REPORT
on right-wing extremism: a study visit in Sweden
LED IN 2019
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
General introduction

In its final report of 18 May 2018, the high-level Commission expert group on radicalisation (HLCEG-R) recommended creating a new collaborative format: ‘project-based collaborations’, led by Member States with the support of the Commission.

The purpose and added value of project-based collaborations was to allow like-minded Member States to collaborate through a series of meetings to produce specific deliverables that helped implement better policy responses.

Following input received from the Member States, the Commission organised in 2019 seven projects with various formats: study visits, workshops or combination of study visits and workshops.

Each group working on a project validated a final report with guidance and recommendations.
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM:
A STUDY VISIT IN SWEDEN
I. Introduction

The report lists the main challenges, priority issues and recommendations related to far-right extremism, as identified during a study visit to Borlänge in Sweden, under the framework of the project-based collaboration. This study visit considered local issues in the county of Dalarna and wider considerations in Sweden and in the six other participating Member States: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The aim of this report is to bring to the attention of all EU Member States the findings of this study visit, and to serve as a basis for discussing the issue of far-right extremism at a broader European level.

Sweden had proposed this study visit in order to understand the specific local context of far-right extremism in the area of Borlänge and Ludvika (county of Dalarna). The objective was also to learn about experiences of far-right extremism from the other Member States, to understand the different approaches and learn from each other about managing the risks posed by far-right extremist groups.

II. Participating Member States and organisations

Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, European Commission, the Radicalisation Awareness Network, the European Strategic Communications Network and Europol.

III. Main insights

a) Summary

The participants agreed that far-right extremism was a threat to democracy, because the *modus operandi* of such groups is to threaten those that speak out against racism and hate. They threaten politicians, government workers, journalists, civil society actors, teachers, students, with the aim of silencing their voices. Although the case of the presence of the Nordic Resistance Movement in Sweden poses specific challenges, Member States can usefully learn from each other’s experience in responding to far-right extremist groups.
Today there is a notable cooperation between far-right extremist groups in Europe and USA.

One area where the Member States would welcome cooperation is in identifying effective tools for law enforcement and public authorities on the legal boundaries between hate speech and free speech, and in clarifying the circumstances under which action by far-right extremists is considered illegal and/or constitutes terrorism. Such clarity may also help in taking action against threats of violence that often go unreported.

Another area is banning of organisations. When considering whether to ban a group, it is important to have in mind the objective of the ban: whether it is, for example, to stop hate, incitement, or protect public order etc. It is recommended to see whether these objectives can be achieved through disruption of activities rather than by banning the group. Some of the potential results of a ban is that organisations change name, go underground or go abroad.

The spread of online hate and propaganda was another issue faced by all Member States, in particular as far-right groups are increasing their organisation and cooperation across Europe and beyond.

At local level, Member States could usefully exchange experiences on how to develop local action plans involving communities, local governments, civil society, schools, students, newspapers and private companies, as well as research. There has been a trend in Sweden and elsewhere in far-right extremist groups moving to certain areas in the countryside to gather as a community. This has resulted in a complex local situation in the county of Dalarna and difficulties in developing prevention work due to threats and fear.

One specific area that requires greater understanding is assessing the reasons why people join and leave far-right extremist groups. Testimony from former extremists can help us understand the complexities of this process. Member States could usefully exchange their research findings and experience with exit programmes to this end.

Further recommendations are included at the end of the report.

b) Context and definitions

Tore Bjørø from the University of Oslo’s Centre for Extremism Research (C-REX) presented a figure that aims to clarify the definitions of the far-right movement.
The figure shows that within the far right, there are organisations that support democracy and those that don’t. White supremacy or racism is not the only ideology (racial nationalism) that drives some of these groups. There are groups that claim not to be racist but believe that western culture must be protected against Muslim immigration (cultural nationalism), or that people with different ethnic origins should not mix (ethnic nationalism). However, the distinction between the three types of nationalism is blurred, and people move from one to the other and collaborate. It is also important to acknowledge that some political parties could be categorised as belonging to the radical right. If we want to prevent far-right extremism, we should probably focus on the extreme right and at the same time beware of the radical right as there are ideological links.

