The Root Causes of Violent Extremism

- THE BASICS -

Updated version 2024

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European Commission

Radicalisation Awareness Network

RAN Practitioners

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Introduction

To effectively prevent individuals from radicalising into violent extremism or terrorism, we need to address the reasons, factors and dynamics that play a role in the process of radicalisation. There are multiple ways to examine the root causes of violent extremism since there is no single cause of or pathway into radicalisation and violent extremism. There is a wide array of factors on the macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. In fact, radicalisation is driven by a combination of personal factors and external influences. This consolidated paper provides a brief non-exhaustive summary of which root causes and factors can lead to violent extremism. And it is meant to provide a basic and easy to use overview of which factors and dynamics to take into account when developing plans and interventions to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism or terrorism. In addition, at the end of the paper there is an overview of six different radicalising personas.

This paper is an updated version of the first version of this paper that was published in early 2016 [1].

Kaleidoscope of factors

According to Magnus Ranstorp, violent extremism can be best conceptualised as a kaleidoscope of factors [2], creating infinite individual combinations of possible roads into violent extremism. There are some basic primary colours that create complex interlocking combinations on personal (micro), group (meso) and societal (macro) levels:

Individual level (micro)	Group level (meso)	Societal level (macro)
1. Individual social psychological factors	5. Ideological and religious dimensions	9. (Geo) political factors
2. Trauma and other trigger mechanisms	6. The role of culture and identity issues	10. Polarisation and identity dynamics
3. Social factors	7. Radical groomers	
4. Social media amplification	8. Group dynamics	

It is the combined interplay of some of these factors that causes violent extremism [3].

Individual (micro) level:

1. Individual social psychological factors. These include individual sensitivities and personality traits as well as grievances and emotions such as: alienation and exclusion; anger and frustration; grievance and a strong sense of injustice; feelings of humiliation; feelings of social isolation; rigid binary thinking [4]; a tendency to misinterpret situations; susceptibility to conspiracy narratives; sense of victimhood; low self-esteem; anti-social personality traits and attitudes [5] with lack of empathy, low impulse control and vulnerabilities, including mental health-related; counter-cultural elements [6]. Also, individuals exposed to peer violence or family dysfunction [7] may be more susceptible to violent extremism.

[1] Radicalisation Awareness Network. Ranstorp, M. (20126). *Root causes of violent extremism*

[2] Ranstorp, M., & Hyllengren, P. (2013). *Förebyggande av våldsbejakande extremism I tredjeland*. Swedish Defence University.

[3] Hafez, M., & Mullins, C. (2015). The radicalization puzzle: A theoretical synthesis of empirical approaches to homegrown extremism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38*(11), 958-975. Also see: Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010). Violent radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33*(9), 797-814.

[4] Brooks, S. K., & Greenberg, N. (2021). *Mental health, complex needs and vulnerability to radicalisation*. Health Protection Research Unit in Emergency Preparedness and Response at King's College London.

[5] Andrews, D. A., & Bonta, J. (2015). *The psychology of criminal conduct*. Routledge.

[6] Research by CSIS has challenged the academic notion that terrorist personality does not exist. It argues it is possible to find personality traits in terrorists such as "sensation seeking" and "social dominance orientation". CSIS. (2013). *Personality traits and terrorism*. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). https://www.tsas.ca/publications/personality-traits-and-terrorism/

[7] Vukčević Marković, M., Nicović, A., & Živanović, M. (2021). Contextual and psychological predictors of militant extremist mindset in youth. *Frontiers in Psychology, 12*, Article 622571.

2. Trauma, trigger mechanisms and mental health issues involve psychological trauma (PTSD) or other complex psychological problems. These can also involve a life crisis or have stress-related aspects. Helplessness and distress arising from trauma could heighten the resonance and comfort derived from extremist narratives, by assigning deeper meaning and nobility to such experiences and seeking to restore control or avenge those who inflict trauma and suffering on others (e.g. through war, military attacks, civil war, sectarian and racial violence, and abuses of power). Anger, irritability, aggression and blame of others for one's traumatic experiences may accentuate the push factors of PTSD, making violence an outlet for tension and anger whilst also giving revenge narratives a stronger pull [8]. When trauma and radicalisation come together, radicalisation is very often the way an individual expresses the trauma(s), hence by treating trauma the radicalisation might subside [9]. Many aspects of trauma or mental illness may be 'present' but not 'relevant' to extremism vulnerability and risk, and in some instances may even protect against it [10].

