Nonetheless, a series of recurring challenges can be identified. They include the following:

1. National strategies are very often centralised and security-oriented, bearing the mark of counterterrorism. There is sometimes a confusion between radicalisation and terrorism, which is detrimental to prevention work.

2. The three levels of prevention are rarely clearly distinguished. From a practical point of view, this may not look like a crucial issue. But the concrete result is that, most of the time, primary prevention is neglected in favour of secondary and tertiary prevention.

3. As a result of that, many practitioners from outside the field of security tend to distance themselves from P/CVE. They either do not have the knowledge, nor sometimes the confidence, to position themselves on these issues.

4. Many prevention projects were conducted in the period from 2015 to 2020, with active support from the EU. Most of these projects ended before 2020, and only a few are still active. Since then, public support to P/CVE has had a tendency to dwindle. After the COVID-19 pandemic and now with the war in Ukraine, P/CVE may not be considered a priority anymore.

5. National strategies could be further developed to take more into consideration the specific national context, with EU recommendations as a reference framework. This particularly applies to countries that have not suffered terrorist attacks in recent times, and where terrorism still appears to be a somewhat distant threat.

6. In some countries, the expressions 'radicalisation' and 'violent extremism' are barely used in official documents. It is not entirely clear whether there was a conscious decision to simply avoid terms that are deemed too controversial or whether the conceptual approach is substantially different.

7. Very few approaches and practices focus on the issue of gender as such, even though it is now regarded as a crucial issue, both in prevention work and in social development in general.

# Recommendations

For this paper, a total of 12 practitioners were interviewed, representing all southern EU MSs. The following recommendations are based on those interviews, and they apply specifically to primary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in the region. They do not cover the whole spectrum of P/CVE activities, including at secondary and tertiary levels ([43]).

1. The **theoretical background of prevention work** does count. It is good practice to promote a general prevention model, such as Declerck's pyramid of prevention. Such theoretical models help to understand the utility and even the necessity of all levels and types of prevention. Without them, general and primary prevention can easily be marginalised, in favour of hard security measures.

2. Similarly, public authorities should also promote a **multi-agency, multi-actor, multidisciplinary, human rights-based, whole of society approach** to P/CVE.

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([43]) For an example of a set of recommendations of a more general nature at the three levels of prevention of radicalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean region, see Muro & Bourekba (2019).

3. At the same time, the different levels of prevention should not be regarded as entirely different planes of reality. **They are actually interconnected**: for example, under certain conditions, former extremists can contribute to primary prevention. P/CVE practitioners should learn from experience on all levels of prevention: lessons learned from secondary and tertiary prevention should feed into primary prevention (for example, by identifying recurring protective and vulnerability factors in a certain context, which can then be addressed in primary prevention).

4. Primary prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism should be connected to **other, more general prevention efforts and policies**, especially in the adjacent fields of crime prevention, safeguarding, child protection, mental health, etc. Already existing prevention programmes and projects can be leveraged for P/CVE, usually with interesting results.

5. P/CVE actors should take into consideration **all forms of radicalisation and violent extremism**, whether religious, political, social, identity-based, hybrid or mixed forms or other. Whenever radicalisation is mentioned, the risk of stigmatisation is always particularly acute, especially in primary prevention, and addressing all forms of extremism usually makes prevention work much more acceptable for first-line practitioners, for communities and for the general public.

6. **Local authorities and other local actors**, including CSOs, should be actively involved in primary prevention. They are best positioned to understand local challenges and should not be considered (or appear to be considered) mere service suppliers for central authorities.

7. There is usually a huge demand for **training on P/CVE and P/CVE-related issues**. First-line practitioners should be trained accordingly, which would allow them to better understand local challenges, and formulate concrete answers, especially by developing a P/CVE aspect in already existing prevention approaches and programmes. Training programmes should be offered to as many practitioners as possible.

8. P/CVE training should include **strategic communication**, in order to help dissipate the stigma and miscomprehension that often surround P/CVE, send positive messages and motivate active participation.

9. The **academic world** can be a powerful ally at all levels of P/CVE, including primary prevention. Partnerships with universities should be supported and developed, in order to better understand the root causes of radicalisation and violent extremism, and then inspire prevention policies.

10. Public authorities should **promote — and practice — transparency**, and thus publish their strategies. National strategies should be made publicly available, and should clearly differentiate between counterterrorism and prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism. Lack of participation in primary prevention often comes from a confusion between security in a narrow sense on the one hand and more general social cohesion approaches on the other hand.

11. P/CVE practitioners should be encouraged to share lessons learned, and most importantly to take part in **national, European and international professional networks** (including but not limited to RAN and from 2025 onwards the EU Knowledge Hub for the prevention of radicalisation), to get inspired, learn from each other and feel part of a wider community. In order to do that, main reference documents should be made easily accessible and translated as much as possible.

12. **Good and innovative primary prevention practices and approaches** from the region should be actively publicised, promoted and widely shared. As a general rule, projects should be coordinated and evaluated, in order to avoid potential waste of resources. There has been a significant number of prevention projects in the region throughout the years, with a certain risk of repetition and overlap, and at some point coordination and consistency become crucial to achieve progress and results.

# Further reading

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2. Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project (2019). *Violent youth radicalisation: National reports from the UK, Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Portugal, Sweden and Italy*. IARS Publications. https://yeip.co.uk/download/1773

3. Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project (2019). *Violent youth radicalisation: Youth-led evidence from the UK, Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Portugal, Sweden and Italy*. IARS Publications. https://yeip.co.uk/download/1747/

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