All violent attacks based on any of the above beliefs may qualify as right-wing violence, but to be considered as terrorism, the violence should be pre-meditated with the aim of installing fear in the wider population. In many Member States right-wing violence may be defined as hate crime, which can also include non-violent acts such as hate speech. Not all Member States define hate crime or hate speech in the same manner, some explicitly cover hatred against LGBT or women, others not. This makes it difficult to compare hate crime statistics. In addition, not all hate crime is motivated by far-right extremism.

Statistics of right-wing terrorism in Western Europe and the USA is based on the work of Jacob Asland Ravndal\(^1\), who looked at the number of deadly attacks that qualify as terrorism by national legislation. There was a peak in the 1990s, in the form of attacks against

\(^1\) Jacob Aasland Ravndal: Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe (data from 2016-2018 are updates and not yet published).
refugees, but the general trend has been decreasing until the recent surge in violence in connection to the refugee crisis in 2016. However, the trend is going down again.

Compared to attacks by Islamic extremists, attacks by far-right extremists are of smaller scale but more frequent. Between 2001-2016, 179 people were killed in 85 attacks in western Europe. Research shows that Sweden has the highest number of extreme-right murders per capita, followed by Germany, mainly targeting immigrants, left-wing activists and the homeless.

There is a general shift in far-right extremist activities away from street movements such as the skinhead movements of the 1980s, towards online activism and lone actors. These include the Breivik case in Norway, who killed 77 people and inspired other attacks such as the recent one in Christchurch. Acting alone and in isolated cells reduces the risk of detection. Breivik made the calculation between risk and arrest and as a result chose to act alone.

**c) Overview of challenges**

There is a broad consensus among participating Member States that far-right extremism is a threat to democracy, mainly because of the tactics they use to silence political opponents, civic leaders and the media with threats. This is in particular the case in Sweden but also to a lesser extent in other Member States. According to the Swedish Security Service, a xenophobic and radical nationalist flow of ideas has increased in society, especially on the internet. The white power movement and the looser radical right and xenophobic groups are coming closer to each other and can be a driving force for individuals to commit hate crimes and even terrorism.

The **Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM)** in the county of Dalarna is the biggest threat to local democracy. The NRM has roots in the region since the 1930s ever since the Nazis set foot in the region, and continue to advocate for supporters to move into the region, therefore their ideology is ‘passed on’ for generations. The NRM has participated in local elections and had a seat in the local parliament between 2014-2018. Their presence in the region means that large international businesses such as Spendrups brewery and ABB electricity find it
difficult to employ and keep staff. The NRM uses threats and vandalism to drive people away and to silence journalists, politicians and civil servants working at local level.

The NRM is also present in Finland and increasingly cooperates cross-border with other groups in the region, such as the Soldiers of Odin, a vigilante group with the aim to protect society from crime. Finland banned the NRM, and the court found that the group was not entitled to freedom of speech protections as its actions violated other people’s human rights. The case is currently in appeal at the Supreme Court while a temporary ban applies. The NRM is active in all Nordic countries, trying to build a political party and a national socialist state. NRM has a stronghold along the Swedish-Finnish border area and they see themselves as a single entity across the region, to show power, although there is some in-fighting as they are not ready to lose their leadership in each country. Their rhetoric is to close the borders and to target politicians and journalists that support refugees. They also threaten judges and court procedures, therefore they constitute a threat to society and the rule of law.

In some countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium, the highest threat comes from lone actors inspired by hate speech, in a highly polarised societal and political climate. Therefore a useful approach to combat far-right extremism is not driven by ideology, but by engaging at local level. Neither countries have seen many violent incidents, and while it is important to create awareness of far-right extremism, it should not take attention away from violent Islamist extremism. Both countries see the growing online threat of far-right extremism as a challenge. Belgium however has also seen the infiltration of far-right groups in mainstream politics: i.e. the founder of Schild&Vriend, poster boy Dries van Langenhove, joined Vlaams Belang to gains seats in the national and European elections. This generation of young identitarians organised a march of more than 5,000 people against the Marrakesh Pact with their objective being to ‘march through the institutions’.