3. Social factors include: social exclusion; marginalisation and discrimination [11] (real and perceived); limited education or employment possibilities; an element of displacement; no future perspective; distrust in the 'establishment'; criminality; lack of social cohesion and self-exclusion. These mean, broadly speaking, having the notion of not being accepted in society and therefore not able to be successful and or able to fit in and build a future. Social factors interact with individual experiences, societal dynamics and group influences to fuel the radicalisation process. For example, the feeling of not being fully accepted into society due to second- or third-generation migrant background or also tensions within a community or between different communities affecting the whole community could be a contributing factor.

4. Social media amplification (motor for radicalisation) which provides connectivity, virtual participation and an echo chamber for like-minded extremist views [12]. The internet "reaches otherwise unreachable individuals"; it accelerates the process of radicalisation, and increases opportunities for self-radicalisation [13]. Social media and gaming platforms like YouTube, Telegram, Reddit with its subreddits communities, Discord, Twitch, 4Chan and TikTok, etc. facilitate 24/7 networking and communication between groups and individuals from all over the world. The possibility of creating online exclusive echo chambers on those platforms is a game-changer for fringe subcultures[14]. Incels, white lives matter and QAnon movements all became influential and gained more interest once they managed to build their own alternative media ecosystems [15]. Gamification is becoming a factor in execution of violent right-wing extremism attacks as well as in the propaganda and recruitment efforts by violent Islamist groups [16].

Group (meso) level:

5. Ideological, religious and conspiracy dimensions include — among others — a sacred historical mission and belief in apocalyptic prophesy, a Salafi-jihadi interpretation of Islam, and the Islamist narrative that Islam is under siege and needs to be protected. Several conspiracy narratives have gained traction in different contexts, reflecting deep societal anxieties and they are often propagated through various media channels. One such theory is the 'great replacement' theory, which suggests that white populations are systematically being replaced by non-white people due to mass migration, demographic shifts and declining birth rates among white communities. Another prevalent notion is that societal failures, including the lack of

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[8] Radicalisation Awareness Network. Al-Attar, Z. (2019). *Extremism, radicalisation & mental health: Handbook for practitioners*. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-11/ran_h-sc_handbook-for-practitioners_extremism-radicalisation-mental-health_112019_en.pdf

[9] Radicalisation Awareness Network. Deniz, F. & Meines, M. (2023). *RAN Mental Health: Trauma, violent extremism and masculinity*. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/af7b3488-4127-4715-9f36-30abd59627a7_en?filename=ran_mental_health_trauma_violent_extremism_and_masculinity_20-21062023_en.pdf

[10] More information on the possible interplay between a number of mental illnesses and psychological and neurodevelopmental disorders and vulnerability to extremism can be found in *Extremism, radicalisation & mental health: Handbook for practitioners* written by Zainab Al-Attar for RAN Practitioners, 2019.

[11] Piazza, J. A. (2011). Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. *Journal of Peace Research, 48*(3), 339-353. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310397404. This statistical analysis of 172 countries between 1970 and 2006, yielding over 3 000 observations, found solid support for a link between minority groups' experience with economic discrimination and higher rates of domestic terrorism. He found that "countries that feature economic discrimination against minority groups experience around six more incidents of domestic terrorism per year."

[12] Edwards, C., & Gribbon, L. (2013). Pathways to violent extremism in the digital era. *The RUSI Journal, 158*(5), 40-47. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.847714

[13] von Behr, I., Reding, A., Edwards, C., & Gribbon, L. (2013). *Radicalisation in the digital era: The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism*. RAND Corporation.

[14] Ebner, J. (2023). *Going mainstream: How extremists are taking over.* Ithaka Press.

[15] Ebner, J. (2023). *Going mainstream: How extremists are taking over*. Ithaka Press.

[16] Radicalisation Awareness Network. Schlegel, L. (2021). *The gamification of violent extremism & lessons for P/CVE*. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/publications/gamification-violent-extremism-lessons-pcve-2021_en

romantic success for some men, should be attributed to women and broader societal structures. There is also a profound scepticism or outright rejection of government authority, official institutions and the establishment at large, which resonates with certain groups. These theories often flourish in environments where misinformation is rampant and critical thinking is undervalued.