France too has seen an increase in far-right extremist groups since 2017. These groups have justified assaults on the Muslim community, on politicians and journalists, and on the left wing. In April 2018, the group ‘Operation Forces Action’ was planning to attack mosques and imams and to poison halal food; they had weapons from abroad and tested explosives. Many far-right extremist groups are inspired by Breivik and have cross-border cooperation.
with groups in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany and together they participate in demonstrations in other countries.

Far-right extremist groups and individuals vary in their ideology and activities and the United Kingdom categorises these groups accordingly. The UK distinguishes between the far right (anti-Islam, counter jihad, patriotism, street movements) and the extreme far right (neo-Nazi, racial narratives, anti-Semitism, more extreme ideology). However, they see both categories as being equally prone to use violence, and recognise that the threat is most likely to be from lone actors.

The ESCN’s thematic paper on ‘How the (violent) Extreme Right Radicalises the Mainstream in Europe’ agrees that it is difficult to know whom we are talking about. However, they found common themes among the groups, including the use of algorithmic activism: posting online and by liking and commenting on Facebook posts, others pick it up and reproduce its content to have more reach. These groups also look to use the mainstream media and have a contradictory relationship with the media, as they are happy to exploit it when they get attention, but when facing criticism, they dismiss media as fake news.

Generally, the far-right movement believes in free speech and questions the legitimacy of established media, and of censoring dissenting voices. They use simple and dramatic language and soften their language or use humour to attract audiences. For instance, memes can disguise radical messages as humour. The target audience is shifting to connect with young people, often well-educated and middle class. The group ‘Generation Identity’, for example, has a solid foothold in France, Germany and Austria, is far less violent, and focuses on recruiting students online through social media. Its softer image makes it difficult to label them as extreme far right, as they seem to be part of the mainstream.

The Radicalisation Awareness Network explained what practitioners see as the major challenges. Many groups are active at local level, and local administrations lack the legal basis needed to challenge the extreme far-right’s activities. Although far-right extremists are undermining the rule of law, it is often difficult to define what is illegal. Local authorities, such as the police, teachers, local government, need advice from the government on how to tackle freedom of speech.

d) Actions and recommendations

Participants discussed four important areas of action to counter and prevent far-right extremism.

1. Legislative measures to tackling far-right extremist groups

Sweden is currently considering different instruments to counter the threat of far-right extremism. A national plan to combat racism and hate crime is in place since 2016, and new instruments are being considered such as expanding the security police, providing special grants to counter hate crimes, e.g. for special hate crime groups in police, registering hate speech to enable the collection of data, and increased police monitoring, subject to new legislation being developed on data retention.

Some Member States have considered banning far-right groups, and some have taken action. Finland’s ban of the Nordic Resistance Movement received positive feedback from the general public in Finland. However, when considering a ban, one of the possible outcomes is that organisations can go underground or go abroad, as was the case of ‘National Action’ in the United Kingdom. On the positive side, the ban allowed law enforcement agencies to investigate the group’s members, even though they were part of new groups.
In some countries, such as Sweden, freedom of organisation and demonstration is part of the constitution, with some exceptions such as setting up militias or organisations that persecute ethnic groups. Therefore, when consider banning far-right extremist groups, new legislation would be needed to define which types of groups/organisations could be banned, depending on the threat level of extremism and subject to broad political support.

Another challenge for the Member States is to define what extremist acts can be defined as terrorism. Finland records extremist crimes (around 100 per year) of which about half are committed by far-right extremists. These crimes are recorded as petty crimes and hate crime, which typically get short sentences. Extremist acts can be considered as terrorism, depending on the impact of the act, but the tipping point between violence driven by racist motives and terrorism is not clearly defined.

Recommendations

- There is a need to collate all possible legal or administrative measures that authorities can take, and have regular meetings with security, intelligence and local prosecutor’s office to understand what actions can be taken. A long-term strategy is important and it may be useful to consider other countries’ actions and experiences. A ban could be an option if there is a public threat, but not on ideological grounds, as that could lead to an erosion of democracy.

- In considering banning a group, it is important to have in mind the objective of a potential ban: is it to stop hate, incitement, protect public order etc., and to see whether these objectives can be achieved through disruption instead of a ban. For example, to forbid meetings for security reasons, or put them in places where they don’t get so much attention. In case of a ban of an organisation, it is important to communicate to the public the reasons for the ban and explain why other organisations were not banned.

- Targeting members of the organisation could afford potential advantages against banning an organisation, using the same methods as in prosecuting organised crime, making it difficult for organisations to act by requiring permits for renting facilities, and through working together with companies and civil society. However, it is also important to take into consideration that far-right groups like NRM aim to start a revolution, therefore they cannot be compared to organised crime.

- Reporting of incidents including vandalism, threats should be encouraged with visible police response, condemnations for graffiti, tags, racist slogans, racist Twitter and Facebook accounts, and to be more present talking to individuals in the community, so that such acts do not remain without consequence and to enable civilians to build trust within the community.

2. Actions at local level

Small municipalities like Borlänge or Ludvika in Sweden suffer, as they sometimes do not dare to speak out. Police have a difficult job in gaining the trust of the people and groups affected as they cannot always take action due to ambiguities in the law (as discussed above). This has an effect on people’s trust in institutions, such as the police. The perception that the institutions not doing anything about the problem, confirms the narrative of the far-right. It is a challenge that these organisations are both fast and skilled at picking up local situations that affect people and targeting local communities with this information. They tend to be good at listening to the issues that upset people in the local communities and exploiting these issues.
Problems at local level are visible in every part of society. In Dalarna, the newspaper reported one incident to the police in which six NMR supporters stood outside the newspaper building, broadcasting their message with a megaphone and burning newspapers. They photographed and filmed the event and posted a film clip on the website Nordfront. The police and prosecutors closed the preliminary investigation twice but resumed it after comments from the newspaper. No decision on prosecution has yet been taken.

Since the 2016 refugee crises, the area around the town of Ludvika has received refugees in 11 asylum accommodations. The NMR stepped up their action, going to schools to recruit kids and threatening refugee children, for example by putting messages on school walls such as ‘Rapefugees not welcome’.

The charity ‘Save the Children’ organises roundtable meetings on the child’s perspective, including representatives from the church, the children’s ombudsman, psychologists, formers, national and local level administration. However, participants to the meetings receive threats and the NRM has asked for records of emails of the meetings and participants.

Reports published by the Ombudsman for Children in Sweden stress similarities between social and economically disadvantaged suburbs in big cities and in isolated rural areas. There is low trust in civil servants, as young people in particular do not feel that they are represented. Young people in Dalarna talked about isolation and not being able to make decisions about their own community. ‘Save the Children’ wants to broaden the perspective, to work with children to get their rights fulfilled and to create resilience against the far right. Teachers themselves do not dare to speak up against the NRM.

There must, however, be local ownership of the problem and of the solution, with support from the national authorities. In Dalarna, two of the biggest and internationally oriented companies, Spendrups Brewery and ABB Electricity, have joined forces with Dalarna and Gothenburg universities to carry out research into far-right extremism, to understand what makes people join and leave such groups. Both companies have or have had NRM members as members of staff, which makes the challenge more complicated.
Recommendations

➢ National authorities must support local authorities by providing information about individuals and assessing their needs in a multi-agency setting.

For example, Belgium keeps a central database of all potential violent extremists, included because they had expressed extremist ideas, justified the use of violence or shown indications of violence. A monthly meeting is organised with all services nationally, including local task forces (police, intelligence, prosecutors, office for foreign nationals), to discuss the best measures for each person in the database. It is a social preventive mechanism, and local authorities get information on each person so that they can carry out their legal duty to convene a board of social workers specialised in prevention to work with each person via local task forces.

➢ Threats silence people, need to be able to demonstrate the fact that this is the modus operandi of far-right extremist groups. Local authorities should be supported to develop a plan of action.

➢ Community projects that promote social inclusion should involve young people to help build trust in the authorities and prevent radicalisation. Projects could focus on for example sport, using role models.

➢ The ‘credible messenger’ approach should be used to support local communication strategies and mentoring programmes, such as by bringing in war veterans (e.g. in Finland) to support young people or pensioners in schools as ‘school granddads/grandmas’ to support children and young people in school.

➢ Prevention work should not be separate from work to support democracy. Young people should be involved in solutions and create their own initiatives in a positive and inclusive context that rejects hate. Young people want democratic dialogue and are concerned about being labelled as racists who come from Ludvika.