6. The role of culture and identity issues relates to — among others — being raised in an extremist environment or the experiences of (cultural) marginalisation, general feelings of alienation or a lack of belonging. Radicalisation is often rooted in identity concerns and can be triggered by events that threaten personal significance ([17]). As such, cultural issues and identity politics foster in-group cohesion and an "us vs them" mentality while it exploits grievances and identity insecurities among marginalised youths ([18]). Examples for this is the often quite polarised rhetoric around migration and integration, which for youngsters who feel marginalised based on their identity can produce alienation and a lack of belonging to either home or their parents' society.[19] This in turn can make them more susceptible to Islamist extremist narratives that are deliberately tapping into feelings of alienation. The same rhetoric can make young men and women that feel marginalised based on the region they come from more open towards right-wing extremist narratives that evolve around migrants getting the jobs, houses and benefits from government that they should get or also certain anti-institutional extremist narratives.

7. Radical groomers (motor for radicalisation) involve hate preachers, influencers and those who prey on vulnerabilities and grievances and channel recruits into violent extremism through persuasion, pressure and manipulation. Targeted dissemination of disinformation via online fora is a successful method to influence and manipulate people. One example is the female recruiters of violent right-wing extremist groups that specifically target young mothers. Websites, gaming platforms and social media channels are useful propaganda and networking platforms where recruiters can actively identify potential recruits among those posting or showing support for propaganda ([20]). This underscores the importance of extremist milieus existing in so-called underground and online communities or in prison.

8. Group dynamics (motor for radicalisation) involve charismatic leadership, pre-existing friendship and kinship ties, socialisation, groupthink, self-isolation, polarising behaviour and counter-cultural elements. Scott Atran argues that "extremism arises, in part, when membership in a group reinforces deeply held ideals, and an individual's identity merges with the group's" ([21]). Such a fusion of identity based on a powerful bonding experience and a perceived existential threat by an outside enemy might even lead to violence ([22]). There are various routes to extremism, influenced by individual personality characteristics and social interaction dynamics. For instance, individuals who are action-oriented or seek adventure may be drawn to extremist activities for the thrill or challenge. Those who are ideologically driven may be motivated by deeply held beliefs. Contact seekers, who desire social connections, might be influenced by relationships with existing members, while others may enter extremist groups through familial ties if they have relatives who are already involved in such activities.

Societal (macro) level:

9. (Geo) political mobilisation factors such as the Covid19 pandemic, migration, climate change and war and conflicts are filtered through core ideological narratives: whether Ukraine, Israel - Hamas, Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq[23], Chechnya, Sub Sahel region etc., these conflicts and events can become a focal point for

([17]) Lobato, R. M., Moya, M., Moyano, M., & Trujillo, H. M. (2018). From oppression to violence: The role of oppression, radicalism, identity, and cultural intelligence in violent disinhibition. *Frontiers in Psychology, 9*, Article 1505. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01505

([18]) Mughal, R., DeMarinis, V., Nordendahl, M., Lone, H., Phillips, V., & Boyd-MacMillan, E. (2023). Public mental health approaches to online radicalisation: An empty systematic review. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 20*(16), Article 6586. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20166586

[19] Al Raffie, D. (2013). Social identity theory for investigating Islamic extremism in the diaspora. *Journal of Strategic Security, 6*(4), Article 4. http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.4.4.

([20]) Radicalisation Awareness Network. Oezmen, F.& Scheuble, S. (2022). *Extremists' targeting of young women on social media and lessons for P/CVE*. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-03/ad_hoc_young_women_social_media_Lessons-p-cve_022022_en.pdf

([21]) Atran, S., Sheikh, H., & Gomez, A. (2015). Devoted actors sacrifice for close comrades and sacred cause. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111*(50), 17702-17703. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1420474111

([22]) Swann, W. B. Jr, Jetten, J., Gómez, A., Whitehouse, H., & Bastian, B. (2012). When group membership gets personal: A theory of identity fusion. *Psychological Review, 119*(3), 441-456. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/a0028589