➢ There is a need to strengthen public services that listen to youth, as the absence of these channels of engagement may open the door for the NRM to have a greater appeal to young people with the aim of recruiting them.

➢ Teachers need guidance on how to handle difficult questions and how to approach children and young people when demonstrating or when standing up against racist behaviour.

➢ A support system should be put in place for victims of hate and violent extremism, such as the Swedish ‘Don’t be silent’ campaign (in Swedish: https://www.tystnainte.se/).

3. Online/propaganda of far-right extremists

Although there are many different far-right extremist groups, most of them have in common that they communicate about whiteness and violence and use irony. One well-known online campaign was the ‘It’s OK to be white campaign’ on 4chan. The campaign included guidelines on how to spread the message globally. ‘Defendevropa’ is an example of an organisation
that participated in the campaign. Their underlying message is that European beauty and identity needs to be preserved.

Far-right groups are also experts at irony, such as the NRM message: ‘Guns don't kill people, niggers aren’t people’. They use specific symbols related to Adolf Hitler’s birthday 4/20, the number 88 for the Nazi salute ‘Heil Hitler’ as the letter H is eighth in the alphabet, whereby 88 becomes HH, or the number 14 for David Eden Lane’s 14 words: ‘We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children’.

Common symbols used in communication are Pepe the frog and Skurt (a green figure from a Swedish programme for children). Another symbol is the word ‘Finspång’, which refers to a fictitious future trial in a Swedish town called Finspång, where everyone who betrayed Sweden is executed or put to work in concentration camps after the revolution. In far-right extremist communication, it is common to single out Jewish people online by putting their names in triple brackets (((x))). Sweden has also seen occurrences of online listings of Jewish people.
It has become harder to detect extremist content through the use of memes and irony. Deciding whether to close pages is a balancing act, as this makes far-right groups feel like victims and confirms their rhetoric. If they are banned from sites and platforms, the groups invent their own forums.

Organised hate campaigns, disinformation and hate speech are a challenge. It is important to follow developments and platforms that produce disinformation aimed at sowing distrust in government and at destabilising society.

Hate speech is the biggest threat to the freedom of speech because people, public figures and journalists are afraid to speak up against violent extremist groups. It is also important to be aware that free speech is being weaponised. Mindful of the risk of being accused of censorship, governments struggle to define what constitutes hate speech. In addition, symbols and tactics change over time, making it even more challenging.

Dalarna Newspaper has reported violent hatred and threats to journalists and attempts to silence free speech. The NRM’s presence affects the newspaper and it is a fine balancing act to explain to people how extreme they are without playing into their hands. Freedom of expression is important, and Dalarna Newspaper has guidelines on how to cover extremists: avoid exposing their symbols, do not air demonstrations on live television, show a journalistic selection of photos and videos on the website, do not report on all their actions. Individual reporters are told not to debate with NMR but to refer them to the chief editor, to shield them from threats. They also organise counter demonstrations, which have become many times bigger than the NRM’s 1 May demonstrations.

Finland plans to publish a report on hate speech, making a distinction between those who spread hate speech and those that just read it, and on organised hate speech spreading. The Archbishop of Finland heads the task force that will produce the report, and will look at examples from court cases to draw the line between freedom of speech and hate speech.

In France, the national authority [https://defenseurdesdroits.fr](https://defenseurdesdroits.fr) has put in place a national helpline and online notification system for anybody that feels their rights have not been respected.
There are well-known hate sites such as https://stormfront.org, https://dailystormer.name and https://gab.com/home that advocate for free speech. As they get shut down, their web address changes periodically. Niche online spaces like 4chan 8chan are used to publicise hate content without moderation.

Before the Swedish elections, the NRM webpage was active and gave the impression of being a strong group and that you belong to something powerful (2016 voted for NRM in the national election in 2018, 20 290 voted for Alternative for Sweden, a far-right party). In addition, their tactics are changing to attract more supporters, using hashtags like #nuisanceimmigration, using mainstream words and abbreviations. Their new image is also more white-collar, upright member of society. Even though some of these groups do not openly advocate violence, they aim to create chaos, sow distrust in institutions and inspire others to act. In addition, far-right political groups are now getting advice from political campaigners such as Steve Bannon and help with algorithmic activism to spread memes and fake news.

There are notable effects on mainstreaming far-right messages and normalising them. This is affecting politicians and the silent majority. The new far right is targeting a wider audience.

**Recommendations**

- The research process is important to understand the target audiences of far-right extremists. ESCN research shows that young people are aware and most of the time know when they are being manipulated, and understand the irony and jokes. However, we lack focus on the adults who spread hate messages.

- Technology can help identify hate speech automatically. Governments still lack online expertise and should recruit experts. International cooperation could help boost learning about technology and online tactics. The Swedish Defence Research Agency is working on automated detection of right-wing extremist hate speech online.

- The role of traditional media and online platforms is important in affording attention to far-right extremists and reporting responsibly about their activities, as far-right groups become more organised and inspire others to act. It is important to bring journalists and companies together to understand the impact of media coverage and to build bridges between media and research.
➢ It is important to raise awareness and increase education among the general public to enable them to distinguish between hate speech and free speech, and facilitate to recognise extremist content online so that the general public does not spread hate speech, even when it is funny. People should also be encouraged to report hate speech.

➢ The same tactics used by the far right can also be used against them, such as demonstrations. What is missing is constant strategic communication by civil society organisations that have the credibility to deliver the message. It would be important to identify credible voices within society and empower them to speak up. For example, the CONTRA project funded by the European Commission produced a manual for teachers to make young people aware of propaganda and empower them to use their own voice.

4. Exit strategies

Ideology is important to far-right extremists, but it is rarely the reason why they join far-right groups. Often it is about violence, proving masculinity or for other social reasons, such as fellowship. During the study visit, a former far-right extremist was present and told participants how he joined the movement and how he left. His story from 16 to 35 years goes from violence to ideologically motivated violence to organised crime. The turning point was the feeling of isolation. He started to doubt the ideology when Muslims became his friends in prison. The tipping point for him to leave after 20 years was a telephone call from his four-year-old child when he was in prison, not initiated either by a prison and probation officer or an exit worker. Today he is working to help individuals leave the far-right extremist movement and organised crime.

Exit programmes are organised differently in Member States and regions. Some are organised by non-governmental organisations, where the advantage is that they could be more easily trusted by those who want to leave, as it is quite common that they distrust the authorities. Other programmes are organised at national level, where the advantage is that the programmes are better funded. It is important to define the objectives of exit programmes. Is the goal to stop criminal activities or change the mindset of an individual? Or both? Tore Bjørgo from C-REX in Norway is working in a research project about these issues. To indicate where an individual is in their extremist career, but also to develop exit strategies, Bjørgo states that is important to take account of five dimensions:

- radicalisation, worldview and ideological belief,
- engagement in extremist activities,
- participation in criminal activities,
- social marginalisation/integration,
- mental health issues, depression, trauma, victimisation etc.

In general, when you work with people involved in organised crime or in violent extremism, it is easier to work with people who are motivated to leave. Exit workers, who could be a prison and probation officer, member of the police, a social worker, or someone in a civil society organisation, do not need to have a personal background in extremism to be effective, but they need to have the right skills and personality to work with these individuals.
Recommendations

- There needs to be several possibilities to leave a violent extremist movement. The individuals in these movement should be asked if they want to leave and get a clear picture of what kind of support they could get from society.

- The prison and probation service should work with exit programs/strategies. Right-wing extremists individuals, convicted and in prison, should be targeted with measures of reintegration and rehabilitation.

- The police and local authorities should provide measures, for example threat assessment, and support individuals to leave right-wing extremist groups, by helping them to find jobs, and with social integration, mental health issues etc., and also to defend these activities and individuals vis-a-vis the press and resistance from the community.

- Society should provide funding for civil society organisations active in running exit programmes.

- It is important to invest in evaluating the impact of exit programmes and to understand the process of individuals leaving behind their extremist past. It would be useful to have at national level an open collection of practices, good and bad, as municipalities and local police need to understand how best to approach the problem.

- The five dimensions of an individual's extremist 'career' is visible in the stories of far-right extremists and can serve both as a way of exploring the way into extremism, and to develop methodologies for setting up exit programmes.

- It is important to support exit workers that have the right mindset for the work and want to help individuals. Some exit workers work in an unofficial capacity with people who are not registered in exit programmes.