[23] Laurence Bindner, "Jihadists' Grievance Narratives against France'', ICCT Policy Brief February 2018. https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Bindner-Jihadists-Grievance-Narratives-Against-France-February2018.pdf

mobilisation. In Islamist extremist ideology, this includes grievances against Western foreign policy and military intervention leading to the narrative that the 'West is at war with Islam', which creates a narrative of 'them and us'. The ban on the Muslim veil, support for Israel following the 7 October 2023 attacks and the not banning of Quran burnings are among several contentious issues used as indicators of a perceived conflict between the West and Muslim communities. These actions foster a sense of alienation and injustice, further amplified by anti-Muslim hatred, xenophobia and discrimination. In right-wing extremist ideology, this includes the claims that Western and Jewish elites are conspiring to replace white Europeans with non-European immigrants. This great replacement theory is gaining traction and becoming a part of mainstream political discourse ([24]). There is a strong sense of having to defend the status quo against mass immigration and large birth rates.

10. Polarisation and identity dynamics. Extreme voices are louder in politics, street protests and online debates, which leads to (perceived) hyper-polarisation. This polarisation is not just the product of different opinions or ideologies, moreover it is deeply rooted in people's identities ([25]). Powerful identity dynamics play a role within all extremist groups ([26]) and highlight how individuals align with group narratives that may influence their decision to undertake violent action ([27]). Clan-based structures can also play a role in radicalisation, especially in regions where clan identities are major organising principles in social and political life ([28]).


Figure 1. Kaleidoscope of factors: It is the combined interplay of factors that may cause violent extremism © Nadia Wind RadarAdvies

([24]) Ekman, M. (2022). The great replacement: Strategic mainstreaming of far-right conspiracy claims. *Convergence, 28*(4), 1127-1143. https://doi.org/10.1177/13548565221091983
([25]) Henley, J. (2021, 17 November). Voters in west divided more by identity than by issues, survey finds. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/nov/17/voters-in-west-divided-more-by-identity-than-issues-survey-finds
([26]) Ebner, J. (2023). *Going mainstream: How extremists are taking over*. Ithaka Press.
([27]) Strindberg, A. (2020). *Social identity theory and the study of terrorism and violent extremism*. Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut. https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--5062--SE
([28]) Chome, N. (2016). *Violent extremism and clan dynamics in Kenya*. United Institute of Peace.; Botha, A., & Abdile, M. (2014). *Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia*. Paper 266, Institute for Security Studies and Finn Church Aid. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184703/Paper266.pdf

Push, pull and protective factors

All individual, group or societal factors that can play a role in the process of radicalisation can be seen as a push or pull factor into radicalisation. In fact, the radicalisation process is a product of interplay between the push and pull factors within individuals. In addition, there are protective factors that limit the effect of these so-called push and pull factors ([29]). It is important to recognise that there are different degrees and speeds of radicalisation.

The **push factors** involve: social, political and economic grievances; a sense of injustice and discrimination; personal crisis and tragedies; frustration; alienation; fascination with violence; searching for answers to the meaning of life; identity crisis; social exclusion; marginalisation; disappointment with democratic process; polarisation, trauma and other mental health predispositions, etc. ([30]).

The **pull factors** are: a personal quest; a sense of belonging to a cause or ideology or social network; power and control/empowerment; a sense of loyalty and commitment; a sense of excitement and adventure; a romanticised view of ideology and cause; the possibility of heroism, personal redemption, etc.

The **protective factors** involve: strong social network with family members and/or friends; good role models; political involvement; feeling a part of society or group; fear of punishment from the criminal justice system or being excluded from society or community and social stigmatisation.

Process of radicalisation: In short, a radicalisation process starts with a cognitive opening ([31]) to new people and new ideas that follows an impactful experience of personal disconnection (unfreezing), personal grievance (discrimination), or group grievance or group trauma (COVID-19 pandemic, war of aggression against Ukraine, Israel–Hamas). Due to this openness a person is more susceptible to factors that can push or pull him or her towards the violent extremist, terrorist or conspiracy narrative, its ideology, and ultimately the group of extremists or terrorists. So-called protective factors can influence this susceptibility or vulnerability. The implication of this analysis is that push and pull factors should be reduced and protective factors should be reinforced ([32]).

Gender

Every radicalisation process is a highly individual trajectory where different factors play a role. What we see is that next to all other listed factors, gender and gender dynamics influence the radicalisation trajectory. Norms associated with femininity and masculinity impact the reactions and actions of a person. In addition, some push factors such as fascination with violence or sexual frustration are more likely to play a role in the radicalisation process of men than in the process of women. Take for example the incels, where concepts of masculinity and sexual frustration are openly discussed. In right-wing extremist groups gender dynamics and stereotypes also play an important role; for example, female recruiters of right-wing extremist groups use narratives of sisterhood and friendship, in which they encourage women to find their true happiness by joining them, since mainstream society is dominated by feminists forcing women to go against their supposed natural instincts of becoming a housewife and mother ([33]). Another important fact to mention is that traumatic experiences have different impact on men and women and provoke different reactions and behaviour ([34]).

([29]) Bjørgo, T. (forthcoming). Conceptualising diversity among violent extremists - typology and a model for explaining change. In M. Obaidi & J. R. Kunst (Eds), *Cambridge handbook of the psychology of violent extremism*. Cambridge University Press.
([30]) Radicalisation Awareness Network. Al-Attar, Z. (2019). Extremism, radicalisation & mental health: Handbook for practitioners. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-11/ran_h-sc_handbook-for-practitioners_extremism-radicalisation-mental-health_112019_en.pdf
([31]) Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). *Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism in the West*. Rowman & Littlefield.
([32]) Bjørgo, T. (forthcoming). Conceptualising diversity among violent extremists - typology and a model for explaining change. In M. Obaidi & J. R. Kunst (Eds), *Cambridge handbook of the psychology of violent extremism*. Cambridge University Press.
([33]) Leidig, E. (2023). *The women of the far-right: Social media influencers and online radicalization*. Columbia University Press.
([34]) Radicalisation Awareness Network. Deniz, F. & Meines, M. (2023). *RAN Mental Health: Trauma, violent extremism and masculinity*. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/af7b3488-4127-4715-9f36-30abd59627a7_en?filename=ran_mental_health_trauma_violent_extremism_and_masculinity_20-21062023_en.pdf

Typology of radicalising persons

Although reasons to radicalise into violent extremism or terrorism can be highly individual, it is possible to point out some common denominators [35]. In 2007, Annette Linden and Bert Klanderman distinguished between four different types of radicalising persons [36]. In 2019, Nikki Sterkenburg added a fifth type to this typology [37,38] that was then again reshuffled in 2024 by Tore Bjørgo [39]. This now adds up to six different personas.

1. **Thrill seekers / Adventurers** are stimulated by the sense of adventure in many extremist activities. They tend to become active at a very young age (i.e. between the ages of 12 and 16), for example in local neo-Nazi or skinhead groups. Their first engagement in extremism is often in the form of anti-social or provocative behaviour such as rioting, vandalism and street fights. They usually have a fascination with violence and weapons.
2. **Political seekers** are usually seeking support and driven by political engagement. They tend to view themselves as saviours defending the people of "the nation" or "the umma". Members of this group have often tried to be or were previously politically active at national or local level and have been disillusioned or disappointed.
3. **Option seekers / Misfits** are characterised by strong feelings of abandonment by their government. They tend to have been raised in disadvantaged circumstances that necessitated daily struggle. They may be angry and frustrated. Members of this group will have observed and been affected by the fact that many of their hard-working, law-abiding peers cannot overcome their strained circumstances or achieve material success due to their identity, looks or background.
4. **Social seekers / Followers** often find themselves playing an active role in an extremist movement without realising it. They are driven by social needs and motivated by the desire to please or support a friend, they join demonstrations or distribute flyers. Although they can have feelings of dissatisfaction, they are not ideologically driven.
5. **Ideological seekers / Ideologists** usually become radicalised online before meeting like-minded people offline. Their ideas are strengthened by alternative (online) media and interaction with like-minded people (online and offline).
6. **Traditionalists** are born into and raised in extremist families and social environments and socialised into extremism or terrorism.

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[35] Linden, A., & Klandermans, B. (2007). Revolutionaries, wanderers, converts, and compliants. Life histories of extreme right activists. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 36*(2), 184-201. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891241606298824

[36] Ibid.

[37] Radicalisation Awareness Network. Sterkenburg, N. (2019). *Far-right extremism: A practical introduction*. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-12/ran_fre_factbook_20191205_en.pdf

[38] Sterkenburg, N. (2021). *Van actie tot zelfverwezenlijking: routes van toetreding tot radicaal- en extreemrechts* [Doctoral dissertation, Leiden University]. Scholarly Publications Leiden University. https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3176648

[39] Bjørgo, T. (forthcoming). Conceptualising diversity among violent extremists - typology and a model for explaining change. In M. Obaidi & J. R. Kunst (Eds), *Cambridge handbook of the psychology of violent extremism*. Cambridge University Press.

Further reading, listening or watching

List of relevant research, articles, papers, podcasts and videos elaborating on specific factors, aspects and types of extremism:

1. ***Mental health aspects:*** Zainab Al-Attar, 'Extremism, Radicalisation & Mental Health: Handbook for Practitioners', Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7bc6efae-4638-4650-b634-c117fad8aeed_en?filename=ran_h-sc_handbook-for-practitioners_extremism-radicalisation-mental-health_112019_en.pdf

2. ***Trauma and other trigger mechanisms:*** Feline Deniz and Marije Meines, 'RAN Mental Health: Trauma, violent extremism and masculinity', Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2023. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/af7b3488-4127-4715-9f36-30abd59627a7_en?filename=ran_mental_health_trauma_violent_extremism_and_masculinity_20-21062023_en.pdf

3. ***(Geo) political mobilisation factors:*** 'RAN in Focus - podcast: Current socio-economic challenges and the impact on extremism', Radicalisation Awareness Network, 24 November 2023. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/ran-media/ran-podcasts_en

4. ***Gamification:*** RAN Spotlight on Games, Gaming and Gamification, June 2023. **Fout! De hyperlinkverwijzing is ongeldig.**https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e1c089f1-3c5d-4d15-af49-6fe07666fc3f_en?filename=spotlight_on_gamification_062023_en.pdf

5. ***Conspiracy narratives:*** Alexander Ritzmann and Ulrike Schiesser, 'Dealing with conspiracy narratives in the close social environment: A practical handbook to help the helpers', Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2024. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/04e118cc-71c6-44ea-aa04-f973175bd7c2_en?filename=ran_dealing_with_conspiracy_narratives_in_close_social_environment_122023_en.pdf

6. ***Anti-system and anti-government extremism (ASAGE):*** Boy Broeders, Carlijn Binnendijk and Steven Lenos, 'Dealing with anti-system/anti-government attitudes and extremism among young people', Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2024. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/bb8dc322-b6c6-4bbc-b3fa-6ae04efcd672_en?filename=ran_ye_dealing_with_problematic_manifestations_of_extreme_left_29-02_01032024_en.pdf

7. ***Islamist extremism:*** Magnus Ranstorp, 'Islamist Extremism: A Practical Introduction', Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-01/ran_factbook_islamist_extremism_december_2019_en.pdf

8. ***Right wing extremism:*** Nikki Sterkenburg, 'Far-Right Extremism: A Practical Introduction', Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-12/ran_fre_factbook_20191205_en.pdf

9. ***Role of women in right wing extremism:*** Eviane Leidig, 'The Women of the Far Right', Diggit Magazine podcast, 13 November 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFM2JPFqOtg

10. ***Incels:*** Moonshot Researcher, 'Incels: A First Scan of the Phenomenon (in the EU) and its Relevance and Challenges for P/CVE', Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2021. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/02d19d72-ecf4-4643-a9d2-86f803ccc031_en?filename=ran_incels_first_scan_of_phenomen_and_relevance_challenges_for_p-cve_202110_en.pdf

11. ***Radicalisation of opinion or of action:*** Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, 'Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model', American Psychologist 2017, Vol. 72, No 3, 205-216. https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-amp0000062.pdf

12. ***Gender aspects:*** Rositsa Dzhekova and Ariane Wolf, 'Gender-specificity in practical P/CVE: Reviewing RAN Practitioners' activities in 2021', Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2022. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-08/ran_ad-hoc_gender_in_pcve_15082022_en.pdf

13. ***Gender aspects:*** RAN Podcast, 'RAN in Focus: Gender in P/CVE', Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i02OvuJay1Y

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